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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters in the field of labor economics related to
worker promotion, hierarchical levels, and wage growth.
Chapter two examines the impact of the skill requirements of an occupation
on the likelihood that a worker receives a promotion. Promotion data are taken
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, while skill requirements
data come from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. I find that the higher
the cognitive skill requirement of an occupation, and the lower the motor and
strength skill requirements, the higher the probability that the worker receives
a promotion. Introducing skill requirements reduces the effect of the worker’s
Armed Forces Qualification Test score on promotion, while it increases the gen-
der gap in promotion.
Chapter three assesses the importance of hierarchical levels to skill accu-
mulation and career outcomes by estimating an occupational choice model. Us-
ing labor market history data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, and task
usage data from the German Qualification and Career Survey, I demonstrate
that hierarchical level significantly impacts labor market outcomes and task
usage within the occupation. To capture these features of the data, I build
an occupational choice model with levels where workers accumulate both task-
specific and occupation-specific human capital through learning-by-doing. I
use indirect inference to estimate versions of the model with and without lev-
els. Omitting hierarchical levels causes occupation-specific human capital to
ii
be underestimated in the blue-collar occupation, and task-specific human cap-
ital to be underestimated in the white-collar occupation. In the model with
levels, eliminating occupation-specific skill accumulation reduces mean wage
level by 16.6%, while eliminating task-specific skill accumulation results in a
29.8% reduction.
Chapter four is coauthored with Jed DeVaro and Antti Kauhanen. We in-
vestigate the theory that promotion serves as a signal of worker ability using
the German Socio-Economic Panel and the Confederation of Finnish Indus-
tries. Controlling for worker performance using bonus data and performance-
related-pay, we find that promotion probabilities are increasing in educational
attainment whereas wage increases from promotion are decreasing in educa-
tional attainment for some educational groups, with both results stronger for
first than for subsequent promotions. Women have lower promotion probabil-
ities than men, though this difference dissipates after first promotions. Evi-
dence of promotion signaling is stronger for within-firm than for across-firm
promotions.
iii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The underlying themes of my dissertation are worker promotion and hierar-
chical level. In chapter two, I investigate the effects of job characteristics, as
measured by the skill requirement of a job, on the probability that a worker
receives a promotion. In chapter three, I estimate a structural occupational
choice model where occupations are composed of hierarchical levels. Chapter
four, which is co-authored with Jed DeVaro and Antti Kauhanen, tests the role
of promotions in signalling worker ability using two European data sets.
Promotions are a common and important type of labor market mobility that
McCue (1996) estimates contributes approximately 15% to wage growth over
the worker’s lifetime. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a large lit-
erature that investigates promotions and the roles that they play. Theoretical
models of promotions include three main frameworks. First, Lazear and Rosen
(1981) model promotions as rewards in tournaments to induce worker effort.
2Second, Waldman (1984) analyzes the effect of promotion as a signalling device,
where outside firms see only a worker’s hierarchical level (and thus a change
in hierarchical level). Lastly, Gibbons and Waldman (1999) model promotions
as the movement of workers to a job assignment with higher returns to ability.
There have been numerous empirical studies that investigate the effects of job
level on worker outcomes such as wages. Notably, Baker, Gibbs, and Holm-
stro¨m (1994) study a large U.S. financial services firm and document many
stylized facts, including that wages are closely tied to job level, and changes in
job level correspond to large changes in wages.
In chapter two, I investigate the determinants of promotions using the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. While there is a large literature
in this area, it has focused mainly on the impacts of worker characteristics
on promotion probability. The role of gender in promotion, investigated by
Cobb-Clark (2001) and Pekkarinen and Vartiainen (2010), among others, has
received particular attention.1 While there has been some investigation of the
effects of job characteristics on promotion, work in this area is minimal. This
chapter partly addresses this gap by investigating how the skills required to
perform a job impact the probability that a worker receives a promotion. I
assign skill requirements to each Census occupation using data from the Dic-
tionary of Occupational Titles. This provides a four-dimensional vector for each
occupation that describes the Cognitive, Interpersonal, Manual, and Strength
1Other works including Pergamit (1999) and da Silva and van der Klaaw (2011) investigate
the impact of promotion “type”, e.g. one where the worker reports to a new supervisor versus
has the same supervisor, and find that promotion type of also important to wage outcomes.
3skill requirements in that occupation. I use this vector as my control for job
characteristics, and run probit estimations to determine what effect skill re-
quirements have on the likelihood that a worker receives a promotion.
I find that workers in more cognitively-intense occupations have signifi-
cantly higher probabilities of receiving a promotion. Higher motor and strength
skill requirements decrease the probability of a worker receiving a promotion,
while the effect of the interpersonal skill is either negative or insignificant.
In addition to impacting promotion receipt directly, the inclusion of these job
characteristics changes the effects of other variables. The effect of education
is reduced by 40% when skills are introduced, while a similar reduction occurs
in the importance of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores. I also
find that omitting job characteristics causes the gender gap in promotion to
be significantly understated: without skill requirement controls, women are
18.5% less likely than men to be promoted in a given year, while with skill re-
quirements this difference rises to 29.5% points. I also find little evidence that
skill requirement affects the wage change upon promotion, which might offset
the impact of higher promotion probability. Overall, these results point to the
importance of controlling for job characteristics when investigating promotion
outcomes.
In chapter three, I investigate the role of hierarchical level on both occu-
pational mobility and wage growth. I use the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP), since it contains information about workers’ hierarchical levels. I
4confirm previous studies that find job level significantly impacts worker wages.
I also show that the probability of occupational change is higher for work-
ers in the lowest hierarchical level. Lastly, workers who experience an un-
employment spell and return to a lower hierarchical level than in their pre-
unemployment job suffer significantly higher wage losses (roughly 10%) than
those who return to the same or a higher level. The latter two empirical ob-
servations confirm the importance of level not only to overall wages, but also
to job mobility and wage change. They also point to the existence of alloca-
tional frictions in the job search process, where workers are not free to move to
their preferred occupation-level immediately. I investigate this possibility by
estimating an occupational choice model where each occupation is composed of
multiple levels and where workers must receive a job offer to change jobs.
In my model, hierarchical levels within an occupation are characterized by
their task usages. These describe what types of activities a worker performs on
the job. Poletaev and Robinson (2008) use tasks to investigate the transferabil-
ity of human capital, and find that workers who are displaced and return to
“closer” occupations (that is, occupations with similar task usages) suffer lower
wage losses than those who return from unempoyment to “farther” occupations.
Yamaguchi (2010, 2012), and Sanders (2012) use this measure of an occupation
- the task usage vector - to replace occupations and simplify computational bur-
den: instead of a worker searching over a large set of discrete occupations, they
search over a small set of task usages. One of the drawbacks of current work,
5however, is that tasks are typically assigned based on a worker’s occupation
alone. This is because panel data sets with task usage information are rare.
As a result, task usage by occupation is estimated in another data set and as-
signed to workers in the panel data set based on their occupation. However,
Autor and Handel (2013) find that task usages vary significantly within oc-
cupations. Thus, assigning tasks based only on occupation misses potentially
important task usage variation. Task usage data are taken from the German
Qualification and Career Survey (GQCS), which contains the same job level
variable as in the GSOEP. I show that task usage varies within an occupation
by level, with cognitive task usage typically increasing with level while man-
ual task usage declining. Since the GQCS contains both occupation and level
information, I am able to assign task usages by both of these characteristics.
This allows for at least some of the within-occupation variation described in
Autor and Handel (2013).
Both task-specific and occupation-specific skills are acquired by the worker
through learning-by-doing. While task-specific skills can be transferred to all
occupation-levels, their usefulness depends on the task usage in a particular
job. Occupation-specific skills can be transferred across levels within an oc-
cupation. I estimate my model using indirect inference. I am able to match
the overall wage and occupational composition patterns in the data. I am
also able to match the positive relationship between being in the lowest level
6and having a higher probability of changing occupations, and the negative im-
pacts on wage changes from exiting unemployment to a lower level. I find that
both sources of human capital accumulation are important but task-specific
skill growth dominates. Counterfactual simulations where task-specific skill
growth is eliminated cause a 32.7% decline in overall mean wage level, while
eliminating occupation-specific skill accumulation results in only a 17.6% drop.
Occupation-specific skills are more important to wage growth for the blue-
collar occupation, while task-specific skills dominate in the white-collar occu-
pation. I also run counterfactuals on the model version without hierarchical
levels. Omitting levels significantly understates the importance of occupation-
specific skills to wage growth for the blue-collar occupation, while also under-
stating the importance of task-specific skills for the white-collar occupation.
Chapter four is co-authored with Jed DeVaro and Antti Kauhanen. In this
chapter, we test the theory that promotions serve as a signal about a worker’s
ability. In an environment where information is asymmetric and the worker’s
current employer has more information about a worker’s ability level than out-
side employers, a promotion sends a signal to outside firms that the worker is
of high ability. This notion was first described by Waldman (1984), who shows
that when a worker is promoted their employer must increase their wage to
avoid having them bid away by an outside firm. This helps to explain the large
wage gains that typically accompany promotions. However, since promotions
require the firm to increase wages they are costly. As a result, some workers
7that would be more productive if they were moved to a higher level are not
promoted, as the firm would lose their informational advantage, and so there
is an inefficient allocation of workers across levels.
DeVaro and Waldman (2012) extend this framework by including a worker
characteristic, such as education, that is publicly observable and correlated
with the worker’s innate ability. Two key findings result: (1) promotion proba-
bility is increasing in education, even conditional on ability; and (2) wage gains
from promotion are decreasing in education level, again conditional on ability
level. Also, these results dissipate after the worker receives their first promo-
tion. The intuition beyond these results is that the promotion of a less educated
worker is more of a surprise to outside firms, who had a low initial belief about
their ability, than the promotion of a more educated worker. This requires the
current firm to bid up the less educated worker’s wage upon promotion more so
than the more educated worker to avoid turnover, making the promotion of less
educated workers more costly even controlling for ability. This reduces the pro-
motion probability of less educated workers. DeVaro and Waldman (2012) then
test these predictions using data from the U.S. firm analyzed by Baker, Gibbs,
and Holmstro¨m (1994), and the results largely confirm the theory. However,
since this is only a single firm, generalizing the results is problematic.
We extend the tests performed by DeVaro and Waldman (2012) by using two
large-scale, nationally-representative, European panel data sets: the GSOEP
and the Confederation of Finnish Industries. One of the difficulties in using
8this type of data is that information about worker performance is typically
unavailable. We address this problem by running regressions of performance-
related-pay and bonus data on worker, firm, and job characteristics. Whatever
we are not able to explain by observable characteristics, i.e. the residual of
these regressions, we assume is the unobserved worker performance and we
use these values as our performance measures. We test the first empirical pre-
diction, that education is positively related to promotion receipt, by performing
probit estimations which include our performance measure. The second empir-
ical prediction, that conditional on promotion, more educated workers receive
lower wage gains, is tested using a wage change regression, again controlling
for performance using our inferred measure. Consistent with the theory de-
scribed in DeVaro and Waldman (2012), we find that promotion probabilities
are increasing in educational attainment, whereas wage increases from pro-
motion are decreasing in educational attainment for some educational groups.
Both of these results are stronger for first than for subsequent promotions. We
also find that women have lower promotion probabilities than men, though
this difference dissipates after the first promotion. Since we are able to follow
workers after they leave their current firm, and our hierarchical level assign-
ment procedure is not firm-specific, we can separately investigate within-firm
versus across-firm promotion. We find that evidence of promotion signaling is
stronger for within-firm than for across-firm promotions.
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Chapter 2
Worker Promotion and
Occupational Skill Requirement
2.1 Introduction
This chapter estimates the impact of occupational characteristics on the prob-
ability that a worker receives a promotion. Specifically, it examines the effects
of occupational skill requirements, as measured by the requirements of cog-
nitive, interpersonal, motor, and strength skills, on promotion receipt. I find
that the skills required in an occupation do, in fact, have a significant effect on
the probability that a worker receives a promotion. In particular, workers in
occupations with higher cognitive skill requirement have a significantly higher
probability of receiving a promotion.
Promotions within an employer are an important source of wage growth for
workers. McCue (1996) estimates that promotions account for up to 15% of
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life-cycle wage growth.1 As a result, there is a large literature studying both
the determinants and effects of promotions on workers. The current literature
has focused mainly on the effects of worker characteristics and, to a lesser ex-
tent, firm characteristics, on the likelihood of promotion. Particular focus has
been given to the role of gender in the promotion process, while little atten-
tion has been paid to the effects of job characteristics on a worker’s promotion
probability.
I use the skills required to perform a job as measures of a job’s characteris-
tics. The occupational skill requirement measure employed here, used in both
Ingram and Neumann (2006) and Poletaev and Robinson (2008), incorporates
a measure of the skills required to perform a job from the Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles (DOT). Every DOT job title consists of a large, 63-element vector
of characteristics, and includes variables such as numerical aptitude, strength,
eye-hand-foot coordination, etc. Each measures the importance of that par-
ticular characteristic in performing a given job. Using Principal Component
Analysis (PCA), I reduce this vector to four components: cognitive, interper-
sonal, motor and strength. DOT to three-digit Census occupation crosswalks
are used to move from DOT job titles to both 1970 and 2000 Census occupa-
tion codes. The result is that each three-digit Census occupation is assigned a
4-dimensional skill vector measuring the skill requirements of that job.
I combine these skill requirements with the National Longitudinal Survey
1Cobb-Clark (2001) estimates the wage gain at around 30% for promotions alone in a sample
of young workers.
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of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). The advantage of this data set is twofold: first, as a
panel data set with rich data on workers, it allows me to control for individ-
ual worker effects; and second, for certain years (1988-1990 and 1996-2008) it
includes a question that asks if the worker has received a promotion at any
job since the previous interview. These features have motivated other studies,
such as Pergamit (1999) and Cobb-Clark (2001), to use this data set to study
promotions. However, these papers consider only the 1988-1990 timeframe.
This narrow timeframe restriction is especially limiting for the NLSY79 since
the survey’s participants were between the ages of 14-22 in 1979; thus, study-
ing a small number of years will miss potentially important life-cycle effects
due to the respondents’ narrow age range.
A probit model is employed to estimate the effects of job skill requirements,
as well as other variables, on the probability that a worker receives a promotion
between two interviews. As the NLSY79 is annual during the 1988-1990 pe-
riod, and biannual in the 1996-2008 period, I perform this analysis separately
for these two time periods. I also estimate the model for the whole sample as
well as separately for men and women. The results indicate that the skill re-
quirements of a job do in fact have significant impacts on a worker’s probability
of promotion. Higher levels of cognitive skills have a positive effect for men as
well as for women in both of the sampling periods. The other three skill mea-
sures - interpersonal, motor and strength - have negative effects on promotion,
though their effects are not always significant.
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Table 2.1: Skill Levels and Promotion: Financial Manager versus Building
Manager
Financial Manager Building Manager Difference Marginal Effect
Cognitive 12.081 9.996 2.085 0.033
Interpersonal 3.789 3.009 0.780 −0.009
Motor 4.557 5.265 −0.708 0.0003
Strength .035 .285 −0.250 0.022
Total 4.63%
Promotion probability difference from skill level differences, Financial Manager versus Building Manager.
The effects of skill requirements on promotion are non-trivial in magnitude.
For example, consider two white-collar occupations, Financial Manager and
Building Manager, both of which are classified in the same one-digit occupation
coding group. Table 2.1 shows the skill levels for these two groups as well as
the marginal effects of their skill differences on the probability of promotion.2
Overall, as a result of their differing occupational skill requirements, a Finan-
cial Manager has a predicted promotion rate which is 4.63 percentage points
higher than a Building Manager, which corresponds to a roughly 25% higher
overall promotion rate. Though these occupations have fairly similar skill re-
quirement vectors compared to the overall distribution, the relatively small
differences between them nonetheless generate a large gap in the predicted
promotion rates. As promotions are associated with substantial increases in
wages, 9.6% vs 2.4% for promoted vs non-promoted workers in the data used
in this chapter, a 4.63% difference in the probability of promotion per year has
a significant impact on a worker’s expected future earnings.
2Skill requirements for these occupations are taken for men in the 1970 coding period.
Marginal differences taken from the estimates in Section 6.2. See Table 2.14.
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Apart from the skill requirement levels’ direct effects on the probability of
promotion, their inclusion also changes the effects of other non-skill variables,
often substantially. In both survey periods, the lower promotion probability for
high-school versus college graduates is reduced by roughly 40% after skills are
included. A similar reduction occurs in the importance of Armed Forces Quali-
fication Test (AFQT) scores. These results indicate that at least part of the im-
pacts of some individual characteristics, such as education and intelligence, on
the receipt of promotion act through their impact on the individual’s job type.
College graduates and those with higher AFQT scores tend to be employed in
higher-cognitive jobs than high-school graduates and those with lower AFQT
scores, and a higher cognitive skill requirement is associated with a higher
promotion probability. Though the selection of a worker into a job is impor-
tant, individual characteristics persist even after controlling for skills, which
indicates that worker heterogeneity plays a role in the promotion process.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe the existing
literature, both on promotions and on occupational skill requirements. Section
2.3 describes the data used. Section 2.4 details the procedure for calculating
the skill requirement vectors, and motivates the relevance of the derived skill
measures by considering their relationship with wages. Section 2.5 estimates
the effects of skills on promotions, and discusses the results. Section 2.6 con-
cludes. Supplementary tables are presented in Appendix A.1.
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2.2 Existing Literature
The importance of promotions has been recognized in the economics literature
for some time, and there are large bodies of both empirical and theoretical
work on the topic. Three main theories about the effects and uses of promo-
tions exist: 1) they serve as rewards in tournaments to induce effort (Lazear
and Rosen (1981)); 2) they send a signal to outside employers about a worker’s
ability (Waldman (1984)); and 3) promotions are a means of optimally allo-
cating a worker to the “correct” production technology, i.e. level, as a result
of learning about a worker’s ability and/or a worker’s accumulation of human
capital (Gibbons and Waldman (1999)). While these three models of promotion
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and a role for each is almost certainly
present to some extent, the Gibbons and Waldman (1999) model is the one that
has become the standard in the literature for analyzing within-firm promotion
dynamics.
Empirically, the literature can be broadly divided into studies that focus on
a particular firm, and those that look at cross-firm data. The seminal contri-
bution in the empirical literature, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstro¨m (1994), is a
case-study that examines a large U.S. financial services firm. Describing what
would become many of the stylized facts in the literature, Baker, Gibbs, and
Holmstro¨m (1994) document significant wage gains from promotion, evidence
for fast-track promotions, and the importance of job level to wages. Several sub-
sequent studies, including Treble, Van Gameren, Bridges, and Barmby (2001)
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and Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann (2004), perform similar analyses on British
and Dutch firms, respectively, largely confirming results from Baker, Gibbs,
and Holmstro¨m (1994).
Pergamit (1999) and Cobb-Clark (2001) extend the analysis in Baker, Gibbs,
and Holmstro¨m (1994) beyond a single firm by studying promotions using the
NLSY79. Using data from the 1988-1990 survey period these studies examine
both the determinants and outcomes of promotions.3 Cobb-Clark (2001) focuses
on the role of gender in the promotion process, and finds that women are less
likely to be promoted and they face higher promotion standards than men;
however, the wage growth from promotion for women is larger than for men.
Pergamit (1999) examines how the type of promotion, i.e. reports to a higher
supervisor or has an increase in responsibilities, affects the determinants and
outcome of promotion.
A major limitation of the current work has been its sparse controls for job
characteristics. The question of how promotion probabilities are affected by the
type of job a worker is performing has not been adequately addressed. While
Cobb-Clark (2001) notes the importance of occupation group for promotion re-
ceipt, there is substantial variation within any given one-digit occupation code
in the skills required to perform a job.4 This chapter more precisely controls for
the characteristics of a job by including these skills, and shows that not only
3Francesconi (2001) and Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2003) use British Household Panel
Survey data and perform similar studies on the determinants and outcomes of promotions in
Britain.
4While the variances in skills within one-digit occupation groups are, not surprisingly,
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do they have statistically significant effects on promotion probabilities them-
selves, but their inclusion also affects the impacts of other variables on the
likelihood of promotion.
The process used to measure an occupation’s skill requirements derives
from work by Ingram and Neumann (2006) and Poletaev and Robinson (2008).
Both of these papers utilize the DOT measure of a job’s skill requirements,
which, using factor analysis, are reduced to a four-dimensional vector. In In-
gram and Neumann (2006), these skills are classified as intelligence, fine mo-
tor, coordination and strength, while the four skills in Poletaev and Robinson
(2008) are denoted as general intelligence, fine motor, strength and gross mo-
tor, and visual skills.5 Based on work suggesting a close match between a job’s
skill requirements and the worker’s actual skill level,6 the skill requirement
levels derived from the DOT can then be interpreted as appropriate measures
of a worker’s skill level. As this chapter uses the DOT data to measure features
of the job, not the worker, the link between the job’s skill requirements and the
worker’s skill level is less important than in other studies.
Instead of the factor analysis approach for deriving skill requirements vec-
tors, this chapter uses the principal component analysis technique employed
by Bacolod and Blum (2010) and Yamaguchi (2010a). This method requires a
smaller than the population, they are nonetheless large. See Tables A-1 and A-2 in the Ap-
pendix, which show the summary statistics for skill levels by white-collar, blue-collar and one-
digit occupation group.
5Since a single DOT characteristic can contribute to several skills, and factor analysis is
insensitive to rotations, it is difficult to categorize these skills precisely. However, examination
of the main characteristics contributing to the skills yields these interpretations.
6See Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Wong (2003)
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priori assumptions about which DOT characteristics contribute to which skills,
but allows for correlations to exist between skill levels.7 Furthermore, impos-
ing which characteristics contribute to which skills clarifies their interpreta-
tion. While neither of these methods is clearly superior to the other, I choose
the PCA approach for both the ease of interpretation and to allow for skill cor-
relations.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 NLSY79
Worker data come from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. This
is a panel data set with rich information about a cohort of individuals who were
between the ages of 14 and 22 in 1979. These data are useful for this analy-
sis since there are two periods, 1988-1990 and 1996-2008, during which the
respondent is asked if he or she received a promotion since the previous inter-
view. The definition of promotion used here is self-reported, and is not based on
a measured change in a worker’s tasks.8 While the self-reported nature of the
promotion variable is of potential concern, it has the advantage of not having to
7There are, in fact, strong correlations between the factors that are derived. See Table 2.5.
8The NLSY79 also includes questions for whether the worker’s responsibilities increased or
if they are reporting to a higher supervisor as a result of their promotion. Both Cobb-Clark
(2001) and Pergamit (1999) cite the importance of the type of promotion, i.e. with or without an
increase in responsibility and with or without a change in supervisor, for their results. Quali-
tatively, the results are quite similar using the supervisor or responsibility increase promotion
definitions instead and, as such, I restrict attention to the most general promotion definition
for the remainder of the paper.
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rely on either wage or occupational changes to define a change in hierarchical
level.9
Spurious occupation changes between periods is a well-known issue plagu-
ing many panel data sets, the NLSY79 included. As skill requirement lev-
els are linked to occupations, these spurious changes are of concern in this
analysis. Some papers, including Neal (1999) and Pavan (2011), assume that
all within-firm occupation changes are miscodings. However, as I am inter-
ested specifically in promotions, and many promotions would reasonably in-
volve changes in occupations, this assumption is not appropriate in this case.
Instead, I follow Yamaguchi (2010a) and consider an occupation change as gen-
uine only if the worker does not return to the previous occupation during the
current firm-employment spell. For example, if a worker begins in occupation
A in year 1, moves to occupation B in year 2, then back to occupation A in year
3, I assume the worker is in occupation A for all three periods, and thus no
change in occupation has occurred. This correction procedure results in a 31%
reduction in the number of occupation changes.10
9Frederiksen, Halliday, and Koch (2010), for example, relies on changes in the occupation
code to denote a promotion. However, as is discussed below, only 39% of promotions in the
NLSY79 correspond with occupation changes, while data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel suggests that only roughly 20% of promotions in Germany correspond to occupation
changes.
10Yamaguchi (2010a) cites a reduction of roughly 40% in occupation changes. The difference
is probably due to sample period: occupation coding in later years, especially during the 2000
Census occupation coding period, seems to be better encoded, and the number of occupation
changes occurring after 1994 drops by 16%, while after 2000 it drops only by 5.7% as a result
of this procedure. This difference is likely caused by the NLSY79 survey becoming more de-
pendent in later survey years, and explicitly asking for a worker’s occupation again only if it is
different than in previous years.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
All Men Women
Mean/% s.d. Mean/% s.d. Mean/% s.d.
Age (years) 34.36 6.69 34.19 6.65 34.60 6.72
Black 0.27 0.45 0.25 0.44 0.30 0.46
Hispanic 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.38
Two-year Interviews 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.65 0.48
2000 Codes 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43
Human Capital
Tenure (years) 5.55 5.44 5.58 5.52 5.50 5.34
Experience (years) 12.79 4.81 13.03 4.81 12.48 4.79
AFQT 1 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.34
AFQT 2 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43
AFQT 3 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.23 0.42
AFQT 4 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41
AFQT 5 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.38
High School 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.39 0.49
Job
ln Wage (cents/hr) 6.65 0.46 6.72 0.47 6.55 0.44
Overtime (# hours/week) 1.10 3.69 1.29 4.07 0.83 3.09
Union 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37
Promotion 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38
# promotions 0.42 0.77 0.43 0.80 0.41 0.74
Firm Size
Small Firm (<100 employees) 0.57 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.53 0.50
Medium (100-500) 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.26 0.44
Large(>500) 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.41
Occupation
Blue-Collar 0.46 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.26 0.44
Managers and Prof. 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.38
Sales 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19
Admin. and Support 0.17 0.38 0.07 0.26 0.31 0.46
Service 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.34
Precision Craft 0.17 0.38 0.27 0.44 0.03 0.18
Operators and Laborers 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44 0.10 0.30
Technicians 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.22 0.41
Occupation Change 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40
Observations 39,546 22,720 16,826
Note 1: If units specified, means presented; otherwise, percentages given
Note 2: Statistics of final estimation sample only
Overall, after implementing the preceding correction procedure, 22% of in-
dividuals change occupations between two survey periods.11 Among promoted
workers, this value is 39%. Also, while occupation changers experience greater
wage growth than non-changers, this difference is due to the higher promotion
rate among occupation changers. In fact, as Table 2.3 indicates, non-promoted
occupation changers have somewhat lower wage growth than non-promoted
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Table 2.3: Log Wage Changes by Event Type
All Men Women
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Promotion 9.50 9.26 9.83
(21.77) (21.67) (21.90)
Occupation Change 4.69 4.27 5.27
(23.73) (24.42) (22.73)
Promotion/Occupation Change 10.80 9.94 11.87
(21.97) (21.33) (22.71)
Promotion/No Occupation Change 8.76 8.89 8.58
(21.62) (21.85) (21.29)
No Promotion/Occupation Change 1.99 1.91 2.10
(23.97) (25.23) (22.06)
No Promotion/No Occupation Change 2.58 2.19 3.10
(22.53) (23.39) (21.33)
Observations 39,546 22,720 16,826
Note: 100*Log wage changes; wages in cent/hr, 1983 dollars.
occupation stayers.
I consider workers who have stayed with the same firm for at least two con-
secutive survey periods during the years when promotion data are available,
from 1988-1990 and 1996-2008. As the NLSY79 is biannual after 1994, I have
a total of ten years of promotion data. Values included in the estimation are
those that occur in the initial period. Thus, the results that are obtained reflect
the probability of a worker receiving a promotion between the current and sub-
sequent interview periods. There are a total of 113,520 instances of a worker
staying with the same firm for two consecutive survey periods. I consider only
full-time workers, defined as those working 35 hours per week or more, leaving
88,724 observations. Demotions are dropped,12 eliminating 1379 observations.
11This figure includes the final estimation sample, excluding the 2000-2002 transition period,
since occupation change is impossible to determine due to the change in Census occupation
coding scheme.
12Demotions are a rare event in this data; each year roughly 2.3% of workers are demoted,
compared to 14% for promotions.
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I clean wage data by dropping observations with wages either in the current or
pre-promotion year lower than $3.00/hr, and I trim the top of the wage distribu-
tion at the 99% level. I also trim wage change observations at the 1% and 99%
levels. This leaves 46,104 observations.13 Other missing data, such as miss-
ing tenure and firm size information, eliminate 6558 observations. In total,
I am left with 39,546 observations - 13,992 in the one-year (1988-1990) sam-
pling period, and 21,468 in the two-year (1996-2008) sampling period. These
data represent 8413 individuals and 15,707 worker-firm spells. Table 2.2 shows
summary statistics for this sample. There are 6821 promotions and 8069 occu-
pation changes, resulting in promotion and occupation change rates of 17.3%
and 20.4% respectively. Roughly 39% of promotions coincide with occupation
changes. These values vary little by gender.
In 2002, the NLSY79 changed from the 1970 Census occupation coding
scheme, which had been used since 1979, to the 2000 Census coding scheme.
Unfortunately, there exists no one-to-one crosswalk between these two meth-
ods of coding occupations. As a result, skill levels derived during these dif-
ferent periods may not be fully comparable. This issue is discussed further in
Section 2.4.2. In the following two sections, I describe the process by which
each three-digit Census occupation code is assigned a four-dimensional skill
requirement vector.
13All wage data are in 1983 dollars
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2.3.2 Dictionary of Occupational Titles
One of this chapter’s contributions is to incorporate a detailed description of
a job, i.e. the skills required to perform that job, into the analysis of promo-
tion receipt. The importance of occupational skill requirements is supported
by Poletaev and Robinson (2008), which provides evidence that human cap-
ital is largely specific to a small number of basic skills, as opposed to being
primarily firm- or industry-specific. The source of these skill requirements is
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and a special version of the 1971
Current Population Survey (CPS). The DOT assigns each of its over 12,000 job
titles a vector of characteristics, which measures the requirements of the job.
The first component of the DOT code is the worker functions ratings, which de-
scribe a job’s complexity of interaction with data, people and things. The DOT
code definition trailer includes information on several other groups of charac-
teristics, including measures for aptitudes, general educational development
and temperament. Each of these groups contains several characteristics. For
example, the aptitudes group includes a numerical variable describing the de-
gree of numerical aptitude needed to perform a job.14 Together, these provide a
comprehensive vector of characteristics describing each DOT job title.
Since the NLSY79 contains only Census occupation coding, and not DOT
coding, it is necessary to convert the DOT job title vector of characteristics
14As an example, the numerical aptitude variable is measured from 1-5, where: 1 = top 10%
of population; 2 = top 1/3, excluding the top 10%; 3 = middle 1/3; 4 = bottom 1/3, excluding
bottom 10%; and 5 = bottom 10%.
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into a Census occupational vector of characteristics. For each job title, the
DOT master file includes the corresponding three-digit Census occupational
code. However, as there are many more DOT job titles than occupations, some
occupations have multiple job titles mapping into them. Two DOT job titles
mapping to the same Census occupation code may have different characteristic
vectors; therefore it is necessary to weight these job titles correctly to properly
calculate an occupation’s characteristic vector. To do this, a measure for the
fraction of employment in each DOT job title is needed. This construction of
weights is made possible by a unique data set, a special version of the Current
Population Survey in 1971, in which each of the 60,441 workers are coded with
a DOT job title. Using these data, it is therefore possible to assign employment
weights to each DOT job title. These weights are then used when assigning
characteristic vectors to each three-digit Census occupation code.
Since the employment shares in each DOT job title may differ by gender,
this crosswalk procedure is done separately for men and women. As a result,
men and women have, often significantly, different skill requirement vectors
for the same occupation code. Also, as there is no way to easily move between
the 1970 to 2000 Census occupation coding schemes, the DOT to Census con-
version is also done separately for this occupational group. To convert from
DOT to 2000 Census schemes, the weighted crosswalk approach, described in
more detail in Robinson (2011), is used. This crosswalk is developed in two
parts. First, a Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) to DOT crosswalk
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is combined with a SOC to Census 2000 crosswalk to generate a DOT to 2000
Census crosswalk. However, some occupations are missing from this crosswalk.
To fill in these gaps, a crosswalk developed from dual-coded samples is used.
2.4 Skill Requirements
Having assigned a vector of characteristics to each Census occupation, the next
step is to reduce the size of this vector to a more manageable, four-dimensional
vector of skill requirements. The following section describes this process.
2.4.1 Principal Component Analysis
Principal Component Analysis is used to reduce the size of the 63-element vec-
tor of characteristics. A priori assumptions about which characteristics con-
tribute to which skills are needed using the PCA approach, but it allows for
correlation between the estimated skills. Following Bacolod and Blum (2010)
and Yamaguchi (2010a), I assume the existence of four underlying skills: cog-
nitive, interpersonal, motor and strength. I then assume that a subset of the
DOT characteristic vector contributes to each of these skills. This assump-
tion simplifies the interpretation of the skills calculated, since the researcher
knows which characteristics are contributing to them. It contrasts with the fac-
tor analysis approach used in Ingram and Neumann (2006) and Poletaev and
Robinson (2008) where a single factor can contribute to multiple skills, making
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the interpretation of what each skill is measuring more difficult.
I use the same skill assignment as Bacolod and Blum (2010) and Yamaguchi
(2010a). The DOT characteristics that measure the cognitive skill requirement
of a job are: complexity of the interaction with data, three general educational
development variables (reasoning, mathematical, and language), and three ap-
titude factors (general reasoning ability, verbal, and numerical). The interper-
sonal skill is calculated using: complexity of the interaction with people, adapt-
ability to influencing people (influ), adaptability to accepting responsibility for
direction (dcp), and adaptability to dealing with people (depl). Motor skill is
measured from variables: complexity of the interaction with things, seven ap-
titudes (motor coordination, finger dexterity, manual dexterity, eye-hand-foot
coordination, spatial perception, form perception, and color discrimination),
and setting limits, tolerance or standards. The last skill requirement, strength,
is measured with a single characteristic, strength.15
I perform the PCA separately for men and women and for the 1970 and
2000 Census occupation coding periods, using the entire NLSY79 sample.16
15See Bacolod and Blum (2010) Appendix A for more detailed descriptions of each of these
variables.
16I use the entire sample period to generate the factor loadings, from 1979-2000 for the 1970
codes, and 2002-2008 for the 2000 codes. However, summary statistics and other results are
presented for only the final estimation sample.
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The purpose of PCA is to represent a higher-dimensional vector with a lower-
dimensional vector of “components”, while maintaining as much of the vari-
ation present in the original data as possible.17 The procedure involves cal-
culating the eigenvector decomposition of the largest eigenvalue of either the
covariance or correlation matrix. The choice of method is potentially impor-
tant, since the calculated factor loadings are sensitive to units as well as to
differences in the variances of characteristics. This chapter uses the correla-
tion matrix approach, since it is advised in the presence of large differences
in variance between characteristics.18,19,20 The results, however, change little
when the covariance method is used instead.
Table 2.4 reports the factor loadings for men and women for the two cod-
ing schemes. The pattern of factor loadings is similar to Bacolod and Blum
(2010), but not surprisingly differs from Yamaguchi (2010a) where the covari-
ance method is used. Using these factor loadings, skill requirements are as-
signed to each occupation in my data. Summary statistics for skill levels, male
and female, are reported in Table 2.7, while correlations between the skills are
17See Jolliffe (2002) for additional details.
18See Jackson (1991), pp 64-65
19For example, the data variable has a standard deviation of 1.58, while the numerical ap-
titude variable’s standard deviation is only 0.65. Such large differences in the characteristics’
variations advises against using the covariance matrix method.
20Yamaguchi (2010a) uses the covariance method, while Bacolod and Blum (2010) seem to
use the correlation matrix
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Table 2.4: Factor Loadings
1970 2000
Men Women Men Women
Cognitive
data 0.373 0.378 0.368 0.368
gedr 0.387 0.384 0.391 0.392
gedm 0.378 0.380 0.376 0.371
gedl 0.385 0.384 0.388 0.390
aptitudg 0.382 0.386 0.381 0.390
aptitudv 0.377 0.383 0.381 0.389
aptitudn 0.363 0.349 0.360 0.343
Interpersonal
people 0.560 0.583 0.568 0.590
tempi 0.403 0.491 0.327 0.399
tempp 0.532 0.402 0.561 0.471
tempd 0.491 0.508 0.506 0.520
Motor
things 0.400 0.409 0.393 0.381
aptitudk 0.384 0.393 0.385 0.402
aptitudf 0.372 0.413 0.366 0.416
aptitudm 0.354 0.357 0.373 0.365
aptitude 0.109 0.031 0.183 0.123
aptitudc 0.272 0.224 0.277 0.260
aptitudp 0.344 0.405 0.328 0.360
aptituds 0.340 0.295 0.341 0.293
tempt 0.330 0.280 0.301 0.300
Note: 1970 codes: prior to 2002; 2000 codes: 2002 to 2008
reported in Table 2.5.21,22 In general, the jobs women hold have higher cogni-
tive and interpersonal skill requirements than the jobs men hold, and lower
motor and strength requirements.
There exists a strong, positive correlation between cognitive and interper-
sonal skills, a more weakly positive motor and strength correlation, and neg-
ative correlations with strength and both cognitive and interpersonal skills.
Lastly, Table 2.6 reports summary statistics for skill level changes, both for
21Skill correlations and summary statistics are reported only for the final sample used in
estimation.
22Separate correlations for men and women are shown in Appendix Tables A-3 and A-4.
While similar overall, the correlations between strength and the other three skills are signifi-
cantly weaker for women than men.
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Table 2.5: Skill Level Correlations
Cognitive Interpersonal Motor Strength
Cognitive 1.00
Interpersonal 0.69 1.00
Motor -0.06 -0.45 1.00
Strength -0.63 -0.51 0.27 1.00
Table 2.6: Skill Changes
All Promoted Only
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive Change 0.28 0.72
2.43 2.47
Interpersonal Change 0.16 0.39
1.31 1.46
Motor Change −0.11 −0.29
1.96 1.98
Strength Change −0.01 −0.03
0.18 0.18
Observations 8,069 2,476
Note: Only occupation changes included; 2000-2002 omitted
Table 2.7: Skill Levels
All Men Women
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive 8.67 8.49 8.92
2.41 2.50 2.26
Interpersonal 2.14 1.97 2.37
1.32 1.27 1.35
Motor 6.78 7.01 6.47
1.72 1.77 1.60
Strength 0.32 0.39 0.22
0.21 0.20 0.17
Observations 39,546 22,720 16,826
all occupation changes and for only the promoted group.23 A clear pattern
emerges: cognitive and interpersonal skills tend to increase with occupation
change, while motor and strength decline. Promotions result in especially large
increases in cognitive and interpersonal skill levels and decreases in motor and
strength skill levels. This pattern accords with the intuition that promotions
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move workers into more managerial and administrative roles, where cognitive
and interpersonal skills are especially important.
2.4.2 1970 vs 2000 Census Occupation Codes
The NLSY79 records a Census occupation code for each job. From 1979 to
2000, inclusive, these occupations are encoded using the 1970 Census occu-
pation codes, while from 2002 to 2008 the NLSY79 uses the 2000 Census oc-
cupation codes. The differences between the 1970 and 2000 coding schemes
are substantial. In fact, there is no clear crosswalk between the 1970 to 2000
codes for many occupations. Earlier Census occupation codes, including the
1970 codes, are based on a hierarchical structure, whereas the 2000 occupa-
tional codes are organized by “job families”, grouping workers by the output
produced, not by services provided.24
As the central focus of this chapter is the effect of skills on promotion re-
ceipt, the comparability of the 1970 and 2000 occupation codes is important. I
first compare the distribution of worker skill requirement levels in years with
1970 codes versus 2000 codes, shown in Table 2.8. While the 2000 occupation
codes yield higher levels of cognitive and interpersonal skills, and lower levels
of motor and strength, these changes may be driven by life cycle effects, which
23Only occupation changers are included since skills change only if occupation changes, ex-
cluding the 2000-2002 transition.
24See Scopp (2003) for discussion.
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Table 2.8: Skill Levels: 1970 and 2000 Codes
1970 2000
All Men Women All Men Women
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive 8.65 8.47 8.90 8.75 8.56 8.99
2.38 2.47 2.24 2.49 2.60 2.32
Interpersonal 2.08 1.92 2.32 2.31 2.13 2.54
1.26 1.20 1.31 1.48 1.47 1.45
Motor 6.80 7.01 6.51 6.71 7.00 6.34
1.69 1.72 1.60 1.80 1.91 1.58
Strength 0.32 0.39 0.21 0.31 0.38 0.22
0.20 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.19
Observations 30,049 17,462 12,587 9,497 5,258 4,239
Note: 1970 codes: prior to 2002; 2000 codes: 2002 to 2008
correspond to changes described in Table 2.6. It is more appropriate, there-
fore, to consider skill levels in periods directly surrounding the coding scheme
change, from 1998 to 2002. A large difference in the levels before and after the
coding change would imply the existence of a significant break that results from
a move to the new coding scheme. Table 2.9 shows the skill level distributions
around the time of transition. From 2000 to 2002, cognitive skill levels drop
somewhat, which is contrary to their usual upward trend, though the drop, less
than a twentieth of a standard deviation, is minor. The increase in interper-
sonal skills is slightly greater than typical, though as with cognitive skills the
difference is small, while motor and strength levels change little. Thus, there
does not appear to be a significant break in the overall distributions of skills
around the change in coding scheme.
Though the overall skill level distributions do not change significantly be-
tween the coding periods, there could still be significant reassignment of work-
ers to different skill requirement levels that nonetheless results in an overall
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Table 2.9: Skill Levels: 1970 and 2000 Codes, Transition Years
1970 2000
1998 2000 2002 2004
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive 8.81 8.84 8.73 8.74
2.41 2.39 2.50 2.47
Interpersonal 2.20 2.23 2.31 2.29
1.31 1.31 1.48 1.46
Motor 6.68 6.66 6.72 6.72
1.68 1.68 1.80 1.81
Strength 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22
Observations 3,990 3,864 3,273 3,062
negligible net effect on skill level distributions. I investigate this possibility
by examining the changes in skill levels between years, again surrounding the
change in coding that occurs in 2002. For years before and after 2000-2002,
only workers who change occupations have a change in their skill requirement
levels, since these levels are associated with their occupation. However, be-
tween 2000 and 2002, all workers’ skill levels can change, as their occupations
necessarily change between these two years. If there is a significant break be-
tween the coding schemes, this will result in a greater variance in the skill
change levels between 2000 and 2002 than between other years.
Table 2.10 shows the distribution of skill requirement changes around the
transition period. As expected, the variances in the skill level changes are
greater during the transition period than during other periods, since each
worker has, to some degree, a change in skill level. However, these variances
are lower than “genuine” occupation changes in either of the coding periods, as
shown in Table 2.6. Thus, while the amount of reassignment from the coding
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Table 2.10: Skill Level Changes: 1970 and 2000 Codes, Transition Years
1970 Transition 2000
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive Change 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.07
1.23 0.85 1.41 0.83 0.94
Interpersonal Change 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.05
0.66 0.46 0.95 0.57 0.64
Motor Change −0.03 0.00 0.08 −0.01 −0.03
1.04 0.75 1.26 0.64 0.73
Strength Change −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01
0.09 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.07
Observations 4,117 3,990 3,864 3,273 3,062
change is not as significant as if workers were all changing occupations during
either coding period, there does appear to be a non-trivial amount of change
occurring.
Robinson (2011) examines involuntary mobility and uses skills to calculate
a distance between two occupations related to the differences in their skill re-
quirements. The issue of the comparability between the 2000 Census occu-
pation coding and earlier schemes is also present in this work. To compare
these schemes, an expected distance measure from a worker randomly moving
from one occupation to another is calculated for the different coding periods.
The result is that, for either coding period, the distances from random mobility
have nearly identical distributions. This indicates that there is no break be-
tween the coding periods in terms of distance, which provides evidence of the
comparability of skills derived from these separate coding schemes.
The results with regard to the comparability of the different coding periods
are mixed. To avoid potential issues that might arise with combining these
35
periods, I estimate the effects of skill levels separately for the 1970 and 2000
coding periods.
2.4.3 Skill Requirement Levels and Wages
In order to demonstrate the importance of the estimated skill requirement lev-
els, I perform a regression of the worker’s log hourly wage on their occupational
skill requirements. While the estimations include human capital variables (ex-
perience, tenure, and education level), demographic variables (age, sex, race,
and AFQT scores), and industry and year controls, for brevity, only skill re-
quirement levels are shown.25 This is performed for the entire sample, as well
as for men and women separately. As this analysis does not rely on promotion
data, the entire NLSY79 panel is used, from 1979 to 2008. Table 2.11 shows
the results.
The skill requirement levels have a statistically significant effect on wages,
and alone they can explain a large fraction of wage variation. The cognitive
skill has a consistently positive effects on wages, while interpersonal and motor
have consistently negative effects. The strength skill, though positive overall,
has a negative effect for men but a positive effect for women. In addition to this
difference in sign between men and women, the effects also vary in magnitude
by gender. Overall, women’s wages appear to be more sensitive to the skill
requirements of the job, with the absolute value of each coefficient higher for
25Again, for simplicity and brevity, I ignore the potential incomparability between the 1970
and 2000 coding periods and include all of the years in a single estimation.
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Table 2.11: Wage Regressions with Skill Levels
All Men Women
Skills
Only
Full
Model
Skills
Only
Full
Model
Skills
Only
Full
Model
Skill Levels
Cognitive 0.092∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interpersonal −0.028∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.049∗∗ −0.048∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Motor −0.009∗∗ −0.011∗∗ 0.005∗∗ −0.002 −0.021∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Strength 0.079∗∗ 0.104∗∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.041∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.188∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Observations 82,147 82,147 46,942 46,942 35,205 35,205
R2 0.205 0.430 0.168 0.407 0.213 0.442
Standard errors in parentheses
Note 1: Linear regression. Dependent variable: log hourly wage in cents.
Note 2: Columns “Full Model” include age, AQFT, tenure, experience, industry, gender, and race, while columns “Skills Only” include gender.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
women than men. Skill requirement levels alone can explain 21% of variation
in wages, while the model with demographic characteristics, human capital
characteristics, and skills explains 43% of variation.
The conclusions from this regression are twofold: first, the skill require-
ments of the job are useful predictors of workers’ wages; and second, the im-
pact of skill requirements vary by gender. The latter result motivates the sub-
sequent analysis being performed independently for men and women.
2.5 Results
This section presents the main estimation results. I discuss both the effects of
skills on the probability that a worker receives a promotion, and whether skill
requirement levels affect the type of promotion a worker receives.
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The goal of this chapter is to examine the determinants of promotion, in
particular the effects of job characteristics as measured by occupational skill
requirements. I explore this question by estimating a probit model, and I take
advantage of the panel nature of the NLSY79 by estimating a random effects
model.26 Each observation represents a worker staying at a firm for two con-
secutive survey periods, and the dependent variable is whether or not a worker
received a promotion between the first and second survey years.
I include several controls for demographic characteristics, including age,
race and gender. Human capital is controlled for with tenure, experience, a
dummy for high-school versus college graduate, and AFQT quintiles.27 Under
job characteristics, I include the log wage level, firm size, overtime hours,28 and
union status. Year dummies are also added.29
Lastly, I include controls for workers’ occupational skill requirement levels
(cognitive, interpersonal, motor and strength). Two separate models are used,
one that includes the skill measures and one that does not, and both of these
models are estimated for men, women, and the entire sample combined, sepa-
rately for the annual and biannual survey periods.
For ease of exposition, the random effects probit results for demographic
26The pooled model results are available upon request. As with Cobb-Clark (2001), the like-
lihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that no individual effects are present; results discussed
are, therefore, based on the random effects model.
27Revised 1989 AFQT scores used.
28Tournament theory predicts that effort exerted is positively related to probability of pro-
motion, thus overtime hours is included.
29Industry controls have negligible effects on promotion probability, thus are excluded from
the estimation.
38
and human capital variables for annual and biannual periods are presented
in Tables 2.12 and 2.13, while skill level coefficients for the two periods are
presented in Table 2.14.30 Marginal effects at the population average are re-
ported.31 As the gap between periods differs for the annual versus biannual
samples, I refrain from quantitative comparisons in the results between these
groups, and focus instead on qualitative differences.
I find that women have a 3.2% lower probability of receiving a promotion in
a given year during the annual period than men when skills are omitted. How-
ever, in the biannual period, the gender gap disappears entirely. Also, while
Pergamit (1999) finds that blacks have a lower probability of promotion, I find
little effect of race on promotion receipt in the annual period.32 In the bian-
nual period, however, both black and Hispanic men have a higher probability
of promotion, 1.6% and 2.8% respectively. For women, race continues to have
no effect in the two year period.
I find positive effects of AFQT scores on promotion probability for men in
both periods, while only one quintile of scores shows significance in each pe-
riod for women when skills are included. Previous studies have shown little
effect of these scores on promotion, perhaps due to their linear specification.33
Conditional on being outside of the bottom quintile, AFQT scores in the annual
30Job characteristics are presented in Appendix Tables A-9 and A-10.
31Changes in probability are evaluated at the sample means. Continuous approximation is
used for discrete variables.
32Pergamit (1999) consider only one year, 1990, in their estimation, which might account for
this discrepancy.
33If AFQT scores are included linearly in my model, they similarly have no impact on pro-
motion for either men or women in the annual period.
39
Table 2.12: Promotion Determinants: Marginal Effects of Random Effects Pro-
bit, Demographic and Human Capital Variables, Annual Period (1988-1990)
All Men Women
No Skills Skills No Skills Skills No Skills Skills
Demographic
Female −0.032∗∗ −0.051∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Age: <25 0.046∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.047∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Black 0.004 0.005 0.017 0.019 −0.012 −0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Hispanic −0.000 −0.005 −0.010 −0.013 0.012 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)
Human Capital
Tenure −0.012∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.011 −0.012∗ −0.013 −0.013
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Tenure2/100 0.036 0.044 0.041 0.050 0.028 0.032
(0.047) (0.046) (0.060) (0.059) (0.075) (0.075)
Experience 0.017 0.016 0.029∗ 0.031∗ 0.004 −0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Experience2/100 −0.117 −0.109 −0.204∗ −0.211∗ −0.020 −0.001
(0.074) (0.074) (0.103) (0.102) (0.108) (0.107)
AFQT 2 0.036∗ 0.029 0.040∗ 0.036 0.036 0.024
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025)
AFQT 3 0.064∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.054∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025)
AFQT 4 0.051∗∗ 0.030 0.054∗ 0.036 0.050 0.024
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027)
AFQT 5 0.062∗∗ 0.029 0.056∗ 0.024 0.070∗ 0.039
(0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029)
High School −0.048∗∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.039∗∗ −0.028
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 13,992 13,992 8,183 8,183 5,809 5,809
Standard errors in parentheses
Note 1: Dependent variable: promotion receipt between interviews; Time period: 1988-1990; Interviews annual
Note 2: Average marginal effects reported; derivatives w.r.t. entire varlist and continuous approximations of discrete variables
Note 3: Job variables and year dummies included in estimation but not displayed
Note 4: Columns labelled skills include skill requirement levels in estimation
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
period have little additional effect. This is demonstrated by the coefficient for
the third to fifth quintiles of AFQT scores being nearly the same. In the bian-
nual period, the positive impact of AFQT scores increases with quintile, with a
marked increase in probability for individuals in the top quintile. This result
implies that a learning process may be occurring where, over a worker’s career,
a firm is better able to observe intelligence, leading to an increased benefit of
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Table 2.13: Promotion Determinants: Marginal Effects of Random Effects Pro-
bit, Demographic and Human Capital Variables, Biannual Period (1996-2008)
All Men Women
No Skills Skills No Skills Skills No Skills Skills
Demographic
Female 0.007 −0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Age: 36-45 −0.005 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.010 −0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Age: 46-55 −0.020 −0.017 −0.022 −0.021 −0.021 −0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)
Black 0.010 0.011 0.016∗ 0.017∗ 0.003 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Hispanic 0.022∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.013 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Human Capital
Tenure −0.004∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure2/100 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Experience 0.001 0.002 −0.002 −0.002 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Experience2/100 −0.007 −0.008 0.002 0.003 −0.013 −0.012
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
AFQT 2 0.024∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.019 0.016 0.025 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
AFQT 3 0.034∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.027 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
AFQT 4 0.037∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.030∗ 0.017
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
AFQT 5 0.068∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.035∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017)
High School −0.025∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.016 −0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 25,554 25,554 14,537 14,537 11,017 11,017
Standard errors in parentheses
Note 1: Dependent variable: promotion receipt between interviews; Time period: 1996-2008; Interviews biannual
Note 2: 1970 Codes: 1996-2000; 2000 Codes: 2002-2008
Note 3: Average marginal effects reported; derivatives w.r.t. entire varlist and continuous approximations of discrete variables
Note 4: Job variables and year dummies included in estimation but not displayed
Note 5: Columns labelled skills include skill requirement levels in estimation
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
higher AFQT scores in the biannual period than the annual period.34
Extending the sample also allows for greater age effects to be considered.35
34This observation mirrors the increase in the importance of AFQT scores on wages over a
worker’s career. In the NLSY79, AFQT quintile explains little wage variation in 1979, but the
fraction steadily increases over the years, rising to 17% in 2008.
35Neither Cobb-Clark (2001) nor Pergamit (1999) control for age.
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In the annual period, I find that workers under 25 years have a 3.7% higher
probability of promotion per year than those in the 26-35 age range - the only
other age group in that sample. In the biannual period, the age coefficients are
not sufficiently significant to conclude that any real age effect is present.
I turn now to the main findings of this chapter, the effects of skill require-
ment levels on promotions. These results are divided into the effects of the skill
levels themselves and the effects of including skills on other variables, which
can be determined by comparing the non-skill and skill columns. The most sig-
nificant and consistent finding in the former group is the importance of cogni-
tive skill requirements on promotion probability. For both men and women, in
both sample periods, higher levels of cognitive skills are associated with large
increases in promotion probability. In the annual period, a one-unit increase
in this skill requirement results in a 1.7% increase in the probability of promo-
tion in a given year - or, put differently, a one standard deviation increase in
cognitive skill requirement yields a 4.1% higher probability of promotion each
year. This gap is similar in size to the difference between a Financial Manager
and a Building Manager from the example considered above.
Interpersonal skill requirement, though it has a highly positive correlation
with cognitive skills, has a negative impact on promotion receipt in the annual
period for women. This negative effect is on the same scale as the positive
effect of cognitive skills, with a one standard deviation change in interpersonal
skill requirement level reducing promotion probability by 4.1% for women in
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Table 2.14: Promotion Determinants: Marginal Effects of Random Effects Pro-
bit, Skill Levels, Annual and Biannual Periods
Annual Biannual
All Men Women All Men Women
1970 Codes
Cognitive 0.016∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Interpersonal −0.012∗ −0.004 −0.017∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.016∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Motor −0.004 −0.000 −0.010∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Strength −0.088∗∗ −0.043 −0.173∗∗ −0.067∗∗ −0.030 −0.115∗∗
(0.030) (0.047) (0.045) (0.019) (0.030) (0.031)
2000 Codes
Cognitive 0.007∗∗ 0.006 0.010∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Interpersonal −0.001 0.004 −0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Motor −0.004 −0.000 −0.010∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Strength −0.047 −0.044 −0.042
(0.024) (0.038) (0.036)
Observations 13,992 8,183 5,809 25,554 14,537 11,017
Standard errors in parentheses
Note 1: Dependent variable: promotion receipt between interviews
Note 2: 1970 Codes: 1996-2000; 2000 Codes: 2002-2008; Annual: 1988-1990; Biannual: 1996-2008
Note 3: Average marginal effects reported; derivatives w.r.t. entire varlist and continuous approximations of discrete variables
Note 4: Job, human capital and demographic variables and year dummies included in estimation but not displayed
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
the annual period. In the biannual period, during the 1970 Census coding
period of 1996-2000, interpersonal skill levels have a negative effect for both
men and women. However, under the 2000 Census occupation coding scheme, a
large change occurs: cognitive skills decline in importance, though still remain
positive and significant, while interpersonal skills become insignificant for both
men and women.
Motor skill levels are either negatively or insignificantly related to promo-
tion. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the level of motor skills
for men in the biannual, 1970 occupation coding period would result in a 1.5%
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decline in promotion probability.36 The effects of motor skills differ between
the 1970 and 2000 coding schemes, though not as substantially as for cognitive
and interpersonal skills. Overall, the level of strength skill required has a neg-
ative effect on promotion in both periods and under both coding schemes, but is
only statistically significant for women. A one standard deviation increase in
strength requirement in the 2000 coding period would lead to a 1.0% reduction
in the probability of promotion. Though motor and strength skill requirement
levels do impact promotion probability, their effects are overshadowed by the
importance of cognitive skills and, to a lesser extent, interpersonal skills.
Thus, it appears that, though the skill distributions looks similar between
the 1970 and 2000 Census coding schemes, an important change has nonethe-
less taken place. The importance of cognitive skill requirement declines, while
interpersonal skill requirement become less negatively related to promotion.
Motor and strength skill requirements also diminish somewhat in importance.
As I noted previously, I find that during the annual period, there is a neg-
ative gender effect. Without skills, women in the annual period have a 3.2%
lower probability of promotion per year, while in the estimation with skills
they have a 5.1% lower probability of promotion per year. This is likely due to
women’s jobs having, on average, higher levels of cognitive skill requirements,
which, as has been discussed, are positively related to promotion. Failure to
include proper occupation measures - in this case skill requirement levels -
36This is a reduction in the probability of the worker reporting at least one promotion since
the previous interview, which for most workers is a two-year period.
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would lead to an underestimate of the gender gap in promotion receipt. While
women and men have similar observed promotion rates, controlling for other
demographic, human capital, and job characteristics, women appear to have a
significantly lower probability of promotion than men earlier in their careers,
and the similarity in their rates of promotion is partly due to their selection
towards higher cognitive jobs.
Another notable effect resulting from the inclusion of skill levels is the im-
portance of AFQT scores. Without skills, AFQT scores are statistically sig-
nificant predictors of promotion for both men and women in both time peri-
ods. Including skills leads to a reduction in the importance and significance
of these scores as predictors. For women, the effect is more drastic: including
skills nearly eliminates the relationship between AFQT scores and promotion.
While a move to a higher AFQT quintile increases the probability of promotion
receipt for women, especially in the second period, this appears to be largely
driven by the skill requirement levels within each AFQT grouping; workers in
the lowest AFQT quintile are in jobs with a mean cognitive skill requirement
level of 6.9, while for the highest quintile the level is 10.4.37 For men, though
the significance and size of the AFQT coefficients are reduced when skill re-
quirement levels are added, they nonetheless remain statistically significant
overall, especially in the biannual period.
Being a high school graduate as opposed to a college graduate leads to a
37See Table A-7.
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reduction in the probability of promotion for men and women in both time pe-
riods. This educational gap is, however, greatly reduced in all estimations when
occupational skill requirements are added. For example, the high school vari-
able for men in the annual time period changes from -5.6% to -3.6% when skills
are included - a 36% reduction. Similar to the drop in AFQT scores, this drop
is largely due to the difference in skill requirement levels between these edu-
cational groups, especially the higher cognitive levels for college graduates.38
This result, as well as the decline in AFQT importance with skill inclusion,
demonstrates one of the main findings of this chapter: although measures for
ability and education are relevant to promotion receipt in and of themselves, it
is important to control for the type of job that a worker is in, measured here us-
ing skill requirement levels. Including skill requirements reduces the effects of
education and ability, as measured by AFQT scores, on promotion. Thus, part
of the impacts of education and ability on promotion derives from their effects
on job assignment, while a still important fraction seems to affect promotion
receipt directly.
While I have shown that skill requirement does significantly impact the
likelihood that a worker receives a promotion, it may be the case that the wage
gains from promotion differ by skill requirement as well. Booth, Francesconi,
and Frank (2003), for example, finds that the wage growth from promotion is
lower for women than men, indicating that the type of promotion, in addition to
38See Table A-8 for skill requirement levels by educational group.
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Table 2.15: Wage Change from Promotion
All Men Women
Cognitive −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Interpersonal −0.006 0.001 −0.013∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Motor −0.006∗∗ −0.004 −0.008∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Strength −0.018 0.010 −0.035
(0.020) (0.032) (0.031)
Observations 6,664 3,857 2,807
Standard errors in parentheses
Note 1: Dependent variable in log wage change.
Note 2: All specifications control for age, tenure,
experience, race, year, and industry.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
the probability of promotion, matters to worker careers. I examine this ques-
tion by running a regression of wage change on skill requirements, controlling
for job and demographic characteristics, conditional on the worker receiving a
promotion.
Results from this regression are shown in Table 2.15.39 The only skill vari-
able that is statistically significant is the motor skill, which has a negative
sign. A one standard deviation increase in motor skill requirement results in
an approximately 1% lower wage gain upon promotion. Since the motor skill
showed either no effect or a negative effect on promotion probability, this re-
sult strengthens the impact of skill requirement on career outcome through
promotion: high motor skill workers are both less likely to receive a promotion
(for some groups), and receive lower wage gains in expectation upon promotion.
Otherwise, I conclude that while skill requirement impacts the probability that
39Separate results for the annual and biannual periods are available in Appendix Tables
A-11 and A-12.
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a worker receives a promotion, it does not significantly affect the outcome con-
ditional on a promotion being received.
2.6 Conclusion
NLSY79 and DOT data are combined to study the determinants of promotion
while controlling for job characteristics more completely than previous studies
by incorporating occupational skill requirements. Also, a longer timeframe
than in previous work on promotions in the NLSY79 is used, which allows for
greater life-cycle effects to be considered. Non-skill related findings include: a
gender gap in earlier periods, which disappears in later years; a positive race
gap for black and Hispanic men in the later period, while race has no effect
in the earlier period and no effect in the female group; and a positive effect
of AFQT scores on promotion, especially for men, with some evidence of firm
learning occurring over the worker’s career.
Occupational skill requirement levels are found to have significant impacts
on a worker’s probability of promotion. Especially important is the positive im-
pact of cognitive skill levels on promotion; interpersonal skills have an impor-
tant, though overall lesser, negative effect. Furthermore, the inclusion of skill
measures in the estimation affects other variables, often substantially, both in
significance and magnitude: the gender gap is widened, and both AFQT scores
as well as the effect of education decline in importance when skills are added
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to the estimation.
These results highlight the importance of controlling for a worker’s occu-
pation more rigorously than previous work has done. It furthers recent work,
notably Ingram and Neumann (2006) and Poletaev and Robinson (2008), both
of which demonstrate the relevance and applicability of the DOT occupational
skill requirement measures. The Gibbons and Waldman (1999) model, which
is the standard in the internal labor market literature regarding promotions,
includes only a single measure of worker ability. I demonstrate here that mul-
tiple skill requirement measures affect promotion receipt.
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Chapter 3
Skills, Tasks, and Occupational
Choice
3.1 Introduction
A worker’s hierarchical level has been shown to have a significant effect on
wages.1 While there is a large literature that investigates the importance of
levels, there has been little work that examines what effect including levels
has on a model of occupational mobility. In this chapter, I present evidence
suggesting that not only does hierarchical level affect workers’ wages, it also
impacts: (1) the probability that a worker changes occupations; (2) their wage
losses during unemployment; and (3) the tasks that they perform on the job. I
estimate a structural occupational choice model with hierarchical level mobil-
ity and skill accumulation in order to match these empirical observations, and
to quantify the sources of wage growth over the life cycle.
1Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstro¨m (1994), among others.
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The importance of levels has been confirmed in numerous studies of both
single-firm and, to a lesser extent, multi-firm data. The seminal contribution
to this literature is Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstro¨m (1994), who show that wages
are closely tied to job level and changes in job level significantly affect wages.
Subsequent studies by Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann (2004), Kauhanen and
Napari (2012), and da Silva and van der Klauuw (2011) all demonstrate the im-
portant of hierarchical level to wages. In this chapter, I confirm these findings
by showing that hierarchical level has a significant impact on worker’s wages
even in a large-scale, nationally-representative data set, the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). In addition to greatly impacting wages, I show that
a worker in the lowest hierarchical level has a significantly higher probability
of undergoing an occupation change than other workers. Furthermore, work-
ers who return to a lower level within an occupation after an unemployment
spell suffer higher wage losses than those who return to the same or a higher
level. This result holds even when controlling for worker characteristics and
for occupation at a highly disaggregated level. What these results demonstrate
is that a worker’s position within an occupation can greatly impact their labor
market outcomes beyond their wage levels alone.
A primary focus of this chapter is investigating the effects of hierarchical
levels on the specificity of human capital. The nature and specificity of human
capital is an important topic in labor economics. Recent work by Kambourov
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and Manovskii (2009) points to human capital being largely specific to the occu-
pation, while Pavan (2011) argues that firm-specific matches play an important
role in wages. Gibbons and Waldman (2004) propose the idea that a job consists
of a set of tasks performed by the worker, and that workers accumulate task-
specific human capital which is transferable between jobs. There has been
significant interest in this idea recently. Poletaev and Robinson (2008) show
that displaced workers’ wage losses are larger for those who move to “farther”
occupations, in terms of tasks performed, than those who move to “closer” occu-
pations. Similarly, Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) find that a worker’s pre-
and post-occupation-change wages are more closely related when the worker
moves between occupations with similar task usages.2 Both of these studies
point to the importance of task-specific human capital.
In Yamaguchi (2010, 2012) and Sanders (2012), occupations are defined by
the tasks that they utilize. Thus, two occupations that are identical in terms
of task usage are equivalent. While this approach greatly reduces the compu-
tations burden and allows for hundreds of occupations to be included, it does
not allow for human capital to be specific to an occupation. In this chapter, I
allow for human capital to be both specific to tasks (and thus transferable be-
tween jobs) and specific to an occupation (and thus not transferable outside of
the occupation).
2See also Spitz-Oener (2006), Black and Spitz-Oener (2007), Bacolod and Blum (2008), Au-
tor and Handel (2013) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for other papers that investigate tasks.
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Thus far, the task usage literature has mostly relied on a worker’s occupa-
tion to infer their task usage since such information is rarely available in panel
data sets. Task usage is typically assigned to workers by taking the mean task
usage by occupation in another data set, such as the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT) or the German Qualification and Career Survey (GQCS), and im-
posing that value on all workers in a given occupation in the panel data set.
Autor and Handel (2013), however, demonstrate that while occupations can
explain a large amount of task usage variation, significant variation within oc-
cupations remains. Since the GQCS includes a worker’s hierarchical level, I
am able to assign task usage by both occupation and level within occupation.
As a result, not only am I able to perform a more accurate task assignment by
using more information than the worker’s occupation alone, the process allows
for the variation in task usage within occupation that Autor and Handel (2013),
as well as this chapter, demonstrate exists to a large degree. I show that cogni-
tive task usage typically increases, and manual task usage typically decreases,
moving up in levels. As task usage varies within an occupation across levels, it
is a natural step to incorporate hierarchical mobility into a model that seeks to
quantify the relative importance of task-specific human capital to wage growth.
I estimate a structural occupational choice model with hierarchical levels to
try and match the observed relationships between level, occupation change and
wage losses during unemployment, and to quantify the specificity of human
capital. I also estimate a version of the model without levels, and I compare
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the results to determine if the inclusion of levels affects the quantification of
human capital specificity. In my model, each occupation-level contains a set of
tasks that the worker performs. Workers can move within-occupation across
hierarchical levels (i.e. through promotions and demotions), and tasks per-
formed vary both by occupation and by level within an occupation. My model
can be interpreted as a generalization of the Gibbons and Waldman (1999)
framework with multidimensional abilities.3 Workers also face search frictions
and a probability of job destruction, and can only change their occupation-level
if they receive a job offer.
I estimate this model using labor market histories from the GSOEP and by
assigning task usages using the GQCS. The model is estimated using indirect
inference. I am able to match the wage profiles (both overall and for each oc-
cupation) and the allocation of workers across occupations over the life cycle. I
am also able to match the empirical observations that lower-level workers are
more likely to undergo an occupation change, and that demotions during unem-
ployment lead to significantly higher wage losses than if the worker returned
to the same or a higher level.
I run counterfactual simulations to separately assess the importance of
task-specific versus occupation-specific human capital. Shutting down task-
specific human capital accumulation reduces the overall mean wage level by
3See also Brilon (2010), DeVaro, Ghosh and Zoghi (2012), and DeVaro and Gu¨rtler (2012)
for models where multidimensional skills are incorporated with promotion.
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32.7% while eliminating occupation-specific human capital accumulation re-
sults in a 17.6% reduction. These effects vary greatly by occupation, with
occupation-specific skill growth dominating in the blue-collar occupation, while
task-specific skill growth dominates in the white-collar occupation.4 Incor-
porating hierarchical levels significantly affects the estimated relative impor-
tance of these sources of human capital accumulation. I find that a model that
omits levels significantly underestimates the importance of occupation-specific
human capital to workers in the blue-collar occupation, while underestimating
the importance of task-specific human capital to workers in the white-collar
occupation.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data used in
the analysis, discusses the hierarchical level assignment procedure, and mo-
tivates the inclusion of hierarchical levels in a model of occupational mobility.
Section 3.3 describes the model. Section 3.4 describes the occupational aggre-
gation method, estimation technique, and identification. Section 3.5 discusses
the parameter results, model fit, and counterfactual simulation results. Sec-
tion 3.6 concludes.
4The result that skills are more occupation-specific for the blue-collar occupations is mir-
rored by Keane and Wolpin (1997), who find that blue-collar experience is more valuable than
white-collar experience, controlling for overall experience.
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3.2 Data
Two sources of data are needed to estimate the model. The first provides the
labor market histories of workers. The second assigns task usage vectors to
each occupation-level. Labor market histories are taken from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), while task usage data are derived from the
German Qualification and Career Survey (GQCS). Previous papers have pri-
marily used the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to estimate
occupation-choice models. Instead, I use these German data sets since they
both include a variable, comparable between the two, which can be interpreted
as a worker’s hierarchical position.
3.2.1 German Socio-Economic Panel
The GSOEP is a yearly, representative, longitudinal survey of German house-
holds, which consists of both a household survey and an individual survey of all
household members over age 16. The initial survey began in 1984, and there
have have been a total of seven additional waves, including an East German
sample added in 1991 during reunification. This analysis uses data from 1984
to 2009.
The primary motive for using this data set over others is the inclusion of
an occupational position question, which I interpret as a worker’s hierarchical
position, that I use to assign workers to one of three hierarchical levels. As
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this question is independent of the worker’s recorded occupation, I am able to
assign worker position without relying on occupational coding, which can mask
true hierarchical mobility.5 For example, in the NLSY, only roughly 40% of pro-
motions correspond to a change in three-digit occupation code.6 I discuss this
variable and the level assignment procedure in more detail in Section 3.2.3.
My estimation sample is based on men between ages 18 and 60.7 I drop the
East German population, since reunification occurs during my sample period.
To avoid issues associated with some workers entering the labor market later,
I select only workers with fewer than 13 years of education. Due to the fea-
tures of the German educational system, selecting based on years of education
has the effect of choosing workers from a number of different educational cate-
gories. However, it allows me to be confident that the worker has entered the
labor market by age 18, while still providing as large a sample size as possi-
ble. I include observations where the worker is in the labour market, either
unemployed or employed. I drop workers in the agricultural sector and mil-
itary, as well as workers with missing education information. Also, I clean
the data by dropping observations where net monthly income is less than 400
Euro/month.8 I consider only full-time workers, defined as those working over
5A worker’s level does not depend explicitly on their occupation, though the distribution of
workers across levels does vary across occupations.
6See Cassidy (2012).
7While the official retirement age in Germany is 65, the effective age as estimated by the
OECD is several years earlier.
8All wage figures are in 2009 Euros.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics, Estimation Sample
All Lower Level Middle Level Upper Level
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Age 40.76 40.58 40.01 43.60
(10.21) (10.56) (10.26) (8.75)
Tenure 12.77 10.83 12.92 16.29
(9.86) (8.86) (9.91) (10.64)
Experience 20.00 19.86 19.27 22.69
(10.63) (11.03) (10.61) (9.36)
Net Income 1, 903.23 1, 651.75 1, 869.35 2, 538.90
(659.12) (444.43) (524.93) (955.45)
Blue-Collar 0.67 0.85 0.64 0.41
(0.47) (0.36) (0.48) (0.49)
White-Collar 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.59
(0.47) (0.36) (0.48) (0.49)
Lower Level 0.33
(0.47)
Middle Level 0.52
(0.50)
Upper Level 0.16
(0.36)
Observations 45,322 14,787 23,430 7,099
Income in net monthly wages, 2009 Euros. All time variables measured in years. Source: German
Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-2009.
30 hours per week. Only workers in Blue-Collar, White-Collar and Civil Ser-
vice jobs are used.9 I allocate Civil Service workers to the White-Collar group.
Lastly, I require that the worker is observed for at least five years in the labor
market. In total, I am left with a sample of 4550 workers, and a total of 50,578
worker-years of observations, which results in an average of roughly 14 years
per worker.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the sample. To illustrate the rela-
tionships between levels and other variables, I show descriptive statistics for
levels 1, 2, and 3 in columns two, three, and four, respectively. Several obvious
patterns emerge. Age, tenure, and experience all rise with level, though age
does not increase as greatly as experience and tenure. As expected, there is
9The means dropping self-employed and workers and trainees.
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a strong positive relationship between level and income. I discuss the occupa-
tional aggregation in Section 3.4.2.
3.2.2 German Qualification and Career Survey
The German Qualification and Career Survey is a cross-sectional worker sur-
vey with five waves: 1979, 1986, 1992, 1998 and 2006. Questions asked cover
worker qualification and working conditions, as well as a limited number of
worker characteristics. While the number of workers varies by survey, it ranges
from 20,000 to 30,000 per wave.10
For each survey, workers are asked a series of yes/no questions concerning
their task usage in their job. For example, a worker might be asked whether or
not they do any cleaning. While each survey asks questions of this nature, their
wording and number vary between the waves. As a result, direct comparison
across all of the cross-sections is problematic. Instead, I focus on the 1986 and
1992 waves as these surveys are, in terms of task questions, nearly identical.
I use only men to assign tasks, since my labor market data include only men.
After cleaning the data, I am left with 31,516 observations.
In total, I use 20 task-related questions in my analysis.11 The first group of
tasks are denoted as cognitive and include: research, planning, law, calculate,
10See Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010), who also use these data to assign task usages.
11Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) group tasks into Analytical, Interactive, and Manual.
I use the same grouping, except I combine the Analytical and Interactive into the Cognitive
group.
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IT, write, educate, publish, guide, and buy. The second task group, manual,
includes: maintain, secure, repair, grow, create, build, entertain, clean, and
pack. A worker is said to perform the cognitive task if they perform any of
the tasks in the cognitive group, and similarly for manual. For example, if a
worker responds “yes” to the cleaning task, then their manual task variable is
one. Additional “yes” responses to tasks in the manual group have no effect,
as the manual task usage is already set to one. If the worker does not respond
“yes” to any of the tasks in one of the two groups, then that task usage group is
set to zero. Table 3.3 demonstrates the grouping of these variables, as well as
their descriptive statistics for only men. Column (1) shows results for the entire
sample, while column (2) shows blue-collar workers and column (3) white-collar
workers. There is a strong negative correlation of -0.521 between cognitive and
manual tasks.
Previous works which examine task usage, such as Ingram and Neumann
(2006), Poletaev and Robinson (2008), Yamaguchi (2010, 2012), and Sanders
(2012), make use of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), or its succes-
sor O*NET, to assign task usages to occupations. However, as I want to focus
on mobility within occupations across hierarchical levels, I require data which
allow for task assignment by both occupation and level. The GQCS includes
a question which asks for a worker’s occupational position, and is nearly iden-
tical to the occupational position question in the GSOEP. This allows me to
assign tasks by both occupation and level. Hierarchical assignment is done in
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics, Task Usage
All Blue-Collar White-Collar
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive 0.63 0.28 0.91
(0.48) (0.45) (0.29)
Research 0.15 0.08 0.23
(0.36) (0.27) (0.42)
Plan 0.13 0.06 0.18
(0.34) (0.24) (0.39)
Law 0.14 0.02 0.26
(0.35) (0.14) (0.44)
Calculate 0.20 0.03 0.30
(0.40) (0.17) (0.46)
IT 0.13 0.02 0.24
(0.34) (0.15) (0.43)
Write 0.32 0.08 0.51
(0.47) (0.28) (0.50)
Educate 0.16 0.04 0.26
(0.36) (0.20) (0.44)
Publish 0.06 0.00 0.11
(0.24) (0.06) (0.31)
Guide 0.32 0.12 0.48
(0.47) (0.32) (0.50)
Buy 0.23 0.06 0.29
(0.42) (0.24) (0.46)
Manual 0.69 0.96 0.42
(0.46) (0.19) (0.49)
Maintain 0.03 0.01 0.04
(0.16) (0.09) (0.19)
Secure 0.06 0.04 0.08
(0.23) (0.20) (0.27)
Machinery 0.30 0.48 0.14
(0.46) (0.50) (0.35)
Repair 0.30 0.50 0.10
(0.46) (0.50) (0.30)
Grow 0.05 0.05 0.01
(0.21) (0.21) (0.11)
Create 0.08 0.14 0.03
(0.27) (0.35) (0.16)
Build 0.15 0.26 0.04
(0.35) (0.44) (0.20)
Entertain 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.14) (0.09) (0.14)
Clean 0.05 0.07 0.03
(0.22) (0.26) (0.16)
Pack 0.26 0.31 0.18
(0.44) (0.46) (0.39)
Observations 32,223 13,938 14,401
Source: German Qualification and Survey, 1986 and 1992 waves.
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Table 3.3: Task Usages
Cognitive Manual
Blue Collar, Level 1 0.14 0.86
Blue Collar, Level 2 0.21 0.79
Blue Collar, Level 3 0.40 0.60
White Collar, Level 1 0.53 0.47
White Collar, Level 2 0.68 0.32
White Collar, Level 3 0.75 0.25
Source: German Qualification and Career Survey, 1986 and 1992
waves.
the same manner as in the GSOEP.
Task assignment follows the same procedure as Gathmann and Scho¨nberg
(2010), except I assign tasks to occupation-levels instead of occupations.12 Each
occupation-level’s task usage is the probability of a worker in that occupation-
level reporting using that task; in other words, it is the mean task usage within
each occupation-level group. I then re-weight the task usage to sum to one.
While other task usage sources such as the DOT have a measure of task usage
intensity within an occupation, workers in the GQCS respond only “yes/no” to
task questions. While workers are not asked how intensively they use a task,
workers in jobs where a certain task is used more intensively should be more
likely to report “yes” when asked about their task usage. As a result, it is likely
that higher task usage represents task usage intensity to some degree. While
not an ideal measure, it does allow for the assignment of task usage by level,
which is not possible using data such as the DOT. Furthermore, if reporting
performing one task makes a worker less likely to report performing another
task, then weighting the tasks to represent fractions instead of intensity helps
12I used the 1998 and 2006 waves of the GQCS to produce a cross-walk between the ISCO-88
codes used in the GSOEP and the 1988 revised vocational classification.
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alleviate the issues related to the lack of intensity measure.
3.2.3 Hierarchical Levels
In this section, I discuss the procedure by which I assign workers to hierar-
chical levels and present empirical evidence that motivates incorporating this
type of mobility in the model.
The GSOEP and GQCS are unique in that they both contain a survey ques-
tion that asks for a worker’s rank in their job. A sample of the survey question
is available in Appendix B.1. Lluis (2005) uses this feature of the GSOEP
to assign workers to one of four hierarchical levels. I follow her assignment
procedure but I aggregate the top two levels, leaving me with a total of three
hierarchical levels.13 This question is specific to the worker’s position, i.e. their
white-collar, blue-collar, or civil-servant status.14 However, it is not specific to
the worker’s occupation itself. For instance, the worker is not asked what rank
of plumber they occupy, but instead what their rank is as a blue-collar worker.
This is an important feature of the question since it makes it feasible to ag-
gregate occupations together and combine their hierarchical levels. To see why
this is the case, consider a manual laborer and a plumber, both of who belong
to the same aggregate occupational group. If the hierarchical level question
13Since Chapter four of this dissertation also uses the assignment procedure but has four
levels, I include the four-level assignment procedure in Appendix B.1
14Apprentice/Trainee and self-employed divisions are also present, but I drop these workers
from my sample.
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were specific to the worker’s occupation, then a manual laborer who is high-
skilled compared to other laborers might report being in the high hierarchical
level within that occupation, even if that worker is, overall, lower skilled than
most plumbers. Aggregating the plumber and manual laborer occupations to-
gether would therefore result in lower-skilled manual laborers being assigned
to higher hierarchical levels than higher-skilled plumbers. But if the hierar-
chical level question were not specific to the occupation, then even a relatively
high-skilled manual laborer is likely to report being in the lower hierarchical
level, and as a result when the plumber and manual laborer occupations are
aggregated, there is less chance of improper hierarchical level assignment.
A potential issue with assigning workers to hierarchical levels is that they
might simply be replicating the information contained in the occupation code,
in that workers in high-skilled occupations report being in a higher level, while
workers in low-skilled occupations report being in a lower level. Due to the
wording of the level question, we can expect that occupations vary in terms
of the distribution of workers across levels, with some occupations weighted
towards lower levels and some towards higher levels. This is indeed the case:
using the GSOEP estimation sample, I find that 155 of the 265 reported occu-
pations have fewer than 5% of workers in that occupation in one of the three
levels. However, these occupations contain only an average of 102 workers
while the overall average per occupation is 298, so the low representation is
likely due at least in part to a lack of observations. Also, 67% of workers are
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employed in occupations where there are at least 5% of workers employed at
all levels of the occupation. So while the distribution of workers across levels
within an occupation does vary across occupations, most workers are employed
in an occupation with a non-trivial representation of workers at each level.
This provides evidence that the worker’s reported level does not simply dupli-
cate the information contained in the occupation code, even though occupation
does impact the distribution of workers across levels.
Since the worker’s hierarchical level is self-reported, there is the potential
for spurious level changes to occur. To help mitigate this problem, I clean the
data using a procedure similar to that used by Yamaguchi (2010), who as-
sumes that occupation changes within a firm are misspecified (and thus are
corrected) if the worker eventually returns to the previous occupation while at
the same firm. I clean hierarchical level cycles in a similar manner: if a worker
changes levels between period-1 and period-2, but returns to the period-1 level
in period-3, the worker’s level in period-2 is set to the period-1(and period-3)
level. This procedure assumes that such level cycles are miscodings. The pro-
motion rate is reduced from 10.7% to 4.8% as a result of this procedure.15
There is strong support in the literature for the importance of hierarchical
level to worker career outcomes. Notably, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstro¨m (1994)
demonstrate the importance of job level to worker wages using a single-firm
15While this procedure likely mislabels some genuine promotions, the wage change from
promotion rises from 2.6% to 3.6%. Furthermore, promotions that were corrected to be non-
promotions as a result of this procedure have an average wage change of only 1.9%. These
results indicate that many of the corrected “promotions” were, in fact, spurious.
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U.S. data set. Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann (2004) also confirm the strong
link between job level and wage using personnel data from the Dutch aircraft
manufacturer Fokker. Using nationally-representative Finnish data, Kauha-
nen and Napari (2012) also demonstrate the importance of job level to wages,
and note that job level can explain a substantial fraction of wage variation.
I replicate these analyses using the GSOEP to investigate the connection
between hierarchical level and worker wages. This is done by estimating a set
of wage regressions, controlling for demographic characteristics, human capi-
tal variables, and hierarchical levels. Table 3.4 shows the results. Column (2)
shows the importance of hierarchical level to log wage level, even in the pres-
ence of other controls: workers in the second level have 15% higher wages than
workers in level 1, while those in level 3 have 32.8% higher wages. Column (5)
repeats this estimation but using a fixed-effect model. While the effect of level
is diminished to some extent, the results clearly show that workers in higher
levels have higher wages overall. These results mirror those found in the stud-
ies cited above, and confirm the importance of hierarchical position to worker
wages.
Not only do hierarchical levels themselves affect wages, but changes in hier-
archical levels are associated with large changes in wages. While the GSOEP
does not contain data on promotions and demotions directly, I say that a worker
has been promoted if they report being in a higher level this year than in the
previous year, and analogously for a demotion. One of the consistent findings
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Table 3.4: Wages and Hierarchical Level
OLS Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experience 0.033∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Experience2 −0.088∗∗ −0.094∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.103∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
Experience3/1000 0.007∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Tenure 0.025∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure2/100 −0.120∗∗ −0.110∗∗ −0.090∗∗ −0.086∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Tenure3/1000 0.019∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.111∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.101∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)
Age2/100 −0.278∗∗ −0.231∗∗ −0.173∗∗ −0.149∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.048) (0.048)
Age3/1000 0.022∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Middle Level 0.149∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.145∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Upper Level 0.328∗∗ 0.470∗∗ 0.190∗∗ 0.221∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Occupation Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Observations 44,553 44,553 44,553 44,553 44,553 44,553
R2 0.177 0.204 0.095 0.077 0.086 0.046
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is log monthly wages, 2009 Euros. Time variables measured in years. All regressions include year
dummy variables. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-2009.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
in the internal labor market literature is that large wage increases are typical
upon promotion. In the GSOEP, I find that a worker receiving a promotion ex-
periences on average about three times the expected wage growth of a worker
who is not promoted. Also, I find that workers who are demoted (move to a
lower level) experience real wage declines on average. These results suggest
that not only are levels themselves important to worker careers, but also that
changes in levels are indicators of career progression.
A worker’s hierarchical level also impacts the probability that the worker
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undergoes an occupational change. I demonstrate this feature of the data by es-
timating a linear probability model of occupation change controlling for worker
characteristics, occupation, and level in the initial period. Results are shown in
Table 3.5. I find that workers in the lowest level have 3-5% more occupational
mobility per year than in the higher two levels, compared to an overall 17%
per year occupation change rate using ISCO-88 codes. This represents approx-
imately a 25% difference in the probability that a worker changes occupations.
With the blue-collar/white-collar occupation coding used in this chapter, the
story becomes more complex: while occupational mobility rates are higher for
those in the lowest level overall, workers in blue-collar level 1 have the lowest
occupational change rate of any occupation-level. The rate climbs by level in
blue-collar, is highest for white-collar level 1, and declines with level in white-
collar. This pattern can be partly explained by considering the cognitive task
usage of an occupation-level. Including the worker’s cognitive task usage in the
previous occupation change regression strengthens the impact of being in the
lower level. Overall, I find that workers in occupation-levels with high cogni-
tive task usage are more likely to change occupations. Since lower levels typ-
ically have lower cognitive task usages, and cognitive task usage is positively
related to occupation change probability, omitting this control mitigates the
impact of level on occupation change to some degree. This additional control
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Table 3.5: Occupation Change and Hierarchical Level
ISCO WC/BC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experience 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗∗ −0.003 −0.003 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience2 −0.032∗ −0.031∗ −0.032∗ 0.011 0.012 0.011
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Experience3/1000 0.004 0.004 0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure −0.013∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure2/100 0.068∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Tenure3/1000 −0.010∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.045∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.042∗∗ 0.010 0.010 0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age2/100 0.099∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.092∗∗ −0.022 −0.022 −0.026
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Age3/1000 −0.007∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.007∗ 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lower Level 0.030∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.004 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Cognitive 0.150∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.046∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.018) (0.018)
Wage Quintiles
Quintile 2 −0.018∗∗ −0.005
(0.006) (0.003)
Quintile 3 −0.023∗∗ −0.012∗∗
(0.006) (0.003)
Quintile 4 −0.029∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.003)
Quintile 5 −0.019∗∗ −0.011∗∗
(0.006) (0.003)
Observations 37,043 37,043 37,043 37,043 37,043 37,043
R2 0.215 0.216 0.216 0.036 0.036 0.037
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is binary, and equals one if an occupation change occured, and zero otherwise. Column (1) measures
occupation using ISCO-88 codes, while column (2) uses blue-collar/white-collar codes. Time variables measured in years. Wages measured in log monthly
wages, 2009 Euros. All variables measured in initial period. All regressions include year, occupation and industry dummy variables. Source: German
Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-2009.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
helps to explain the relationship observed in the blue-collar/white-collar divi-
sion where occupational mobility increases with level in the blue-collar occupa-
tion. I find that when using the blue-collar/white-collar codes and controlling
for task usage and other worker and job characteristics, workers in the lowest
level experience 0.8% more occupational mobility in a given year, compared to
the overall rate of 3.0%. While a lower absolute effect than observed using the
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ISCO-88 codes, the relative increase is approximately the same, with workers
in the lower level having approximately 27% higher probability of changing
occupations.
Groes, Kircher and Manovskii (2010) find that occupational mobility ex-
hibits a U-shaped pattern, where low and high earners within an occupation
are the most likely to move. Since there is a strong connection between hier-
archical level and earnings, my results may be picking up this relationship. I
test this by including occupation-specific wage quintiles in the linear regression
specification. The inclusion of these variables does not significantly impact the
positive effect that being in the lower level has on the probability of occupa-
tional mobility. Interestingly, the wage quintile coefficients are negative and,
with the exception of quintile 2 in the WC/BC estimation, statistically signifi-
cant. Furthermore, they appear to exhibit the U-shaped pattern described in
Groes, Kircher and Manovskii (2010), yet I cannot reject the hypothesis that
the coefficients for quintiles 2-5 are equal.
Another key finding that supports the importance of hierarchical levels is
the effect of level on outcomes for unemployed workers. 18.3% of workers who
pass through unemployment in my estimation sample return to a lower level
than they were in before unemployment. These workers suffer an average
wage loss of 13.8%, compared to the 1.1% wage loss suffered by workers who
return to the same or a higher level. These results suggest that a significant
fraction of wages lost during unemployment are the result of the worker being
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unable to return to their preferred level after unemployment. I further inves-
tigate this effect by performing a regression of wage change during unemploy-
ment on worker characteristics, occupation, industry, unemployment duration,
and dummy variables for whether the worker’s occupation changed during un-
employment and whether the worker returned to a lower level than before
unemployment (i.e. suffered a “demotion”). I find that wage losses during un-
employment are approximately 10% higher for workers who return to a level
lower than their pre-unemployment level. This result holds even when con-
trolling for initial occupation, final occupation, and occupation change at the
three-digit level. Thus, it appears that workers coming out of unemployment
are significantly impacted by where in the hierarchy they return. I investigate
the possibility that search frictions cause this result in the model estimated in
this chapter.
Task usage provides another strong motivation for the separation of occupa-
tions into levels. Since detailed task usage information is typically unavailable
in panel data sets, including the NLSY and the GSOEP, researchers are forced
to assign task usage based on some observed characteristics in the longitudinal
data. Typically, this has been the worker’s occupation. However, what this nec-
essarily means is that all workers in the same occupation have the same task
usage, which is unlikely to hold. Indeed, Autor and Handel (2013) find task
usage varies significantly both within and between occupations.16 Specifically,
16See also Gordo and Skirbekk (2013) which investigates changes in task usage over time in
the GQCS.
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Table 3.6: Unemployment Wage Change and Hierarchical Level Change
(1) (2)
ISCO WC/BC
Experience −0.012 −0.010
(0.010) (0.009)
Experience2 0.024 0.017
(0.026) (0.023)
Age 0.019 0.012
(0.022) (0.019)
Age2/100 −0.026 −0.016
(0.027) (0.023)
Unemployment Duration −0.026 −0.030∗
(0.015) (0.013)
Occupation Change −0.037 −0.008
(0.036) (0.048)
Demotion −0.090∗ −0.100∗∗
(0.041) (0.035)
Observations 528 528
R2 0.418 0.244
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is change in log wages
during unemployment spell, 2009 Euros. Column (1) measures occupation
using ISCO-88 codes, while column (2) uses blue-collar/white-collar codes.
Demotion refers to a worker returning to a lower level than before unem-
ployment. Time variables measured in years. All regressions include year,
occupation and industry dummy variables. Source: German Socio-Economic
Panel, 1984-2009.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
they find that both employment characteristics such as experience, and worker
characteristics such as education, race, and gender, have statistically signifi-
cant impacts on abstract, routine and manual task usages, even when control-
ling for occupation. From this we can conclude that assigning task usage based
solely on a worker’s occupation misses a potentially significant amount of task
variation.
I perform similar analyses using the German Qualification and Career Sur-
vey. The following results include both men and women but excludes East
German workers, while the sample used to assign tasks includes only men.17
17While the size of the coefficients change if I consider only men, the qualitative results hold.
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Since the GQCS is a survey of workers, I am able to examine what character-
istics of both the job and of workers impact the task usages that the worker
reports. This is in contrast to a data set such as the DOT where task usage
is given only by occupation and does not allow for investigation of task usage
variation within occupation. I analyze the cognitive and manual tasks sepa-
rately. I regress the worker’s task usage, which equals 1 if the worker performs
that task and 0 otherwise, on several worker characteristics, occupation, in-
dustry code, and hierarchical level. I repeat this analysis for blue-collar and
white-collar, since the level division is particular to those categories.
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 3.7. Similar to Autor
and Handel (2013), I find that characteristics other than occupation are statis-
tically significantly related to the probability that a worker reports performing
a given task. These include age, potential experience, education, and sex. Most
important to this chapter, I find that the worker’s reported hierarchical level
has a significant effect for each of the tasks. Cognitive task usage increases
with level while manual task usage decreases with level in the overall sample
as well as in the blue-collar and white-collar subsamples. These effects are also
non-trivial in size: for example, a level 3 worker has a 24.1% higher probability
of performing the cognitive task, controlling for their occupation, industry, and
worker characteristics, compared to a level 1 worker. Thus, a worker’s hierar-
chical level has a large impact on their task usage, which motivates incorporat-
ing hierarchical level into the task assignment procedure. Also, though these
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Table 3.7: Task Usage and Hierarchical Level
Cognitive Manual
All BC WC All BC WC
Female 0.021∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.010∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.010
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Age 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.001 −0.002∗ 0.001 −0.004∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age2/100 −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Middle Level 0.108∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.077∗∗ −0.033∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.035∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Upper Level 0.241∗∗ 0.449∗∗ 0.109∗∗ −0.072∗∗ −0.037∗∗ −0.058∗∗
(0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Observations 42,656 18,014 24,642 42,656 18,014 24,642
R2 0.562 0.253 0.287 0.485 0.203 0.285
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is binary, and equals one is the worker reports using the task, and zero otherwise. BC refers
to the blue-collar occupation while WC refers to white-collar. All regressions include education level, occupation, and industry dummy variables.
Source: German Qualification and Survey, 1986 and 1992 waves.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
data are only cross-sectional, it does suggest that a worker moving to a higher
level within their occupation changes the tasks that they perform, which is a
dimension of task change that has not previously been considered.
3.3 Model
In this section I describe the model. Estimating a structural occupational
choice model allows me to run counterfactual simulations and assess the im-
portance of the different sources of skill accumulation to wage growth, and the
effect that including levels has on this specificity. My occupational choice model
is similar to Keane and Wolpin (1997). While that paper considers both school-
ing and work decisions, I consider only labor market outcomes after schooling
is complete.
78
3.3.1 Environment
The labor market consists of J occupations, where each occupation has L differ-
ent levels.18 Workers enter the labor market in unemployment. An unemployed
worker has probability φ1 of receiving a job offer at the beginning of the period.
This offer comes from a single occupation-level. With probability φj+1 the of-
fer comes from occupation j. The offer probability varies by hierarchical level,
where κj1 and κ
j
2 are the probabilities that an occupation j offer is from levels 1
and 2, respectively. The offer probability from level 3 thus is (1− κj1− κj2). Note
that these values are allowed to vary by occupation j. An unemployed worker
that receives no job offer stays in unemployment for another period, while an
unemployed worker that receives an offer from occupation j, level l has the
option of moving to that occupation-level or remaining in unemployment.
Once employed, a worker faces an exogenous job destruction rate of ψj.
Again, note that this rate is allowed to vary by occupation. If an unemployed
worker is hit with this job destruction shock, they are immediately able to re-
ceive a job offer with the same probability as an unemployed worker. As a
result, some workers who experience job destruction are actually re-employed
immediately and are not recorded as unemployed. Without this feature, all
unemployment spells would be a minimum of one year due to the model be-
ing yearly. Some workers who in the data do not pass through unemployment
18It is not restrictive to assume a common number of levels when fairly aggregated occu-
pation groups are considered. At a three-digit disaggregation level, however, this assumption
would not hold without amalgamating the number of levels.
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likely do suffer a job destruction, but are quickly or immediately re-employed,
which is possible with this specification.
If an employed worker does not suffer job destruction, they have probability
νj1 of receiving a within-occupation job offer. These offers allow the worker to
move across levels within their occupation, where the distribution of these of-
fers by level is determined by the κ values re-weighted to exclude their current
level.19 Finally employed workers whose job is not destroyed and do not receive
a within-occupation offer have probability νj2 of receiving an across-occupation
offer, with the same κ determining the probability distribution across levels.
Note that these offer arrival rates are allowed to vary by occupation j. Re-
gardless of job offer outcome, the worker has the option of moving into unem-
ployment. Conditional on not suffering job destruction, an employed worker
can choose to stay in their current occupation-level. Finally, all workers have a
finite lifetime of T years.
3.3.2 Tasks and Skills
Each occupation-level has a task usage vector which describes what work is
performed in that job. I consider two tasks and corresponding skills, Cogni-
tive and Manual.20 The occupation j, level l task usages are τ jl = (τ cjl, τmjl ).
These values represent the relative usage of a task in an occupation-level, and
19For example, a within-occupation job offer for a blue-collar level 2 worker has probability
κBC1
1−κBC2
of being from level 1, and a probability 1−κ
BC
2 −κBC1
1−κBC2
of being from level 2.
20Yamaguchi (2012) and Sanders (2012) both include only Cognitive and Manual tasks.
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thus are bounded between zero and one and sum to one.21 Also, task usage is
constant over time.22 Corresponding to the cognitive and manual tasks, each
worker i has cognitive and manual skill levels in period t, which I denote as
sit = (s
c
it, s
m
it ).
Each worker is endowed with an initial (unobserved) vector of skills at la-
bor market entry which they apply to tasks to produce output. The earliest a
worker can enter the labor market is age 18. I assume that the worker’s skills
remain unchanged between ages 18 and when they enter the labor market.
While this would be problematic if more education groups were included, be-
cause I consider workers with at most 13 years of education, 96% of my workers
have entered the labor market by age 20.
The initial skills per worker are drawn from normal distributions:
ski1 ∼ N(µk, σk), k ∈ {c,m} (3.1)
These skills grow over time, depending on the worker’s current task usage in a
job.23 The law of motion for skills is:
ski,t+1 = s
k
it +
(Rkτ
k
jl)
1 + γt
− δk, k ∈ {c,m} (3.2)
21This is a common assumption in the task literature. This includes Gathmann and
Scho¨nberg (2010), which uses the same task data as this chapter, as well as Lazear (2009).
22This assumption is data driven as the task data are only comparable across two waves.
23This is a common assumption. For example, Yamaguchi (2012) and Sanders (2012) demon-
strate that task usage does indeed affect worker skill accumulation.
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where Rk is a scalar that determines the impact of task usage of skill k on
the growth of skill k, where k ∈ {c,m} represents cognitive or manual. δk
is the rate of depreciation of skill k. In order to match the concave shaped
of lifecycle wages, I allow the rate of skill change to be a function of period
through parameter γ. Conditional on occupational choice (that is, task usage
vector), skills change in a deterministic manner.24
Workers also accumulate occupation-specific skills, where worker i’s period
t occupation j skill level is denoted as xjit. Workers enter the labor market
with zero occupation-specific skill level in each occupation, i.e. xji1 = 0 for all
i and j. Occupation-specific skills evolve in a similar manner as transferable
skills, where the task-usage of an occupation skill is always one within that
occupation, and zero outside. Thus, occupation-specific skills evolve according
to:
xji,t+1 = x
j
it +
(Rj)
1 + γt
(3.3)
if the worker is currently in occupation j, and xj−1i,t+1 = x
j−1
it otherwise, and
where Rj describe the rate of occupation j skill change. Note that this value
is allowed to vary by occupation, reflecting the empirical evidence suggesting
that occupation-specific human capital differs in importance across occupa-
tions. The entire set of occupation-specific skills for worker i in year t is referred
24Sanders (2012), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) and Nagypal (2007) all allow for the skill
accumulation rate to change with age.
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to as xit. The worker’s state space is their task-specific skill levels, sit, their
occupation-specific skill levels, xit, and their current occupation-level (or unem-
ployment) status. I refer to the collection of state variables as Sit = {sit,xit, j, l}.
All information is symmetric and there is no uncertainty by the worker or em-
ployer about the worker’s skill levels, though these skill levels are unobserved
by the econometrician.
3.3.3 Wages
A worker’s wage is a function of several elements. First, a worker’s task-specific
skill level, sit, interacts with the task usage of the job, τ jl. Second, the worker’s
occupation-specific skill xjit contributes to output.25 Lastly, there is a random
wage component, it. This stochastic variable is a J ∗ L + 1 vector with a value
for each occupation-level and the non-employment state. It affects the worker’s
wage in the employed states, and the worker’s non-pecuniary utility in the
non-employed state. In addition, it is observable by the worker prior to making
their next period decision. Worker i’s log wage in occupation j, level l, in period
t is given by:
wijlt = s
c
itτ
c
jl + s
m
it τ
m
jl + x
j
it + jlt (3.4)
25Again, it is convenient to think of the worker’s occupation-specific skill as a type of trans-
ferable skill where the task usage equals exactly one in the given occupation, and zero in every
other occupation.
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There is no saving or borrowing, so an employed worker i’s period t utility,
ujlt(sit, xit), equals their wage. Unemployed workers receive a non-pecuniary
benefit λ, plus the random shock component 0t. Workers discount the future
at the rate β.
The worker’s decision problem is to maximize their present value of dis-
counted lifetime utility by selecting their occupation-level each period, con-
ditional on their current occupation-level or being in unemployment and the
presence of an offer from another occupation-level. Their choice of occupation-
level affects not only their wages (or unemployment benefit) in the current pe-
riod, but also their accumulation of both task-specific and occupation-specific
skills. Thus, the worker might sacrifice current wages in favour of the accumu-
lation of skills, which increases future wages. This also applies to unemploy-
ment: a worker might choose employment, even if the estimated unemploy-
ment benefit is relatively high, due to the effect such a decision would have on
their continuation value. For brevity I omit the value function specification,
given in Appendix B.2.
3.4 Estimation
I use indirect inference to estimate the model parameters. One of the main mo-
tivations for using indirect inference is data related. While other occupational-
choice models, such as Keane and Wolpin (1997), use the NLSY as a data
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source, I use the GSOEP since it contains hierarchical position information.
The NLSY follows workers from labor market entry. The GSOEP, however, is
representative of the entire population at each survey date. As a result, only
a small number of workers are observed from labor market entry. Essentially,
this amounts to a missing data problem. I overcome this difficulty by simulat-
ing 4550 worker histories from labor market entry to age 60, and selectively
sampling from these histories in order to make the sampled simulated data
set structurally resemble the true data set in several key dimensions. I dis-
cuss this procedure in more detail in Section 3.4.3. I start by discussing how
I aggregate occupations, then I proceed to discuss inference inference and the
simulation procedures.
3.4.1 Occupation Aggregation
Due to the computational burden of estimating discrete choice dynamic models,
the number of occupations must be significantly aggregated.26 Also, as I sub-
divide each occupation into three levels, I am further restricted in the number
of occupations that I can include and still estimate parameters in a reasonable
amount of time. Since the occupational position question is blue-collar/white-
collar dependent, I use blue-collar and white-collar as my occupations. There-
fore, I have two occupations with three levels per occupation, for a total of six
26Keane and Wolpin(1997) uses only white-collar, blue-collar and military, with home and
school options. Lee and Wolpin (2006) include white-collar, blue-collar, and pink-collar occupa-
tions, in both the service and goods sectors, and Sullivan (2010) includes five occupations.
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occupation-levels.27
Since the hierarchical level question differs for blue-collar versus white-
collar workers, the two are not directly comparable. Thus, it is important to
assign workers’ occupations as closely as possible along the blue-collar/white-
collar dimension. However, since the workers self-report their hierarchical
level and blue-collar/white-collar status, assigning the worker’s occupation us-
ing that question is problematic as it increases the chance of occupational mis-
coding and spurious occupation changes. This leaves two conflicting goals: com-
parable level assignment versus accurate occupational classification (and thus
accurate occupation changes). I address this issue by allocating workers based
on their one-digit ISCO-88 occupation category.28 For eight of the nine one-
digit ISCO-88 categories, over 80% of the workers identify themselves as either
white-collar or blue-collar. As a result, I assign all workers in those occupation
groups to blue-collar or white-collar, depending on which is the most preva-
lent. This compromise allows for an accurate hierarchical level assignment for
the vast majority of workers, while preserving the more accurate occupational
categorization, which helps to better identify occupational mobility and avoid
spurious changes.29
27In terms of employment choices, this is greater than both Keane and Wolpin (1997), which
includes only blue-collar, white-collar, and military, and Sullivan, which includes five occupa-
tions. Both works include a schooling and unemployment decision. Future work will include
expanding the number of occupations and levels.
28This approach relies on the assumption that the interviewer is better and more consistently
able to assess the workers’ occupation codes than the workers themselves.
29Previous versions of this chapter used the hierarchial level question itself to assign occupa-
tion. While a valid option, that procedure leads to a great deal of spurious occupation changes.
As a result, this version opts for using the occupational code to assign occupation.
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While eight of the nine occupations can confidently be grouped into either
the blue-collar or white-collar categories, ISCO-88 group 5, “Service workers
and shop and market sales workers”, is more difficult to allocate. As 31% of
workers in this group identify themselves as blue-collar, it seems inappropri-
ate to assign all workers in this group into either white-collar or blue-collar.
I address this problem by using the three-digit code for workers in this ma-
jor occupation group. Workers in three-digit groups 511, 513 and 516, and
two-digit group 52, report being white-collar with 85%, 87%, 90%, and 73%
probability, respectively, and so are allocated to that occupation. Workers in
512 and 514 are more difficult to assign, but since they are slightly more likely
to be blue-collar, they are assigned to that occupation. These difficult to assign
workers represent only about 2% of the overall sample. A potential cause for
concern with this procedure is that, since the occupational allocation is done
in a more narrow manner for workers in major group 5, occupational mobility
might be artificially higher if workers move between occupations within this
major group. Investigating mobility patterns, however, reveals that workers
move between the categories within the “Service workers” group infrequently,
so there is little concern that narrowing the occupational allocation for this
group will produce artificially higher mobility.
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3.4.2 Simulation and Indirect Inference
In order to simulate worker careers, I use Chebyshev interpolation to estimate
a worker’s continuation value.30 The random component of wages follows an
extreme value distribution, with variance parameter ξ.31 Starting in the fi-
nal period, I solve the problem using backward induction: I first estimate the
Chebyshev coefficients in period T , then I move to period T − 1, where I use
the period T Chebyshev coefficients to estimate the continuation values. This
allows me to estimate the period T − 1 Chebyshev coefficients, which I in turn
use in period T − 2. This process is repeated until the first period is reached.
Then, using these coefficients, worker histories can be quickly simulated.
Indirect inference involves choosing parameters to make the simulated data
resemble the observed data through the lens of an auxiliary model. This model
consists of several moments that capture aspects of the observed data the
model is attempting to match, e.g. wage growth, occupation-level make-up,
etc. For each parameter guess, N sets of worker histories are simulated.32
Denote the set of parameter estimates as θˆ. The function g(θˆ)n maps the pa-
rameter estimates to the moment estimates for simulation number n ∈ N , and
gˆ is the moment values from the observed data. I average across the N sets of
moments, g(θˆ) = (1/N)
∑N
n g(θˆ)n. The objective is to choose θˆ to minimize the
30Thanks to Salvador Navarro for providing the Fortran code used in the interpolation.
31This assumption simplifies the computational burden, since the integral is closed form.
32I set N = 4 for my estimation.
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following function:
θˆ = arg min
θˆ
(g(θˆ)− gˆ)′W (g(θˆ)− gˆ) (3.5)
The weighting matrix used is the diagonal matrix of the inverse of the stan-
dard errors of the moment conditions.33 I estimate the standard errors using
bootstrapping, with blocking at the individual level. This means that, instead
of selecting a particular worker-year observation to include, I select (with re-
placement) entire worker histories for each bootstrap sample. In total, I use
10,000 samples to estimate the weighting matrix.34 I describe the moment
conditions used in the estimation in Section 3.4.4. Lastly, I set the worker’s
discount rate, β, to 0.95.
3.4.3 Sampling Method
In order to properly perform indirect inference, the observed and simulated
data must structurally resemble each other as much as possible. Two steps are
required for this procedure. The first step involves simulating each worker’s la-
bor market history. This requires me to assign each worker an initial skill level,
and a labor market entry age. I do this by first drawing three random numbers
for each worker. The first two random numbers drawn for each worker deter-
mine their initial, i.e. age 18, cognitive and manual skill levels, distributed
33See Blundell et al. (2008)
34This matrix is calculated only once at the beginning of the estimation process.
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according to Equation (3.1). Next I assign each worker a labor market entry
age using the third random number.35 This assignment is done such that the
distribution of labor market entry ages resembles the distribution in the ob-
served data.36 Given these values, I can then simulate each worker’s labor
market history.
While I observe my entire simulated data set, I do not perform indirect in-
ference using all of the simulated data since its structure does not match the
GSOEP. Matching the structure of the GSOEP requires drawing an additional
pair of random numbers for each worker which determine the sampling char-
acteristics of that worker’s labor market history. The first random number is
used to assign each worker a sample entry age, when they are first “observed”.
As with labor market entry age, these values are chosen to match the popu-
lation distribution. Given this entry age, I select the number of years each
worker is observed using the second random number. All observations lying
outside of this range are ignored and considered as unobserved for the pur-
poses of indirect inference. When constructing variables such as experience in
an occupation, I use only values that I can “see”, since this is what I must do
35I assume that skills are unchanged during the period after age 18 when the worker is not
yet in the labor market. If the model were to include more educated workers, this would be
problematic, since the distribution of initial wages for these workers strongly suggests that
later labor market entry is correlated with higher skills upon labor market entry. However,
for the lower-educated group, the vast majority enter the labor market in the first two to three
years, so I do not view this as an issue for this group.
36I determine the distribution of labor market entry by analyzing male workers in the
GSOEP who are observed for every year between ages 18 to 30 and who eventually enter
the labor market.
90
in the observed data. Thus, while this procedure causes me to lose informa-
tion regarding the simulated sample, it is necessary since I do not have this
information in the observed data. I then search for the set of structural param-
eters that solve Equation 3.5, i.e. the parameters that minimize the objective
function. This yields my set of structural parameters, θˆ.
3.4.4 Auxiliary Model
Indirect inference proceeds by choosing the model parameters that make the
simulated data as similar to the observed data as possible, where “similar”
refers to the moments of the auxiliary model. While identification of each of
the model parameters does not, strictly speaking, come from a single moment
condition, nonetheless the moments are chosen to convey relevant information
regarding one or a set of parameters. In this section, I describe the moments
used in my auxiliary model and how they help to identify my model parameters.
Workers’ initial skill levels are drawn from iid distributions N(µc, σc) and
N(µm, σm). To help identify these parameters, I use the mean and variance
of initial worker earnings for each occupation-level. Initial earnings are used
since worker’s wages are not yet significantly affected by skill accumulation.
I restrict myself to at most the first observed wage per individual, and force
that wage to be observed within the first seven years in the labor market.37
Variation in task usage across occupation-levels helps to separately identify the
37Since level 3 of each occupation is comparatively sparse in the initial few years, I allow the
first wage to be observed in the first 12 years for these occupation-levels.
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mean and variance parameters of the initial skill distributions, thus the initial
mean and variance of wages of each occupation-level are included separately.
Several wage variance moments are used to identify ξ, the variance pa-
rameter of the random component of wages and non-pecuniary returns. These
include the variance of initial wages discussed above, as well as overall wage
variance. In addition, I include the mean individual lifetime wage variance
and the variance of individual wage change between years, all of which help to
pin down ξ.
Initial wage levels also help to identify the unemployment benefit parame-
ter λ.38 In addition, I perform a linear probability regression of employment to
unemployment transition, controlling for previous period wage:
empunempit = β
1
0 + β
1
1wit + 
1
it (3.6)
where empunempit equals 1 if worker i transitioned from employment to un-
employment between periods t and t + 1, and zero otherwise. The coefficients
from this regression are included in my model as auxiliary parameters. Al-
though some employment to unemployment transitions are involuntary, some
are voluntary. Thus, controlling for current wage level helps to identify λ. In
addition, I include the mean level of wage prior to an unemployment spell,
and mean wages immediately following an unemployment spell. Again, this
helps to identify λ since a higher λ makes unemployment more attractive to
38See Yamaguchi (2010).
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employed workers, raising the wage level at which workers will be willing to
move into unemployment, while increasing the wage level required to induce
workers to exit unemployment.
There are a number of events and corresponding probabilities in my model,
including unemployment to employment, employment to unemployment, and
both within- and across-occupation changes. To identify the job destruction
rates ψBC and ψWC , I include the employment to unemployment probability
rates by occupation. Also, the constant term in regression (3.6) help to identify
this parameter. I include the unemployment to employment rate by destina-
tion occupation-level to help identify the offer arrival rate in unemployment,
φ1, the distribution of job offers by occupation, φ2, and by levels, the κ’s. In ad-
dition, I include unemployment make-up in ages 18, 19, and 20. Since workers
enter the model in unemployment, the changes in the unemployment rate in
the first several years helps to pin down the unemployment job offer arrival
rate. Within-occupation arrival rates, νBC1 and νWC1 , are identified by includ-
ing promotion and demotion rates by occupation. Lastly, the across-occupation
arrival rates, νBC2 and νBC2 , are estimated using occupation change rates by oc-
cupation and level. I also include occupation change rates by occupation and
age range to capture the observed declining pattern of occupation change over
the lifecycle.
In addition to the rate of change moments, I perform a linear probability
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regression of occupation change:
occchangeit = β
2
0 + β
2
1t+ β
2
21(l = 1) + β
2
3τi,t−1 + 
2
it (3.7)
I control for period t, an indicator variable 1(l = 1) which equals one if the ini-
tial level equals 1, and the initial occupation-level’s cognitive task, τi,t−1. One
of the central motivations for including hierarchical level in an occupational
choice model is that a worker in the lower level has a significantly higher prob-
ability of changing occupations. Thus this is a an important moment to match
to the observed empirical facts.
I include non-constant coefficients from linear probability regressions for
each occupation-level. These regressions take the form:39
djlit = β
3
0 + β
3
1t+ β
3
2t
2, j ∈ {BC,WC}, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}+ 3it (3.8)
where djlit is an indicator that equals 1 if worker i is in occupation-level jl in
period t, and 0 otherwise. These regressions help to match the overall pattern
of occupation-level make-up in the data. In particular, they help to properly
identify the probability parameters. If, for example, the blue-collar probability
φ2 was too low, then there would be too few workers in blue-collar jobs, at least
initially, which would not match the patterns from the regressions. Also, I
include the fraction of workers in each occupation-level for age ranges 18-30,
39I include period only linearly for blue-collar level 1 and white-collar level 3, since that
specification better matched the observed data.
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31-50 and 51-60. These moments help my model to fit the overall patterns in
the data.
The final group of parameters to discuss are those related to skill change.
Identification of these parameters comes primarily from considering wages.
First, I include a Mincerian fixed effect wage regression of the following form:
wit = β
4
1t+ β
4
2t
2 + β43exp1,it ∗ 1(j = 1) + β44exp21,it ∗ 1(j = 1) + β45exp31,it ∗ 1(j = 1)
+β46exp2,it ∗ 1(j = 2) + β47exp22,it ∗ 1(j = 2) + β48exp32,it ∗ 1(j = 2) (3.9)
+β49expit + β
4
10exp
2
it + β
4
11τit + β
4
12cogsumit ∗ τit + β413cogsum2it ∗ τit + 4it
where 1(j = 1) and 1(j = 2) are indicator functions that equal 1 if worker i is
in the given occupation in period t, and zero otherwise, expj,it is the worker’s
experience in occupation j at time t and expit is overall experience. In addition,
cogsumit refers to the sum of a worker’s cognitive task usage. For example, if a
worker is employed in an occupation-level with a cognitive task usage of 0.5 in
period 1 and 0.6 in period 2, then cogsum in period 3 would be 1.1.
This regression contains several elements that all help to identify specific
elements of the model. First, since this model contains a search component,
t and t2 are included to help identify this search process. Even without skill
level change, wages would be expected to, on average, increase with age as
workers move to better matches for their skills. Second, workers accumulate
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occupation-specific skills at a rate that (potentially) differs between occupa-
tions. Thus, the occupational experience, interacted with a dummy term for
their current occupation, is included. This allows for occupational experience
to have differential impacts on their wages depending on the occupation, and
helps to identify the RBC and RWC parameters. Third, overall experience terms
are included to help match overall change in worker skill over time. These
terms provide information regarding all of the skill growth as well as deprecia-
tion parameters. The model predicts, however, that the type of experience, i.e.
previous task usages, will impact wages. Also, the impact of this task-weighted
experience depends on the current task usage. Thus, the fourth and final set
of regressors include the cognitive task usage, the cognitive sum (described
above) interacted with cognitive task usage, and the square of their cognitive
sum interacted with cognitive task usage. Including these regressors provides
important information useful for disentangling the growth rate of cognitive (Rc)
versus manual (Rm) skills.
I also include as moments the mean wage levels at different points in the
lifecycle for each occupation-level. These moments help the model to better
match the observed wage patterns. Also, they help to pin down the curvature
parameter on skill change, γ. I choose the years to be representative of the
overall lifecycle pattern and so include mean wage level at age 29-31, 39-41,
and 54-56. Three-year ranges are included since, for some occupation-levels,
there may be few workers present.
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Since the skill change parameters have direct implications for wage changes,
I also include coefficients from a wage change regression in the auxiliary model:
∆wit = β
5
0 + β
5
1
1
log(t)
+ β52
1
log(t)
∗ τi,t−1 ∗ τi,t + β53expj,it + 5it (3.10)
where ∆wit is worker i’s wage change between periods t − 1 and t, and τi,t−1
and τi,t are worker i’s cognitive task usage in periods t − 1 and t respectively.
The model specification predicts that wage change between periods depends
both on current task usage as well as last-period’s task usage. This is due to
the fact that last period’s task usage determines the change in the skill level,
while current task usage determines payoff from this change in skill. This
change, however, depends on the worker’s age, which enters the equation in
an inverse-log form. Thus, I include the inverse log period as a regressor as
well as interacted with the current and prior task usages. Also, by including
prior task usage, I take advantage of worker movement across either level or
occupation to help identify the skill change parameters. Lastly, as wages also
change due to accumulation of occupation-specific skill, I include the worker’s
occupational experience as a regressor.40
To help match the overall features of the data, especially in terms of mobil-
ity across occupations and levels, I include as auxiliary parameters the mean
40Unlike the Mincerian wage regression, I do not allow occupation experience to interact
with occupation. This is because, in the observed data, I found that such a control produced
little difference in coefficient value or model fit.
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change in worker wages for the following events: no change, promotion, demo-
tion, occupation change, and unemployment.
Lastly, I include coefficients from a regression of the wage change during un-
employment. These help to identify the skill depreciation terms. In addition,
I motivate hierarchical levels by showing that workers who experience “unem-
ployment demotions” suffer significantly higher wage losses than those who
return to the same or higher hierarchical level than their pre-unemployment
level. This regression is as follows:
∆wunit = β
6
0 + β
6
11(undurit > 1) + β
6
2t+ β
6
2unempdemotit + 
6
it (3.11)
where ∆wunit is worker i’s wage change during the unemployment spell that
ended in period t, 1(undurit > 1) is an indicator function that equals one if
the unemployment spell was greater than one year, and zero otherwise, and
unempdemotit is an indicator variable that equals one if the worker returns to
a lower hierarchical level than prior to unemployment.41 Wage changes dur-
ing unemployment for two reasons. First, skills depreciate, and the amount of
depreciation depends on the length of unemployment. Thus, including unem-
ployment duration in this regression helps to pin down the skill depreciation
terms. Second, due to search frictions, workers cannot return to their preferred
occupation-level immediately. As a result, workers who return to a lower level
41A categorical variable is included since there are only a small number of unemployment
spells that last longer than a year.
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experience higher wage losses. Period t is included since older workers are ex-
pected to have had more time to move into their optimal occupation-level, and
thus may suffer higher wage losses due to unemployment.
In addition to wages, it should be noted that the regressions specified by
Equation (3.8) will also help to identify these parameters. Consider, for exam-
ple, if the growth rate in cognitive skill is too high while the growth rate for
manual skill is too low. This would cause workers to accumulate “too much”
cognitive skill, and thus they would substitute into higher cognitive-task us-
ing occupation-levels. Thus, the overall pattern of occupation-level make-up is
crucially affected by skill change parameters.
3.4.5 Estimating Standard Errors
Calculating standard errors using a numerical Jacobian is problematic for this
model due to the non-smoothness of the objective function. This lack of smooth-
ness results from the discrete choice nature of the model. For example, small
changes in the job destruction rate parameter ψj will only impact the objective
function if a worker’s risk of unemployment fell in the small range between the
original and adjusted value, which is unlikely, and thus the finite difference
method will likely fail. While this issue can theoretically be addressed by in-
creasing the number of simulations, there is no guarantee that this procedure
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will lead to accurate standard errors. Instead, I turn to a bootstrap proce-
dure. Using the parameter estimates, I simulate Q data sets,42 and estimate
the model parameters for each simulated data set (θˆq).43 These values are then
used to estimate the standard errors of the parameters. While computationally
intensive, this procedure allows for accurate error terms to be estimated.
In addition to providing standard errors for the parameter values, perform-
ing the bootstrap procedure helps to ensure that my model is, in fact, identified.
Since the estimation is able to recover with a high degree of accuracy the pa-
rameters of the model, this demonstrates that the auxiliary model contains
sufficient information to identify the parameters. These results also demon-
strate that the sampling procedure is effective: since I drop on average around
3/4 of each worker’s occupational history, it is not clear that the remaining data
are enough to reliably recover the model parameters. However, as the results
demonstrate, this method is effective. Thus, even though I simulate 43 years of
data per worker, and I only actually observe at most 25 years per worker (and
on average roughly 14 years), I am still able to estimate the parameters of a
full life-cycle model.
42I use Q = 40 data sets in total.
43See Sullivan (2010), who also uses this method to calculate standard errors in a structural
model.
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3.5 Results
I begin my analysis of the estimation results by discussing the parameter esti-
mates. In addition to estimating parameters for the full model, I also estimate
parameters for a version of the model without levels.44 I then proceed to discuss
the overall fit of the model. Lastly, I describe the counterfactual exercises that
are performed to evaluate the importance of task-specific versus occupation-
specific human capital accumulation to wage growth, and I compare the results
between the models with and without hierarchical levels to assess the impact
of omitting levels from an occupational choice model.
3.5.1 Parameter Estimates
Parameter estimates are shown in Table 3.8. I begin by describing the model
with levels. I find that cognitive skill accumulation exceeds manual skill accu-
mulation. In contrast to Yamaguchi (2012) and Sanders (2012), however, the
manual growth rate is fairly large. Occupation-specific skill growth is large
for the blue-collar occupation but appears to be small for the white-collar oc-
cupation. Depreciation impacts the manual skill more so than the cognitive
skill, which experiences little depreciation. I also find that cognitive skills are
distributed with higher variance than manual skills. The shape parameter
governing skill growth, γ, is 0.284. At this value, by age 40, the rate of skill
44This requires the simplification of the auxiliary model to remove any level-specific mo-
ments. Other than removing moments particular to hierarchical level, the same auxiliary
model is used.
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accumulation by the worker has fallen to 14% of its age 18 value.
Event probabilities vary to a significant degree between the two occupa-
tions. Blue-collar workers experience more than double the job destruction
rate of white-collar workers. White-collar workers also receive job offers both
within and across firms at a higher rate than blue-collar workers. In both oc-
cupations, the probability of receiving a job offer from the highest level is quite
low, which matches the overall scarcity of both white-collar and blue-collar level
3 workers.
Overall, the parameter estimates between the model with and without lev-
els are fairly close, with a few important exceptions. Without levels, the model
estimates a significantly lower rate of blue-collar occupation-specific skill accu-
mulation, and a correspondingly higher level of manual task-specific skill accu-
mulation. Also, the initial distribution of manual skills has a higher variance
in the model without levels. This is likely due to the lower variability in task
vector options making the wage variation more difficult to match, and forcing a
higher distribution of initial skill levels. The mean of the initial cognitive skill
distribution is lower in the model without levels, which again is likely caused
by the lack of task usage variation within the occupation forcing the model to
reduce the overall cognitive skill levels to match the wage data. Lastly, the
across-occupation offer arrival rate for workers in white-collar is significantly
higher in the no level model than in the model with levels. This large difference
in occupation-specific returns appears to be caused by the model attempting to
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Table 3.8: Model Parameter Estimates
Parameters Values
Levels No Levels
Skill Change
Task-Specific
Cognitive: Rc 0.317 (0.027) 0.332 (0.040)
Manual: Rm 0.100 (0.017) 0.210 (0.039)
Occupation-Specific
Blue-Collar: RBC 0.107 (0.009) 0.022 (0.018)
White-Collar: RWC 0.019 (0.011) 0.029 (0.016)
Depreciation
Cognitive: δc 0.003 (0.002) 0.006 (0.003)
Manual: δm 0.026 (0.002) 0.022 (0.002)
Shape Parameter: γ 0.284 (0.022) 0.305 (0.015)
Initial Skill Distributions
Cognitive: µc 6.942 (0.036) 6.71 (0.041)
σc 0.168 (0.019) 0.170 (0.028)
Manual: µm 7.028 (0.023) 7.094 (0.023)
σm 0.043 (0.09) 0.082 (0.012)
Wage Error Variance: ξ 0.101 (0.002) 0.105 (0.001)
Unemployment Benefit: λ 7.147 (0.053) 7.026 (0.022)
Event Probabilities
Unemployment Events
Offer Arrival (Unemployed): φ1 0.507 (0.013) 0.506 (0.021)
Blue-Collar Probability: φ2 0.735 (0.017) 0.796 (0.021)
White-Collar Probability: 1 - φ2 0.265 0.204
Blue-Collar Events
Job Destruction: ψBC 0.088 (0.005) 0.069 (0.004)
Offer Arrival (Within-Occ): νBC1 0.073 (0.013)
Offer Arrival (Across-Occ): νWC2 0.092 (0.022) 0.085 (0.020)
Level 1 Probability: κBC1 0.458 (0.021)
Level 2 Probability: κBC2 0.495 (0.011)
Level 3 Probability: 1- κBC1 - κ
BC
2 0.047
White-Collar Events
Job Destruction: ψWC 0.041 (0.004) 0.049 (0.005)
Offer Arrival (Within-Occ): νWC1 0.104 (0.017)
Offer Arrival (Across-Occ): νWC2 0.308 (0.041) 0.499 (0.162)
Level 1 Probability: κWC1 0.446 (0.045)
Level 2 Probability: κWC2 0.461 (0.016)
Level 3 Probability: 1- κWC1 - κ
BC
2 0.093
Standard errors in parentheses.
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properly match the proportion of workers in each occupation. If I simulate
data using the model without levels but take the skill change parameters from
the model with levels, the white-collar occupation is significantly underrepre-
sented.
3.5.2 Model Fit
In this section I assess the overall fit of my model. I compare the life cycle wage
profiles of the observed data and data simulated using the model parameters,
and I examine the auxiliary model moment values. I include key auxiliary
moments in this section, and leave the rest to Appendix B.4.
Figure 3.1 shows the overall age-wage profiles from the simulated data ver-
sus the observed data. The model fits the pattern well, though the curvature of
the profiles differs somewhat. I show the blue-collar and white-collar life cycle
wage profiles in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. The blue-collar wage profile is matched
extremely well, while the white-collar wage profile does not match as well as
the blue-collar profile. The reason for this disparity is likely due to the inclu-
sion of only a single curvature parameter that governs all skill accumulation.
These results motivate future work to allow for manual and cognitive task us-
age accumulation to have different curvature parameters, which should help
better match the white-collar wage patterns.
Figure 3.4 shows the fraction of workers in the blue-collar and white-collar
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Figure 3.1: Overall Wages
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occupations by age. The model matches the fraction of workers in each occupa-
tion over the life cycle well. The fraction of workers in blue-collar is matched
very well over the entire lifecycle. The white-collar fraction is matched well
after age 30, but is overestimated early in the career. This is due to the model
understating unemployment initially, which can be seen in Figure 3.5. How-
ever, after age 30 the model matches the pattern of unemployment very well,
and begins to closely match the fraction of workers in white-collar. I replicate
these figures for the model without levels, which are included in Appendix B.3.
Both the level and non-level model versions match the occupation fractions
and the wage profile for the blue-collar occupation well. However, the non-level
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Figure 3.2: Wages: Blue-Collar
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Figure 3.3: Wages: White-Collar
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Figure 3.4: Occupation Composition
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Figure 3.5: Unemployment
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Table 3.9: Auxiliary Model: Wage Change During Unemployment
Data Model
1(undurit > 1) -0.06313 -0.01365
(0.0263114) (0.0188719)
t -0.0049 0.002114
(0.0012566) (0.0009503)
unempdemotit -0.11736 -0.11912
(0.0327483) (0.0201509)
Constant 0.113199 -0.13039
(0.0296531) (0.0271916)
N = 559 N¯ = 1290.5
R2 = 0.067 R2 = 0.031
Table 3.10: Auxiliary Model: Occupation Change Regression
Data Model
t -0.00046 -0.00044
(0.0000891) (0.0000806)
1(l = 1) 0.008901 0.012407
(0.0021413) (0.0019732)
τi,t−1 0.032797 0.035915
(0.0042429) (0.0038979)
Constant 0.027232 0.020477
(0.0028657) (0.0027823)
N = 38086 N¯ = 40052
R2 = 0.002 R2 = 0.003
version does not match the white-collar life cycle wage profile.
Two of the main motivating features of the data are: (1) workers who go
through unemployment and return to a lower level suffer larger wage losses
on average than those returning to the same or higher level; and (2) workers
in the lower hierarchical level are more likely to change occupations. Table
3.9 shows the auxiliary model moments for the wage change during unemploy-
ment regression in both the observed and simulated data. The value of note
is the unempdemotit coefficient. In the observed data, workers who experience
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Table 3.11: Auxiliary Model: Occupation Change Probabilities
Data Model
Blue-Collar Level 1 0.021 0.019
Blue-Collar Level 2 0.027 0.024
Blue-Collar Level 3 0.049 0.023
White-Collar Level 1 0.091 0.085
White-Collar Level 2 0.033 0.033
White-Collar Level 3 0.025 0.019
a demotion during unemployment suffer an additional 11.7% wage loss over
those who return to the same or higher level. I am able to match this value
very closely, as in my simulated data, workers experiencing a demotion in un-
employment suffer an additional 11.9% wage loss. Table 3.10 shows the occu-
pation change regression of the auxiliary model. While the coefficient value is
slightly too high, I am nonetheless able to match the positive effect that being
in the lower level has on occupational mobility. Also, as Table 3.11 shows, I am
able to match the increasing occupation change rate by level in blue-collar, and
decreasing rate by level in white-collar. These results confirm that my model
is able to replicate the observed relationships between hierarchical level, occu-
pational mobility, and wage losses from unemployment.
In the model without levels, wage change during unemployment is positive,
which contradicts the empirical observation that wages on average decline as
a results of a spell of unemployment. The reason for wages actually increasing
is that the job arrival rate is higher for workers in unemployment, which can
lead to a better match as a result of passing through unemployment. The model
with hierarchical levels, however, is able to match the observation that wages
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decline during unemployment, due in large part to the presence of hierarchical
level search frictions. Therefore, hierarchical levels appear to be an important
feature of a model that examines wage losses during unemployment, since their
inclusion allows the model to capture a significant source of wage losses.
3.5.3 Counterfactuals
One of the primary motivations for estimating a structural model is that I can
run counterfactual simulations to quantify the relative contributions of task-
specific versus occupation-specific human capital to wage growth, and I can
compare these estimated values between the model with and without hierar-
chical levels. I run four simulations: (1) a baseline simulation at the esti-
mated parameter values; (2) a counterfactual simulation where task-specific
skill growth rates Rc and Rm are set to zero; (3) a counterfactual simula-
tion where the occupation-specific skill growth parameters RBC and RWC are
set to zero; and (4) a counterfactual simulation where both task-specific and
occupation-specific skill growth rates are set to zero.
I simulate 10,000 worker histories for each of the four cases and I compare
the average log wages in each. This is done separately for the model with lev-
els and the version without, and also separately by occupation. The mean log
wage levels from these simulations are shown in Table 3.12. The overall mean
log wage from the baseline simulation with levels is 7.478. Eliminating task-
specific skill growth reduces the mean log wage to 7.082, while eliminating
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occupation-specific human capital accumulation results in a mean log wage of
7.284. This corresponds to a 32.7% drop in overall mean wage level from elimi-
nating task-specific skill growth, while eliminating occupation-specific human
capital accumulation causes a 17.6% drop. Thus, while growth of both types of
human capital is important to wage growth over the life cycle, it is task-specific
human capital that has the most significant effect.
Not surprisingly, since RBC > RWC , I find that occupation-specific skill ac-
cumulation is more important for wage growth in the blue-collar than white-
collar occupation. This is a similar result to one found in Keane and Wolpin
(1997), where experience in the blue-collar occupation increased wages more
so than experience in the white-collar occupation, controlling for total experi-
ence. Eliminating occupation-specific skill accumulation results in mean wage
level reductions for blue-collar and white-collar of 35.1% and 16.3%, respec-
tively, while eliminating task-specific skill accumulation causes reductions of
29.2% and 42.3%. The high growth rate of the cognitive skill results in the rel-
atively high importance of task-specific skill accumulation for the white-collar
occupation.
I motivate incorporating hierarchical levels by theorizing that allowing for
task variation within the occupation and allowing for workers to adjust their
task usages without having to sacrifice occupation-specific human capital may
have significant effects on the estimated specificity of human capital. I as-
sess the impact that incorporating levels has by comparing the counterfactuals
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Table 3.12: Counterfactual Simulations
Model With Levels
Baseline No Task Skill No Occ Skill No Skill Growth
Overall 7.478 7.082 7.284 6.889
Occupation:
Blue-Collar 7.442 7.096 7.010 6.845
White-Collar 7.583 7.031 7.405 6.909
Model Without Levels
Baseline No Task Skill No Occ Skill No Skill Growth
Overall 7.427 7.059 7.343 7.054
Occupation:
Blue-Collar 7.424 7.202 7.326 7.065
White-Collar 7.432 7.218 7.351 7.049
Cell values are mean log wage levels. First column is the baseline simulation. Second column is the counter-
factual with no task-specific skill growth. Third column is the counterfactual with no occupation-specific skill
growth. Last column is the counterfactual with no task-specific or occupation-specific skill growth.
with and without levels. I find that there are significant differences between
the models in terms of the specificity of human capital. In the blue-collar oc-
cupation, occupation-specific human capital is estimated to have much less of
an effect for the model without levels, and eliminating accumulation of that
skill causes a reduction of only 10.2% in mean wage level compared to 35.1%
for the model with levels. For the white-collar occupation, the model without
levels significantly understates the importance of task-specific skill accumula-
tion, and the wage reductions from eliminating this skill growth are 42.4% and
19.3% in the models with levels and without levels, respectively. These results
show that incorporating hierarchical levels can have an important impact on
estimates of the specificity of human capital.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I document several facts relating to hierarchical level - specifi-
cally, that workers in the lower hierarchical level are more likely to experience
occupation change, workers who return from unemployment into a lower level
suffer higher wage losses, and that task usage within an occupation varies by
level, with cognitive tasks usage typically increasing with level. I estimate an
occupational mobility model where occupations are composed of hierarchical
levels, workers accumulate both task-specific and occupation-specific human
capital through learning-by-doing, and where workers face search frictions, in
order to match these findings and to quantify the importance of task-specific
versus occupation-specific human capital for wage growth. This is done sep-
arately for models with and without hierarchical levels, and the results are
compared to evaluate what effect including levels has on the estimated speci-
ficity of human capital.
I use labor market history data from the GSOEP and task usage data from
the GQCS. Estimating the model using indirect inference, I am able to match
the empirical observations. Running counterfactual simulations, I find that
both sources are important, though task-specific human capital can explain the
majority of wage growth, especially for the white-collar occupation. Omitting
levels results in a significant understatement of the importance of occupation-
specific human capital for workers in the blue-collar occupation. Furthermore,
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the model without hierarchical levels fails to match wage declines during un-
employment. These results demonstrate that omitting hierarchical levels can
result in both the specificity of human capital being misestimated, as well as
failing to match important labor market outcomes.
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Chapter 4
The Signaling Role of
Promotions: New Evidence from
European Firms
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we provide new empirical evidence on the signaling role of
promotions. The idea that promotions serve as signals of worker ability was
first developed in Waldman (1984) and has significantly influenced the sub-
sequent theoretical literature. The theory is based on asymmetric learning
(about worker ability) by employers in a labor market. In most employment
relationships, the party who possesses the most accurate and complete infor-
mation concerning a worker’s ability is that worker’s own employer. The infor-
mation possessed by other employers in the labor market is typically less com-
plete. This means that promoting a worker to a higher rank conveys new (and
positive) information to other employers concerning the worker’s ability, and
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those employers update their beliefs (and wage offers) accordingly. The cur-
rent employer must therefore increase the promoted worker’s compensation to
a sufficient extent to prevent the worker from being bid away by a competitor.
Extending the model of Waldman (1984) to incorporate a worker charac-
teristic that is publicly observed by all firms in the labor market and that is
correlated with ability gives rise to testable implications. In DeVaro and Wald-
man (2012) that worker characteristic is the level of educational attainment.1
Promotion of a highly-educated worker releases little new information to the
market (since other employers already saw the person as having high ability)
whereas a promotion of a less-educated worker is more of a surprise to other
firms. This greater surprise leads to a big positive update in the beliefs of com-
peting firms about the worker’s ability and, hence, a big increase in the wage
these employers are willing to offer the worker. To avoid the resulting bidding
war, the employer of this less-educated worker may be inclined to withhold
a promotion from the worker, even if such a promotion would be justified on
productivity grounds. The result is that promotion rates are inefficiently low
for less-educated workers, holding job performance constant. By similar logic,
the wage increase occurring at the time of promotion should decrease with ed-
ucational attainment, again holding job performance constant. Furthermore,
both of these predictions should hold more strongly for first promotions than
for subsequent promotions. The reason is that because a promotion releases
1See Bernhardt (1995) for a related theoretical analysis that also differentiats workers by
level of educational attainment.
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significant information about a worker’s ability to other firms in the market,
each successive promotion a worker receives reduces the information asymme-
try between the worker’s current employer and other employers in the labor
market. The preceding testable implications are derived formally in DeVaro
and Waldman (2012) and serve as the primary basis for the present chapter.
We empirically test the predictions from DeVaro and Waldman (2012), using
large-scale, nationally-representative, worker and firm-level panel data from
Finland and Germany. The Finnish dataset is a linked employer-employee
panel, drawn from the records of the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK),
which is the central organization of employer associations in Finland. Al-
though the full panel spans the years 1981 to 2010, only the years 2001 to 2010
contain suitable information for our analysis. That analysis sample consists of
2364 firms, 86,900 persons (of which 31,572 are female), and 269,559 person-
year observations (of which 33.4 percent are female). The German dataset is
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), an annual panel of households
that began in 1984 and that continues to the present (2013).2 The panel con-
sists of 17,134 households, 55,471 individuals, and a total of 497,087 person-
year observations. The advantages of focusing on two distinct countries in
the same empirical analysis are highlighted in the following statement from
Hamermesh (2007): “If our theories are intended to be general, to describe the
behaviour of consumers, firms, or markets independent of the social or broader
2Our analysis uses the International Scientific Use Version, which is a 95% subsample of
the full panel.
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economic context, they should be tested using data from more than just one
economy.” Following DeVaro and Waldman (2012) we differentiate workers
by their level of educational attainment, and we address the aforementioned
testable implications related to the probability of promotion and to the wage
increases conditional on promotion. We find that the signaling role of promo-
tions is supported in both Finland and Germany in that the predictions from
DeVaro and Waldman (2012) hold for certain educational groups.
We also investigate whether and how the signaling role of promotions dif-
fers between men and women. A potential theoretical explanation for gender
differences in the extent to which promotions signal worker ability can be found
in Milgrom and Oster (1987). In that framework there are two types of work-
ers (Visibles and Invisibles). Visibles are workers whose abilities are readily
observed by all employers in the labor market, whereas Invisibles are workers
whose abilities are difficult to observe by employers other than the worker’s
current employer. Women (men) are likely to have disproportionately large
representation in the Invisibles (Visibles) group. The argument is that for var-
ious reasons, such as lack of “old boys club” connections, women are less well
connected to the outside labor market. This framework provides a theory of
gender discrimination in the labor market, because employers with private in-
formation about their highly talented (but Invisible) workers can “hide” these
workers from competing firms by failing to promote them. The strategy would
not work for Visibles, because withholding promotion from a highly talented
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Visible would lead a competing firm to steal that worker away. One implication
is that, holding worker performance constant, promotion probability should be
lower for women than men.3 Furthermore, again holding performance con-
stant, the preceding gender difference should be larger for first promotions
than for subsequent promotions, for the following reason. Since a promotion
releases significant information about ability to competing firms, the informa-
tional asymmetry is reduced and “Invisible” women start to look more “Visible”
to outside firms. A related implication of the Milgrom-Oster framework is that
the wage increase attached to promotion should be larger for women than men,
controlling for worker performance, with this result more pronounced for first
than for subsequent promotions.
The empirical literature on gender differences in promotion probabilities
and in the wage changes attached to promotion has yielded mixed results,
though in most cases the empirical models in that literature do not control for
time varying, job-specific measures of worker performance.4 Some studies find
a positive gender gap in promotion probabilities, others find a negative gap, and
others find no gap. One study that includes a control for worker performance is
Blau and DeVaro (2007), which finds a lower promotion probability for women
3Lazear and Rosen (1990) offer an alternative explanation for why, holding worker perfor-
mance constant, promotion probability should be lower for women than men. That explanation
is not based on the signaling role of promotion but rather on the idea that differential move-
ment along job ladders entails comparative advantage, and women are assumed to be more
productive than men in non-market labor such as household work.
4See Blau and DeVaro (2007) for a survey.
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than men of 2 to 3 percentage points. That same study finds essentially no gen-
der difference in the wage change attached to within-firm promotion.5 Draw-
ing on the Milgrom-Oster framework, we can evaluate whether women have
lower promotion probabilities than men after controlling for performance, and
whether the gender gap diminishes after the first promotion is received. Sim-
ilarly, we can evaluate whether women experience larger wage increases than
men after controlling for worker performance and whether this gender differ-
ence is stronger for first than for subsequent promotions. In both Finland and
Germany we find evidence of gender differences in promotion probabilities that
are of comparable magnitude to those found in Blau and DeVaro (2007), and
we also find evidence in both countries that this gender gap dissipates after
the first promotion. In the Finnish data the point estimates reveal larger wage
increases attached to within-firm promotion for women than men, with this
difference larger for first than for subsequent promotions, though these gender
differences are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. In the German
data we find a positive but statistically insignificant wage increase from within-
firm first promotions for men, whereas the corresponding increase for women
is considerably larger and statistically significant at the one percent level. In
the case of subsequent promotions, neither gender experiences a statistically
5Examples of studies that found the same result but without controlling for worker per-
formance include Olson and Becker (1983), Gerhart and Milkovich (1989), and McCue (1996).
Other studies found evidence of a gender gap in one direction or the other, though in the ab-
sence of a control for worker performance. The gender gap favored men in Hersch and Viscusi
(1996), Barnett et al. (2000), and Booth et al. (2003), whereas it favored women in Cobb-Clark
(2001).
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significant wage change. This pattern of results is consistent with the signal-
ing role of promotions being stronger for women than men, and diminishing
after first promotion, consistent with the Milgrom-Oster framework.
A unique feature of our analysis is that we distinguish between within-
firm and across-firm promotions. The theoretical literature on promotions and
wage dynamics frequently focuses on a unique equilibrium that is character-
ized by no turnover, so that a worker’s initial employer always raises a pro-
moted worker’s wage (or a non-promoted worker’s wage) to a sufficient extent to
prevent that worker from being bid away by a rival firm. Testable implications
are then based on this zero-turnover equilibrium, which is seen as a justifica-
tion for conducting empirical work that focuses only on workers who remain
with the firm. The focus on within-firm promotions is convenient, given that
in single-firm personnel data sets there is typically no information on workers
after they separate from the firm. However, in the real world, turnover regu-
larly occurs, and previous research suggests it is an important aspect of careers
(e.g. Topel and Ward 1992, Farber 1994, Booth et al. 1999, Munasinghe and
Sigman 2004, and Parrado et al. 2007).6 The data in the present study allow
6Noting the connection between career progression and turnover, Waldman (2007) has
called for more empirical work on this subject to guide the development of theories that connect
wage and promotion dynamics to turnover. Building on Gibbons and Waldman (1999), Ghosh
(2007) provides a theoretical analysis predicting that the probability that a worker switches
firms decreases with labor market experience. See also DeVaro and Morita (2013) which pro-
vides a theoretical and empirical analysis of internal promotion versus external hiring, with
predictions concerning the probability that a firm’s manager departs for another firm when
getting promoted.
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us to consider both within-firm and across-firm job changes (and the result-
ing wage changes). Our results suggest that theoretical predictions concerning
the signaling role of promotions are more strongly supported for within-firm
promotions than for across-firm promotions.
Three recent papers provide empirical evidence related to this study. The
first of these, DeVaro and Waldman (2012), is the most closely related to the
present study. That analysis uses data on white males from the single, large
American firm in the financial services industry that was studied in the clas-
sic internal labor market analyses by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstro¨m (1994a,b).
DeVaro and Waldman (2012) find that across all education groups, after con-
trolling for worker performance the probability of promotion is increasing in
the level of educational attainment, and this result is stronger for first promo-
tions than for subsequent promotions. Furthermore, for first promotions the
authors find that the wage increase due to promotion (measured as either a
change in levels or a change in logs) is smaller for those with masters degrees
than for those with bachelors degrees, whereas this relationship is not found
for subsequent promotions. In contrast, they do not find the predicted relation-
ships between education and wage growth for high school educated workers
and those with Ph.D.s. Overall the results support signaling being important
for workers with BA and MA degrees, whereas the evidence concerning the
importance of signaling for high school graduates and Ph.D.s is mixed.7
7Belzil and Bognanno (2010) report related results in the context of a study of fast-track
promotions using a panel of 30,000 American executives, though their data do not include
time-varying, job-specific worker performance ratings to be used as controls.
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Second, DeVaro, Ghosh, and Zoghi (2012) use data from the American firm
analyzed in Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) to investigate four empirical predic-
tions from a theoretical model that extends the Milgrom-Oster framework. As
in Milgrom and Oster (1987), consider two groups of workers (Invisibles and
Visibles) where the former consists of workers who are traditionally thought
to be disadvantaged in the labor market (e.g. women or racial minorities) and
the latter consists of workers who are traditionally thought to be advantaged
(e.g. men or whites). Suppose that job hierarchies vary in the degree to which
job tasks differ across hierarchical levels. DeVaro, Ghosh, and Zoghi (2012)
show that four testable implications emerge. First, controlling for worker per-
formance, promotion probabilities are lower for Invisibles than Visibles, and
second, this difference is mitigated in job hierarchies that exhibit significant
variability of tasks across job levels. Third, the wage growth attached to promo-
tion is higher for Invisibles than Visibles, and fourth, this difference decreases
when tasks become more variable across hierarchical levels. The authors con-
duct the empirical tests focusing on race, where Invisibles are nonwhite work-
ers and Visibles are white workers. However, in principle the tests could also
be applied in the case of gender. The empirical evidence supports the first
three of these predictions, and the authors discuss some potential reasons for
the lack of support of the fourth. Given that three of the four predictions are
empirically supported the authors interpret the evidence as broadly suggestive
of a signaling role of promotions.
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Third, like the present study, Bognanno and Melero (2012) seek to empiri-
cally test the signaling role of promotions in panel data spanning many firms.
They use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to investigate whether
promotions that reveal more information to the outside market (e.g. those for
young workers or for workers with low education levels) are accompanied by
greater percentage increases in the wage. Bognanno and Melero find results in
accordance with their hypotheses regarding the effect of both age and educa-
tion on the increase in log-wages attached to promotions, though the statistical
significance of their estimates hinges on the definition of promotion. Apart
from the fact that their paper covers Britain - whereas ours covers Finland and
Germany - the focus of the two studies differs in a number of ways. For exam-
ple, our chapter considers theoretical predictions concerning both promotion
probability and wage increases conditional on promotion, whereas theirs only
considers the latter; our chapter distinguishes between first promotions and
subsequent promotions, following the theoretical predictions from DeVaro and
Waldman (2012), whereas theirs does not; and their paper does not consider
gender differences nor does it distinguish between within-firm to across-firm
promotions, whereas these are important points of focus in our analysis.
All theoretical predictions in a promotion signaling framework, whether
concerning promotion probabilities or the wage increases attached to promo-
tion, include the qualifying phrase “holding worker performance constant”. As
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an example illustrating why this is so important, consider the theoretical pre-
diction that promotion probability is increasing in the level of educational at-
tainment. Absent a control for worker performance, an empirical finding that
promotion probability is increasing in education would be no surprise. Workers
with more education are, on average, more productive than those with less edu-
cation. Thus, it should be expected that workers with more education are more
likely to be promoted. The requirement that the worker’s pre-promotion job
performance be held constant poses a considerable challenge for empirical tests
given that performance measurements are rarely available in the few data sets
that contain all the other requisite information (e.g. promotions, wages, mea-
sures of job hierarchy, and educational attainment).
There are three potential approaches for dealing with the performance mea-
surement problem. One approach is to rely on single-firm personnel data
sets that often contain supervisor-reported worker performance measurements
which are inherently job-specific and time varying. Such measures are typ-
ically unavailable in data sets spanning many firms, and even if they were
available the comparability of the ratings across firms would be questionable
(e.g. the ratings might be measured in different units and on different scales).
Examples of the single-firm approach to solving the performance measure-
ment problem are DeVaro and Waldman (2012) and DeVaro, Ghosh, and Zoghi
(2012). However, this approach has three important limitations, all of which
derive from the nature of the data. First, as noted in Baker and Holmstro¨m
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(1995), it is unclear to what extent the results of single-firm case studies gen-
eralize to broader classes of employers. Second, workers who switch firms dis-
appear from the sample, so there is no way to know whether they switched
to a new firm, or to unemployment, and in the case of switching firms their
new job level and wage are unobservable. Given that many workers come and
go in the typical firm, particularly over a long time horizon, dropping all of
the “leavers” from an analysis is problematic and could bias the results of an
analysis of promotion and wage dynamics. Third, such data do not allow the
researcher to investigate whether the signaling role of promotions differs be-
tween within-firm versus across-firm promotions. A second approach is to use
large-scale, multi-firm panels that mitigate the limitations of single-firm stud-
ies, but at the expense of forgoing controls for worker performance. This is the
approach taken in Bognanno and Melero (2012). A third and new approach,
taken in the present chapter, is to exploit large-scale, worker-firm panel data
while inferring a job-specific, time-varying worker performance measure by es-
timating the idiosyncratic component of individual performance bonuses. The
approach of inferring a measure of individual performance from bonus data has
been used before for different purposes in Pekkarinen and Vartiainen (2006)
and Gittings (2012a,b). Since lack of crucial data on worker performance has
prevented researchers from exploiting rich, large-scale, worker-firm panels to
empirically test the predictions of theories concerning careers, our approach
opens the door for future work in this literature to move beyond single-firm
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case studies. Our empirical tests are not subject to any of the aforementioned
limitations of single-firm studies.
In the remainder of the chapter we devote two sections to the Finnish anal-
ysis and two to the German analysis before summarizing and concluding.
4.2 Data and Measures: Finland
The Finnish data are drawn from a large, worker-firm-linked panel. Our anal-
ysis is based on the years 2001 to 2010. The source of the annual survey data
is the records of the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK), which is the
central organization of employer associations in Finland. EK-affiliated firms
represent over two thirds of the Finnish GDP and over 90 percent of exports,
so that the data represent a significant share of the Finnish economy.8 The
data are of high quality given that they are based on firms’ administrative
records, and since participation in the survey is compulsory except for the
smallest firms, the response rate is nearly 100 percent. Our sample consists of
269,559 person-years, of which 33.4 percent represent women. The number of
individual persons is 86,900, which includes 31,572 women. The data allow us
to follow individual workers’ careers over time, to distinguish within-firm from
across-firm promotions and to incorporate a large set of controls for worker and
firm characteristics.
8See Kauhanen and Napari (2012a) for a more detailed description of the data and of the
wage-setting process in Finland, and see Asplund (2007) and Vartiainen (1998) for descriptions
of the Finnish bargaining system.
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Apart from the performance measurement problem discussed in the intro-
duction, moving from single-firm data to multi-firm data poses a second empir-
ical challenge. Defining promotions across firms is difficult because job hierar-
chies are not easily measured in a comparable way across firms.9 This problem
can be resolved in the Finnish data given that all firms use the same 56 job
titles and four hierarchical levels, which makes the classification comparable
across firms. We can therefore define a promotion as a transition across hier-
archical levels (either within or across firms).
4.2.1 Variables and Data Selection: Finland
We restrict our analysis to all workers who appear in the data after 2001, since
in this subsample we can distinguish more cleanly between workers receiving
their first promotion and those receiving subsequent promotions.10 The theo-
retical argument for making this distinction is given in DeVaro and Waldman
(2012).11
We restrict attention to white-collar jobs in manufacturing because com-
plexities in the occupational classification system for blue-collar jobs make it
9A small number of papers have addressed this issue. Frederiksen et al. (2010) use occupa-
tion codes to distinguish between executive and non-executive ranks, while Da Silva and Van
der Klaauw (2011) use Portuguese matched employer-employee data that contain a hierarchy
definition that is comparable across firms.
10This is because in 2001 there was a change in the way job titles were coded, and it is
difficult to compare codes consistently before and after this change.
11Even in our “first-promotion subsample” it is possible that some workers were in fact pro-
moted earlier. This could happen if, for example, the firm first appears in the data in 2002. In
this case 2002 would be the first observation for a given worker, but that person might have
been promoted in the firm at an earlier date.
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difficult to allocate those jobs across hierarchical levels. We also restrict our
analysis to full-time workers (defined as regular weekly working hours exceed-
ing 30), though this restriction is of little practical consequence given that the
share of part-time workers is small for white-collar jobs (about 2 percent in
2006).
The two dependent variables in this analysis are a binary indicator for
whether a promotion was received and the annual wage change (measured in
both levels and logs). We measure promotions based on changes in job titles. In
manufacturing, these titles are comprised of two parts. The first is a three-digit
code describing the field (e.g. R&D, production, sales and marketing), of which
there are 56. The second describes the organizational level, and it has four cat-
egories. For the wage change analysis, following DeVaro and Waldman (2012),
the annual wage change does not include bonuses. In our analysis, excluding
bonuses from the construction of the dependent variable avoids an endogene-
ity problem, given that we use the bonus data to infer individual performance,
which is a key control variable required by the theory.
The independent variable in this analysis is educational attainment. As
discussed in DeVaro and Waldman (2012), given that a higher observed level
of schooling serves as a signal that the worker belongs to a higher productivity
group, in models of promotion probability and of the wage growth attached
to promotion it is preferable to focus on the receipt of a degree rather than on
years of education. For example, taking five years to complete a BA degree does
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not signal higher quality than taking four, and taking three years to complete
an MBA does not signal higher quality than taking two. In the absence of
direct measures of degree receipt, DeVaro and Waldman (2012) is forced to
define their four education dummies for degrees indirectly (and possibly with
error) based on years of education. An advantage of the Finnish data is that we
directly observe five categories of education levels, which we aggregate to the
following four educational groups (upper secondary, lowest-level tertiary, BA,
and GRAD), where BA is lower-degree-level tertiary education and GRAD is
higher-degree-level tertiary education or doctoral (or equivalent-level tertiary)
education. We aggregate from five categories to four because of an extremely
small sample size in the highest-level category.12
4.2.2 Worker Performance Measures: Finland
Data on time-varying, job-specific, individual worker performance measures
are needed to test the promotion-as-signal hypothesis. Such data are absent
in the Finnish data set, as in most other data sets that span many firms, in-
cluding the British BHPS data used in Bognanno and Melero (2012). The diffi-
culty of obtaining such performance data necessitated using personnel records
from single-firm cases in DeVaro and Waldman (2012) and DeVaro, Ghosh, and
12Like the Finnish data, the British data used in Bognanno and Melero (2012) also contain
direct measures of degree receipt. In that study the authors use those dummies to construct
an inferred “years of education” measure on which they base their analysis, thereby assuming
that the effect of an additional year of education on wage growth is the same, regardless of the
education level.
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Zoghi (2012). To overcome the problem in the present study, we infer measures
of worker performance from the amount of performance-related-pay the worker
received, following a similar approach to those used in Pekkarinen and Varti-
ainen (2006) and Gittings (2012a,b). About 58 percent of workers in the data
received performance-related-pay.
We begin by estimating a regression in which the dependent variable is
the amount of performance-related-pay that worker i receives in year t + 1,
and the independent variables (including job title dummies, job level dummies,
year dummies, and industry dummies) are measured in year t. The reason
for leading the dependent variable is that payments for performance in year t
are typically paid in year t + 1. We then use the residuals from the regression
as measures of worker performance. Thus, each worker’s performance is mea-
sured by how much performance-related-pay the worker received compared to
other workers in the same job title, same job level, and same industry, in a
given year.
A feature of actual (as opposed to inferred) worker performance ratings is
that they tend to be positively autocorrelated, with the strength of the corre-
lation diminishing with the order of the autocorrelation. This is the case, for
example, in Table 10 of DeVaro and Waldman (2012), which reports the bivari-
ate correlation matrix of the workers’ actual annual performance ratings and
their first three lagged values, using data from a single American firm in the
financial services industry. That table is reproduced in Panel A of Table 4.1
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Table 4.1: Autocorrelation Matrix for Worker Performance
Panel A: Actual Performance Ratings in One American Firm
Performance Performancet−1 Performancet−2 Performancet−3
Performance 1.000
Performancet−1 0.581∗ 1.000
Performancet−2 0.394∗ 0.590∗ 1.000
Performancet−3 0.249∗ 0.398∗ 0.610∗ 1.000
Panel B: Inferred Performance Ratings in Finnish Panel Data
Performance Performancet−1 Performancet−2 Performancet−3
Performance 1.000
Performancet−1 0.518∗ 1.000
Performancet−2 0.382∗ 0.518∗ 1.000
Performancet−3 0.296∗ 0.381∗ 0.509∗ 1.000
Panel C: Inferred Performance Ratings in German Panel Data
Performance Performancet−1 Performancet−2 Performancet−3
Performance 1.000
Performancet−1 0.644∗ 1.000
Performancet−2 0.565∗ 0.619∗ 1.000
Performancet−3 0.497∗ 0.547∗ 0.606∗ 1.000
Sources: Panel A: DeVaro and Waldman (2012), Table 10, based on single-firm personnel data from Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstro¨m (1994a,b);
Panel B: Finnish EK data, 2002-2010; Panel C: German SOEP, 1984-2009.
* Statistically significant at the 1% level.
in the present chapter. As shown in Panel B of that table, we find exactly the
same pattern in the Finnish data, using the performance measure we inferred
from bonus data. The correlation matrix is strikingly similar to that of the
DeVaro-Waldman analysis.
A potential issue that arises in the case of workers who change firms is that
performance related pay is typically paid in year t + 1 based on performance
in year t. This could lead us to understate the performance of workers who
change firms, because a worker who changes firms in period t+ 1 might not re-
ceive performance related pay in that year. This issue does not pose a problem
for our analysis given that the estimation results in the following section are
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insensitive to the exclusion of workers who changed firms and received zero
performance related pay. Another potential concern is that a particular resid-
ual from the performance regression might have a high value because of an
unobserved characteristic of the firm rather than because of high worker per-
formance. To address this possibility, as a robustness check we estimated the
performance-related-pay regression including firm fixed effects. When the per-
formance measure is constructed using this regression, our results of interest
are virtually identical to those we report in this study.13
4.3 Empirical Analysis: Finland
The following two subsections present the analyses of promotion probability
and the wage change conditional on promotion, respectively.14 Descriptive
statistics for all variables in the subsequent analysis appear in Table 4.2.
4.3.1 Promotion Probability: Finland
We estimate a multinomial probit model with a trivariate dependent variable
in which the baseline outcome, 0, is no promotion, outcome 1 is promotion
13This robustness check in which firm fixed effects are included in the performance-related-
pay regression is not possible in the German analysis described later, given that in the GSOEP
data the worker cannot be linked to the firm.
14Our approach is similar to that used in DeVaro and Waldman (2012), and we refer readers
to that study for more detailed discussions of the underlying theoretical motivation for the
empirical models we estimate.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics, Finland
All Workers Men Only Women Only
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Female 0.337 0.473
Promotion 0.067 0.250 0.066 0.249 0.068 0.252
Firm change 0.042 0.201 0.043 0.202 0.042 0.200
Demographics
Upper secondary 0.301 0.458 0.312 0.463 0.278 0.448
Lowest level tertiary 0.111 0.315 0.093 0.290 0.148 0.355
BA 0.348 0.476 0.359 0.480 0.326 0.469
GRAD 0.240 0.427 0.236 0.425 0.247 0.431
Age 33.994 7.894 34.052 7.810 33.879 8.055
Tenure 2.119 2.056 2.168 2.086 2.021 1.995
Occupation
Hourly wage 17.866 5.729 18.630 5.749 16.369 5.382
Management 0.032 0.176 0.037 0.188 0.022 0.148
Professional 0.213 0.409 0.240 0.427 0.158 0.365
Expert 0.550 0.498 0.595 0.491 0.460 0.498
Clerical 0.206 0.404 0.127 0.333 0.360 0.480
Firm Size
0-50 0.106 0.308 0.107 0.309 0.106 0.307
51-100 0.083 0.275 0.078 0.268 0.091 0.288
101-200 0.125 0.331 0.122 0.327 0.130 0.337
201-500 0.199 0.400 0.198 0.398 0.203 0.402
501-1000 0.115 0.319 0.127 0.332 0.093 0.290
1001-2000 0.092 0.289 0.083 0.276 0.110 0.312
2000+ 0.280 0.449 0.286 0.452 0.268 0.443
Observations 269,559 178,728 90,831
Source: Finnish EK data, 2002-2010.
within the firm, and outcome 2 is promotion across firms. The dependent vari-
able refers to the outcome for worker i in year t, whereas all right-hand-side
variables are measured in year t− 1. The independent variables of interest are
the dummies for educational attainment. The control variables include worker
performance (as defined in the preceding section), age, age squared, job tenure
(in years) at the firm, job tenure (in years) at the firm squared, job level dum-
mies, and job title dummies.
Table 4.3 displays average marginal effects, where the omitted educational
group is BA, which is the second highest of the four groups. The table reveals
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that the overall probability of within-firm promotion for all workers combined
is 6.2 percent. The probability of a within-firm first promotion is a bit higher,
at 6.6 percent, whereas the probability of a within-firm subsequent promotion
(conditional on having received an earlier promotion) is 3.8 percent. The prob-
ability of across-firm promotion is extremely small in the white-collar Finnish
manufacturing data, at less than 1 percent. Although most promotions in the
Finnish data occur within firms, the sample size is large enough to support
analysis of across-firm promotions. Six interesting results emerge from Panel
A, which combines men and women.
First, as seen in column 1, the probability of within-firm promotion is in-
creasing in the level of educational attainment, holding worker performance
constant. This is the same result found in DeVaro and Waldman (2012) which
considers only white, male stayers and within-firm promotions in a single firm.
Second, the incremental effects of the education variables are smaller in
column 5 than in column 3. This suggests that the first result is stronger
for within-firm first promotions than for within-firm subsequent promotions,
as theory predicts. This result also matches what was found in DeVaro and
Waldman (2012), which provides the following theoretical rationale. As other
employers in the labor market learn more about a worker’s abilities (as a conse-
quence of observing the promotion record) education carries less informational
content, and its importance diminishes. We suspect that our evidence in favor
of this second result, here and throughout the chapter, is understated given
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Table 4.3: Multinomial Probit, Promotion Within and Across Firms, Finland
Panel A: All Workers
All Workers First Promotion Subsequent Promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Within Across Within Across Within Across
Upper secondary -0.011∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001
(-6.28) (-3.23) (-6.40) (-3.08) (-0.54) (-0.48)
Lowest level tertiary -0.014∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.001 0.003
(-4.78) (-1.35) (-5.20) (-1.76) (-0.12) (1.18)
GRAD 0.036∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(19.67) (7.88) (17.63) (7.52) (6.51) (2.99)
Performance t-1 0.007∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(14.41) (-12.36) (13.41) (-11.28) (8.35) (-4.01)
Female -0.022∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001
(-12.94) (-4.05) (-13.27) (-4.38) (-0.69) (-0.46)
Pr(Y=k) 0.062 0.006 0.066 0.007 0.038 0.005
Observations 118,984 118,984 101,502 101,502 17,482 17,482
Panel B: Men
All Workers First Promotion Subsequent Promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Within Across Within Across Within Across
Upper secondary -0.014∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001
(-6.33) (-3.48) (-6.63) (-3.19) (0.05) (-0.85)
Lowest level tertiary -0.012∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.002 0.002 0.001
(-3.23) (-1.48) (-3.58) (-1.58) (0.27) (0.45)
GRAD 0.031∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(14.39) (6.19) (12.93) (5.94) (4.17) (2.87)
Performance t-1 0.006∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(11.93) (-10.84) (11.27) (-9.92) (6.79) (-4.16)
Pr(Y=k) 0.061 0.006 0.066 0.007 0.034 0.004
Observations 81,776 81,776 69,472 69,472 12,304 12,304
Panel C: Women
All Workers First Promotion Subsequent Promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Within Across Within Across Within Across
Upper secondary -0.009∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.009∗∗ -0.001 -0.012 0.002
(-2.75) (-0.41) (-2.43) (-0.46) (-1.43) (0.82)
Lowest level tertiary -0.013∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.003 0.005
(-2.89) (-0.10) (-3.10) (-0.51) (-0.30) (1.14)
GRAD 0.041∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.004
(11.88) (4.49) (10.16) (4.30) (4.69) (1.63)
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Performance t-1 0.011∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(11.88) (-6.11) (11.95) (-5.53) (8.03) (-2.97)
Pr(Y=k) 0.063 0.006 0.066 0.006 0.047 0.006
Observations 37,208 37,208 32,030 32,030 5,178 5,178
Notes: Cell entries are average marginal effects from a multinomial probit, with t-statistics in parentheses. Base Outcome 0: no promotion; Outcome
1: promotion within firm (“Within”); Outcome 2: promotion across firms (“Across”). Row “Pr(Y=k)” refers to the probability of the column’s outcome.
Base education category is the second-highest education level, BA. All right-hand-side variables are measured in year t-1, and the dependent variable
is measured in year t. All specifications include age, (age) squared, job tenure at the firm, (job tenure at the firm) squared, job level dummies, job title
dummies, and an intercept term. Source: Finnish EK data, 2002-2010.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
that our method of distinguishing between first and subsequent promotions
likely produces some misclassifications that would blur the distinction between
columns 3 and 5.
Third, as seen in column 2, the result that promotion probability is increas-
ing in the level of educational attainment (controlling for pre-promotion perfor-
mance) also holds in the rare case of across-firm promotions just as it did for
within-firm promotions.
Fourth, as seen by comparing the incremental effects of education in col-
umn 4 to those in column 6, the result that the across-firm promotion proba-
bility is increasing in the level of educational attainment is stronger for first
promotions than for subsequent promotions. These third and fourth results
concerning across-firm promotions parallel those that are found, theoretically
and empirically, in DeVaro and Waldman (2012) for within-firm promotions.
The result that these patterns of evidence are also true for across-firm promo-
tions is new to the literature.
Fifth, as seen in columns 1, 3, and 5 concerning within-firm promotions,
the marginal effect of pre-promotion performance has the anticipated positive
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sign. However, as seen in columns 2, 4, and 6, the sign flips to negative in the
rare event of across-firm promotions. One possible explanation for the negative
sign is adverse selection in the labor market as discussed in Greenwald (1986).
However, we see that explanation as unlikely given that, as we show in Table
4.4, across-firm moves (whether promotions or not) are on average accompa-
nied by large wage increases. We think that a more likely explanation for the
negative sign derives from the definition of our performance measure, which
is inferred from individual bonus data. Low measured performance in the
pre-promotion year means the worker’s bonus was low, and in such cases the
worker may be more open to advancing the career at a different firm, whereas
if last year’s bonus was extremely high the worker might find it hard to leave.
Sixth, the probability of promotion (within and across firms) is lower for
women than men. The lower promotion probability for women in this data
set is documented in Kauhanen and Napari (2012b). However, like most stud-
ies in the literature, that study does not control for pre-promotion, job-specific
worker performance. As noted earlier, one study that controls for such pre-
promotion job performance (measured as the supervisor’s subjective rating on
a 0-100 scale) is Blau and DeVaro (2007), which also finds evidence of lower
within-firm promotion probabilities for women than men, for recent hires in
an American establishment-level cross section. In that study, the magnitude
of the marginal effect of gender is in the neighborhood of 2 to 3 percentage
points, depending on the specification, just as it is in columns 1 and 3. When a
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prior promotion has occurred, there is no evidence in the Finnish data that the
likelihood of a future promotion (within or across firms) is different for women
versus men. This is consistent with the argument developed in Milgrom and
Oster (1987) based on the Invisibility Hypothesis. At earlier career stages be-
fore a first promotion has been received, the labor market finds it harder to
learn the abilities of (Invisible) women than (Visible) men. However, when a
promotion occurs a considerable amount of information is revealed to the mar-
ket concerning worker ability, so the visibility of women improves relative to
men, explaining why the gender difference diminishes for the probability of
subsequent promotion.
Panels B and C of Table 3 repeat the preceding analyses for the subsamples
of men and women, respectively. The first five results just stated largely hold
for both men and women, with few noteworthy differences between these two
subsamples. All of the preceding results are insensitive to controlling for an
additional lag of worker performance.
4.3.2 Wage Growth and Promotion: Finland
The promotion-as-signal hypothesis implies that the wage increase that accom-
panies a promotion should decrease with the level of educational attainment,
controlling for pre-promotion performance. The intuition is that when highly-
educated workers are promoted, employers are unsurprised since they already
viewed these workers as being highly capable. There is therefore less positive
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updating in beliefs about the abilities of promoted workers, and consequently
less of an increase in the wage competing employers are willing to offer. This in
turn means that the worker’s original employer need not offer a large wage in-
crease to retain the worker. A further prediction of the theory is that the result
just noted should be stronger for first promotions than subsequent promotions.
Theoretical predictions involving wage growth in this literature are more often
stated in wage levels than in log-wages. We consider both in this chapter, as in
DeVaro and Waldman (2012).15
We analyze the relationship between educational attainment and the wage
increase that accompanies promotion by constructing four dummies capturing
within-firm promotions, across-firm promotions, within-firm non-promotions,
and across-firm non-promotions. In OLS regressions for each of two depen-
dent variables (annual change in wage level, and annual change in log-wage),
we include three of the preceding four dummies (excluding the indicator for
within-firm non-promotions) as main effects and also interacted with each of
the education dummies. Our use of OLS regressions is consistent with the
approach of DeVaro and Waldman (2012). Bognanno and Melero (2012) take
an alternative approach that accounts for individual worker heterogeneity via
random effects (or fixed effects in their models that include worker age but
exclude years of education). Given that those authors are unable to control
15As noted in the introduction, Bognanno and Melero (2012) also test this empirical predic-
tion and find supporting evidence for it depending on how promotions are defined. However,
they only consider differences in log wages, they do not control for pre-promotion worker per-
formance, and they do not distinguish first promotions from subsequent promotions.
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for pre-promotion performance, their decision to incorporate individual effects
into the analysis is well advised. Note that most of the unobserved worker
characteristics (some time varying, others not) that researchers are worried
about in a wage growth model relate to and ultimately predict worker perfor-
mance. Examples include worker attitudes, levels of motivation, effort levels,
unobserved components of ability, unmeasured mental and physical health, etc.
These unobserved factors affect wages via their effect on job performance, so
most unobserved factors that one would be interested in absorbing via individ-
ual effects are already subsumed in measures of worker performance. These
worker performance controls are included in our analysis as they are in DeVaro
and Waldman (2012). Nonetheless, as a robustness check we also estimated our
models accounting for individual worker heterogeneity via random effects and
found results very similar to those we report here, which again is unsurprising
given that the main unobserved components one hopes to absorb in an individ-
ual effect should already be embedded in our control for worker performance.
Note that in random effects and fixed effects models the individual effect can-
not be interpreted as fully accounting for worker performance, because some
important determinants of worker performance tend to be time-varying (e.g.
worker effort).
Table 4.4 displays the results for men and women combined (Panel A), men
(Panel B), and women (Panel C). Several points are worth highlighting.
First, as seen in columns 1 and 4 of Panel A, whether considering changes
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Table 4.4: OLS Estimates, Changes in Wage Levels and Log-Wage, Finland
Panel A: All Workers
Wage Levels Log-Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
Workers
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
All
Workers
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
Upper secondary 0.081*** 0.075*** 0.087*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005***
(8.16) (7.10) (3.07) (10.72) (9.73) (3.51)
Lowest level tertiary 0.008 0.003 0.030 0.002*** 0.002** 0.003
(0.60) (0.23) (0.72) (2.74) (2.48) (1.13)
GRAD 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.113*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003**
(12.26) (11.60) (4.83) (5.47) (5.41) (2.54)
Promotion-Within 0.623*** 0.600*** 0.867*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.042***
(15.25) (13.49) (10.00) (16.72) (15.17) (9.19)
× Upper Secondary 0.150** 0.174*** -0.030 0.009*** 0.011*** -0.004
(2.45) (2.72) (-0.17) (2.63) (2.83) (-0.44)
× Lowest level tertiary 0.045 0.086 -0.390 0.001 0.005 -0.049
(0.45) (0.83) (-0.87) (0.16) (0.98) (-1.16)
× GRAD 0.141** 0.132** 0.209 0.001 0.001 0.003
(2.32) (1.99) (1.45) (0.35) (0.24) (0.41)
Promotion-Across 1.603*** 1.564*** 1.833*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.089***
(10.59) (9.65) (4.41) (10.22) (9.40) (4.06)
× Upper Secondary 0.215 0.286 -0.507 0.016 0.018 -0.017
(0.90) (1.14) (-0.63) (1.14) (1.25) (-0.43)
× Lowest level tertiary -0.746** -0.853** 0.304 -0.039** -0.044** 0.005
(-2.27) (-2.42) (0.33) (-2.16) (-2.23) (0.11)
× GRAD 0.883*** 0.882*** 0.938 0.025** 0.024* 0.035
(3.55) (3.27) (1.51) (2.12) (1.88) (1.14)
No Promotion-Across 0.698*** 0.679*** 0.745*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.036***
(10.77) (9.04) (6.05) (12.14) (10.60) (5.57)
× Upper Secondary 0.041 0.034 0.110 0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.45) (0.34) (0.55) (1.08) (0.95) (0.54)
× Lowest level tertiary -0.197 -0.149 -0.499 -0.011* -0.010 -0.018
(-1.38) (-0.95) (-1.48) (-1.69) (-1.42) (-1.11)
× GRAD 0.031 0.025 0.054 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.32) (0.23) (0.26) (-0.95) (-0.91) (-0.22)
Performance t-1 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.015*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000
(4.40) (3.72) (2.61) (-2.54) (-2.26) (-0.77)
Female -0.091*** -0.097*** -0.064*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001
(-10.18) (-9.88) (-2.88) (-4.69) (-4.64) (-1.14)
Observations 122,152 103,317 18,835 122,150 103,315 18,835
R2 0.061 0.060 0.083 0.058 0.058 0.078
Panel B: Men
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Wage Levels Log-Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
Workers
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
All
Workers
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
Upper secondary 0.085*** 0.077*** 0.097*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(6.96) (5.90) (2.87) (9.45) (8.29) (3.57)
Lowest level tertiary -0.001 0.001 -0.014 0.002 0.002 0.002
(-0.06) (0.03) (-0.25) (1.58) (1.61) (0.44)
GRAD 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.133*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(9.96) (8.96) (4.74) (4.49) (3.97) (2.79)
Promotion-Within 0.606*** 0.582*** 0.898*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.043***
(11.88) (10.52) (8.25) (12.67) (11.46) (7.66)
× Upper Secondary 0.146** 0.172** -0.025 0.009** 0.010** -0.003
(1.97) (2.21) (-0.12) (1.96) (2.17) (-0.28)
× Lowest level tertiary 0.010 0.102 -1.183 -0.002 0.006 -0.111
(0.07) (0.67) (-1.49) (-0.20) (0.77) (-1.25)
× GRAD 0.136* 0.124 0.279 0.001 0.001 0.004
(1.74) (1.46) (1.59) (0.31) (0.22) (0.56)
Promotion-Across 1.757*** 1.813*** 1.381*** 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.067***
(10.68) (9.93) (4.28) (10.35) (9.68) (4.17)
× Upper Secondary 0.304 0.281 0.282 0.020 0.018 0.022
(1.09) (0.96) (0.30) (1.28) (1.07) (0.50)
× Lowest level tertiary -0.835* -0.908* -0.071 -0.046* -0.051* -0.001
(-1.83) (-1.86) (-0.17) (-1.80) (-1.87) (-0.05)
× GRAD 0.732** 0.665** 1.221* 0.017 0.013 0.047
(2.46) (2.03) (1.93) (1.21) (0.83) (1.57)
No Promotion-Across 0.771*** 0.753*** 0.825*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.040***
(9.16) (7.65) (5.65) (10.60) (9.14) (5.42)
× Upper Secondary 0.047 0.054 0.025 0.005 0.006 -0.001
(0.41) (0.42) (0.11) (0.88) (0.92) (-0.07)
× Lowest level tertiary -0.286 -0.222 -0.753 -0.015 -0.012 -0.033
(-1.48) (-1.07) (-1.39) (-1.63) (-1.30) (-1.29)
× GRAD -0.010 0.020 -0.125 -0.007 -0.006 -0.010
(-0.08) (0.15) (-0.49) (-1.36) (-1.03) (-0.92)
Performance t-1 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.001*
(2.89) (2.68) (0.97) (-2.59) (-2.03) (-1.91)
Observations 84,282 70,926 13,356 84,280 70,924 13,356
R2 0.059 0.058 0.081 0.060 0.060 0.078
Panel C: Women
Wage Levels Log-Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
Workers
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
All First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
Upper secondary 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.080 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003
(3.76) (3.42) (1.54) (4.88) (4.80) (1.16)
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Lowest level tertiary 0.009 -0.006 0.087 0.002* 0.002 0.004
(0.45) (-0.32) (1.47) (1.79) (1.40) (1.23)
GRAD 0.109*** 0.128*** 0.051 0.002** 0.003*** 0.000
(6.08) (6.43) (1.19) (2.33) (2.97) (0.16)
Promotion-Within 0.639*** 0.617*** 0.804*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.040***
(9.35) (8.20) (5.50) (10.62) (9.65) (5.00)
× Upper Secondary 0.162 0.189* -0.007 0.012* 0.013** -0.003
(1.53) (1.68) (-0.02) (1.96) (2.04) (-0.24)
× Lowest level tertiary 0.085 0.063 0.150 0.004 0.004 -0.002
(0.64) (0.45) (0.31) (0.52) (0.48) (-0.09)
× GRAD 0.157* 0.154 0.115 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.66) (1.51) (0.46) (0.25) (0.17) (0.04)
Promotion-Across 1.167*** 0.861*** 2.835** 0.061*** 0.047*** 0.136**
(3.49) (2.64) (2.54) (3.32) (2.58) (2.28)
× Upper Secondary 0.096 0.431 -2.095 0.010 0.026 -0.095
(0.21) (0.94) (-1.39) (0.38) (0.91) (-1.20)
× Lowest level tertiary -0.406 -0.461 -0.271 -0.018 -0.017 -0.029
(-0.81) (-0.93) (-0.17) (-0.65) (-0.59) (-0.37)
× GRAD 1.336*** 1.525*** 0.352 0.049** 0.057** 0.011
(2.92) (3.28) (0.25) (2.12) (2.42) (0.15)
No Promotion-Across 0.499*** 0.473*** 0.567** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026**
(5.88) (5.34) (2.46) (5.83) (5.46) (2.10)
× Upper Secondary 0.003 -0.037 0.298 0.005 0.002 0.020
(0.02) (-0.26) (0.76) (0.54) (0.22) (0.83)
× Lowest level tertiary 0.035 0.070 -0.144 -0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.18) (0.32) (-0.45) (-0.15) (-0.18) (0.06)
× GRAD 0.168 0.092 0.444 0.005 0.002 0.015
(1.01) (0.51) (1.13) (0.60) (0.24) (0.83)
Performance t-1 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.042*** 0.000 -0.000 0.001***
(4.89) (3.75) (4.30) (0.58) (-0.23) (3.20)
Observations 37,870 32,391 5,479 37,870 32,391 5,479
R2 0.075 0.074 0.121 0.060 0.059 0.108
Notes: Dependent variables are change in: 1) hourly wage levels (columns 1-3); and 2) hourly log-wages (columns 4-6), 2009 Euros. All right-hand-side
variables are measured in year t-1, and the dependent variable is measured in year t. Base education category is the second-highest education level,
BA. All specifications include age, (age) squared, job tenure at the firm, (job tenure at the firm) squared, job level dummies, job title dummies, and an
intercept term. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Source: Finnish EK data, 2002-2010.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
in wage levels or changes in log wages, in the case of within-firm promotions
(which comprise the vast majority of all promotions) the results are consistent
with the theoretical prediction for the lowest-level education group. That is,
the coefficient of the interaction between the within-firm promotion dummy
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and the lowest-level education dummy is positive and statistically significant.
For the case of the highest-level education group, the coefficient on the inter-
action term has the wrong theoretical sign but is statistically significant only
in the case of wage levels. The fact that the prediction fails to hold for the
highest-level educational group is also true in the case of white men in the firm
analyzed in DeVaro and Waldman (2012).
Second, as seen in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 of Panel A, the evidence of promo-
tion signaling for the lowest-level education group is stronger for first promo-
tions than for subsequent promotions, consistent with theory.
Third, for the rare cases of across-firm promotions the theoretical prediction
concerning wage growth fails to hold in Panel A, and distinguishing first from
subsequent promotions does nothing to change matters.
Fourth, comparing Panels B and C reveals that both in level and logs, for all
workers and for first promotions, within-firm promotions are associated with
larger wage increases for women than men, though the reverse is true for sub-
sequent promotions. However, none of these gender differences are statistically
significant at conventional levels. For across-firm moves (whether promotions
or not), both in levels and in logs, wage increases from first promotion are
higher for men than women (a difference that is statistically significant at con-
ventional levels), but there is no statistically significant gender difference in
the wage increases attached to subsequent promotions.16 The Milgrom-Oster
16Kauhanen and Napari (2012b) also find that wage increases from across-firm promotions
are higher for men than women but they do not separate first and subsequent promotions, nor
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framework offers a potential explanation for the fact that across-firm job tran-
sitions are associated with larger annual wage increases for men than women,
whereas there is no gender difference in the wage changes attached to within-
firm promotion. More precisely, whatever mechanisms might be causing an-
nual wage increases to be higher for men than women are weakened in the
case of within-firm promotions for the following reason. Since promotions of
(Invisible) women are more of a surprise to competing firms than promotions
of (Visible) men, there is a larger positive update in the beliefs about wom-
ens’ ability, and hence a larger wage increase attached to promotion. In fact,
although the gender differences are statistically insignificant, the point esti-
mates reveal a large wage increase for women than men for within-firm pro-
motion, and this difference is even larger for first promotions and absent for
subsequent promotions. This pattern of evidence is consistent with a potential
signaling role of promotions that is stronger for women than men.
Finally, as has been well documented in the literature, Panel A reveals that
within-firm promotions are associated with wage increases. If the promotion
involves a change in firms, this wage increase is even larger. Even job transi-
tions that occur across firms but that do not involve promotion are associated
with big wage increases, relative to remaining in the original firm without a
promotion. Across all models in wage levels, unsurprisingly, last year’s perfor-
mance is positively related to annual wage increases. In contrast, last year’s
do they control for performance.
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performance has essentially no effect in the models in logs.
The patterns of results in Panel B (for men) and Panel C (for women) essen-
tially mirror those for Panel A.
4.4 Data and Measures: Germany
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual panel survey of Ger-
man households. The survey began in 1984, and as of 2012 there have been
seven new waves added to the initial sample, including an East German sam-
ple starting in 1990. In addition to household information the panel contains
a personal survey component which includes many employment-related ques-
tions. The data permit a definition of hierarchy and promotion that is consis-
tent across firms. Workers are asked their occupational status, which can be
interpreted as their hierarchical rank within the firm.17 We describe the hier-
archical assignment procedure in more detail in the Appendix B.1. Using the
response to the question about occupational status, we allocate workers to one
of four hierarchical levels: Lower, Middle, Upper and Executive.
As noted earlier, defining promotions consistently across firms poses a po-
tential challenge in data sets spanning many firms. In the German data we
measure promotions by a worker-reported survey indicator that a promotion
17Lluis (2005) and Cassidy (2012a) also use this GSOEP question for this purpose. See
Appendix B.1 for an example of this question in the 1985 survey year.
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has occurred. This type of measure resolves the issue of defining an across-
firm promotion since the definition does not hinge on a particular definition
of the job hierarchy. Furthermore, since this survey question is asked inde-
pendently of the worker’s occupation, we need not rely on occupation codes to
define the hierarchy as has been done in previous work.18 The disadvantage of
using transitions across occupation codes to define promotions is that promo-
tions more commonly occur within occupations than across occupations.19
4.4.1 Variables and Data Selection: Germany
Our analysis focuses on full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 65.20 We
focus only on white-collar, blue-collar, and civil service workers, dropping self-
employed workers and apprentices. These selection criteria result in a total
of 112,412 observations for which we can assign a worker to a job level. We
drop observations for which wages are below 4800 Euros a year,21 as well as
outlying yearly bonuses of over 50,000 Euros. We also drop absolute net yearly
wage changes between years that exceed 24,000 Euros per year. In total, we
18See, for example, Frederiksen, Halliday and Koch (2010), which uses occupation codes
to group workers into executive and non-executive ranks, so that a promotion or demotion
necessarily requires a change in occupation.
19For example, in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Cassidy (2012b) finds
that roughly 60 percent of promotions occur within occupations. Furthermore, in the single-
firm personnel data analyzed in DeVaro, Ghosh, and Zoghi (2012), the fraction of promotions
occurring within-occupation is 93 percent using two-digit occupation codes and 92 percent us-
ing three-digit occupation codes.
20We identify full-time workers using the GSOEP-generated Labor Force Status variable and
further restrict our attention to workers employed for over 30 hours per week on average.
21Income is denominated in 2009 Euros. We use net yearly labor income, as opposed to gross
income.
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lose 1168 observations due to wage or bonus data cleaning. Missing occupa-
tion, industry, and firm size data further reduce our sample by 5560. We lose
499 observations due to missing education, tenure, and experience data. Since
a worker in the highest job level cannot be promoted, we exclude 5437 obser-
vations where the worker is in the Executive level in the initial period.
We define a promotion to occur when a worker’s job level increases from
one year to the next. Following DeVaro and Waldman (2012), we do not distin-
guish between single-level versus multiple-level promotions, e.g. from Lower
to Middle versus from Lower to Upper (bypassing the Middle level). The self-
reported nature of the worker’s job level introduces the possibility of spurious
level changes. To mitigate this problem, Lluis (2005) uses a job change ques-
tion in conjunction with level change and wage change to determine promotions
and demotions; in that study, a promotion occurs if: a) the worker reports both
a job change and a level increase; or b) the worker reports only a level increase,
but with a wage gain of at least 5%. Demotions are analogously defined, but
in case (b), occur only for workers whose real wage decreases. Using endoge-
nous wage information to determine level changes would be problematic for our
analysis since we use wage changes as a dependent variable. For this reason,
we clean the data by assuming that if a worker changes level between period
1 and period 2, but returns to the initial level in period 3, the level change
was mismeasured. In this case, we assign the period 1 (and period 3) level to
period 2. This approach is similar to the method used in Yamaguchi (2010) for
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occupation codes, but where the intervening period is a single year, instead of
the worker’s entire firm tenure.22 Our correction procedure reduces the yearly
promotion rate from 10.7% to 5.7%.23
We define a categorical variable based on the worker’s number of years of
education, labeling respondents with fewer than 13 years of schooling as hav-
ing a high school degree or less (HS), those with 13 to 16 years as having a
bachelor’s degree (BA), and those with 17 years or more as having a graduate
degree (GRAD).24 Testing the DeVaro and Waldman (2012) model requires a
ranking of education corresponding to increasing average ability. However, it
is unclear how that ranking should be constructed in Germany due to the large
number of different degree types, hence we rely instead on years of schooling.
Firm size appears in the survey as a categorical variable with the following
four size groups: 1-19, 20-199, 200-1999 and 2000+ workers. Industry classifi-
cation is at the two-digit level, following the NACE classification system, and
occupation classification uses the three-digit ISCO-88 system. Job tenure and
worker experience are both worker-reported, where only full-time experience
is used.25
22In that study, if a worker changes occupations but eventually changes back to the orig-
inal occupation while at the same firm, Yamaguchi assumes that the intervening spell was
mismeasured and imposes the original occupation code for the intervening period.
23Although this procedure probably mislabels some genuine promotions, the average wage
change experienced by promoted workers increases from 3.7% to 4.6% after we impose the cor-
rection. For workers who are promoted based on the non-corrected procedure but not promoted
after the correction, average wage change is only 2.6%. This is suggestive that many corrected
“promotions” are, in fact, spurious.
24This approach of inferring indicators for levels of educational attainment from data on
years of education was taken in DeVaro and Waldman (2012).
25Ignoring part-time experience is unlikely to be a problem, given that the mean part-time
154
We partition the sample into first-promotion and subsequent-promotion sub-
samples, where the first-promotion subsample includes workers who have ei-
ther not yet received a promotion, or who have just received their first pro-
motion in that year.26 All other observations are included in the subsequent-
promotion sample. We note that in some cases our approach might misclassify
a subsequent promotion as a first promotion. This issue arises because in the
GSOEP, since many of the workers in the survey are only observed starting
from a later age,27 we do not observe the early part of the labor market history
for many workers. Thus, for some workers in the survey the first promotion
received may not be their true first promotion.28
4.4.2 Worker Performance Measurement: Germany
As in our Finnish analysis, we infer a measure of individual, job-specific perfor-
mance from data on individual performance bonuses. The GSOEP asks work-
ers for the amount of the bonus received in the previous year, divided into
Christmas, vacation, profit sharing and “other” bonus. We aggregate all four
types into a single bonus amount (setting missing bonus data to zero for each
and full-time experience are roughly 2 years and 15 years, respectively.
26In our sample, 78% of promotions are “first” promotions.
27The mean worker is first observed in the sample at age 33.
28A similar concern pertains to DeVaro and Waldman (2012). In that analysis, the single-
firm personnel records did not capture the entire hierarchy of the firm but rather only the
managerial portion of it. So when a worker first appears in that sample, it is impossible to
know whether the worker entered from outside the firm or was promoted up from the non-
managerial ranks of the firm. In the latter case, a worker who appears to be promoted for
the first time (in the sample) would in fact have experienced earlier promotions in the firm,
unbeknownst to the researcher.
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type) and use this to impute performance.29 A large fraction (75%) of workers
received a bonus, and the average annual bonus amount is 1470 Euros.
The imputation procedure for the GSOEP is similar to the procedure used
for the Finnish data. We measure performance as the residual of an OLS
regression of bonus pay on firm size, industry and occupation dummies, the
worker’s blue-collar/white-collar status, hierarchical level, and year dummies.
The bonus variable we use is observed in year t+1 but refers to bonuses earned
during year t; thus, we use year-t independent variables in the regression.
Panel C of Table 4.1 displays the autocorrelation matrix for the performance
measure. As in DeVaro and Waldman (2012) using actual performance (Panel
A), and as in the Finnish data using imputed performance (Panel B), in the
German data the imputed performance measure is highly autocorrelated, and
the strength of the relationship declines with time.
As we noted in the Finnish analysis, a potential issue that arises when
workers change firms is that performance related pay is typically paid in year
t + 1 based on performance in year t. This could lead us to understate the
performance of workers who change firms, because a worker who changes firms
in period t+1 might not receive performance related pay in that year. This issue
does not pose a problem for our analysis given that the estimation results in
the following section change very little when workers who switch firms and
29Since Christmas bonuses might be thought of more as gifts than as performance-based pay,
we also conducted the analysis dropping these payments from the bonus measure. Our results
of interest are largely unchanged in that case and are available upon request.
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received zero performance-related pay are excluded.
4.5 Empirical Analysis: Germany
The empirical analysis using German data parallels the analysis using Finnish
data as closely as possible, and the structure of this section parallels the cor-
responding structure from the Finnish analysis. Table 4.5 displays descriptive
statistics for all variables used in the analysis.
4.5.1 Promotion Probability: Germany
We estimate the same multinomial probit model for promotions described ear-
lier in the Finnish analysis. Again the dependent variable is trivariate, where
the baseline outcome, 0, is no promotion, outcome 1 is promotion within the
firm, and outcome 2 is promotion across firms. The dependent variable refers
to the outcome for worker i in year t, whereas all right-hand-side variables are
measured in year t − 1. The independent variables of interest are the dum-
mies for educational attainment, where the middle category (BA) is the refer-
ence group. The control variables include worker performance (as defined in
the preceding section), age, age squared, experience (in years), experience (in
years) squared, job tenure (in years) at the firm, job tenure (in years) at the
firm squared, one-digit industry codes, one-digit occupation codes, occupation
group (white collar, blue collar, or civil service), and worker’s hierarchical level.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics, Germany
All Workers Men Only Women Only
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Female 0.322 0.467
Promotion 0.057 0.232 0.060 0.237 0.052 0.223
Firm Change 0.051 0.219 0.051 0.220 0.050 0.217
Demographics
HS 0.730 0.444 0.749 0.434 0.692 0.462
BA 0.174 0.379 0.155 0.362 0.213 0.410
GRAD 0.096 0.294 0.096 0.295 0.095 0.293
Age 39.970 10.522 40.547 10.347 38.758 10.782
Tenure 11.122 9.523 11.740 9.811 9.822 8.746
Experience 17.382 10.777 18.662 10.864 14.691 10.076
Occupation
Net Income 21,618 9,323 23,602 9,760 17,447 6,613
Lower Level 0.274 0.446 0.245 0.430 0.336 0.472
Middle Level 0.496 0.500 0.493 0.500 0.504 0.500
Upper Level 0.229 0.420 0.263 0.440 0.160 0.366
Blue-Collar 0.438 0.496 0.532 0.499 0.242 0.428
White-Collar 0.489 0.500 0.385 0.487 0.707 0.455
Civil Servant 0.073 0.259 0.083 0.275 0.051 0.220
Firm Size
0-19 0.168 0.374 0.157 0.363 0.193 0.395
20-199 0.288 0.453 0.284 0.451 0.296 0.457
200-1999 0.265 0.441 0.258 0.438 0.280 0.449
2000+ 0.279 0.448 0.301 0.459 0.231 0.421
Observations 99,748 67,595 32,153
Source: German SOEP, 1984-2009.
Table 6 displays average marginal effects. Panel A reveals a within-firm
promotion rate of 5 percent, which is slightly less than the corresponding rate
of 6.2 percent from the Finnish data. As in the Finnish data, most promotions
are within-firm, and the probability of across-firm promotion is less than 1
percent. This pattern is true for both men and women, though as in the Finnish
data promotion rates are higher for men than women. Six interesting results
emerge from Panel A, which combines men and women.
First, as seen in column 1, the probability of within-firm promotion is in-
creasing in the level of educational attainment, holding worker performance
in the pre-promotion period constant. This result is the same as that found
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Table 4.6: Multinomial Probit, Promotion Within and Across Firms, Germany
Panel A: All Workers
All Workers First Promotion Subsequent Promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Within Across Within Across Within Across
HS -0.019∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.002
(-8.91) (-5.22) (-8.82) (-5.24) (-2.95) (-1.13)
GRAD 0.015∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(5.14) (4.50) (5.53) (2.90) (1.76) (3.85)
Performance t-1 0.140∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ 0.064 -0.092∗∗∗
(4.90) (-5.60) (5.18) (-4.91) (1.18) (-2.74)
Female -0.030∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(-17.05) (-7.16) (-16.40) (-6.20) (-5.14) (-3.31)
Pr(Y=k) 0.050 0.008 0.051 0.008 0.045 0.007
Observations 99,748 99,748 75,796 75,796 23,952 23,952
Panel B: Men
All Men First Promotion Subsequent Promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Within Across Within Across Within Across
HS -0.019∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.009∗ -0.002
(-6.84) (-2.44) (-7.32) (-2.30) (-1.66) (-0.91)
GRAD 0.010∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.003 0.007 0.004∗
(2.80) (2.29) (3.22) (1.60) (0.98) (1.78)
Performance t-1 0.132∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.122∗∗∗
(4.09) (-5.17) (4.83) (-4.28) (0.13) (-2.99)
Pr(Y=k) 0.052 0.008 0.053 0.008 0.048 0.007
Observations 67,595 67,595 50,507 50,507 17,088 17,088
Panel C: Women
All Women First Promotion Subsequent Promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Within Across Within Across Within Across
HS -0.020∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.001
(-6.33) (-4.71) (-5.62) (-5.02) (-3.13) (0.17)
GRAD 0.024∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(4.93) (4.58) (4.66) (2.88) (1.97) (3.50)
Performance t-1 0.196∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗ 0.167∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗ -0.023
(2.96) (-2.57) (2.07) (-2.77) (2.55) (-0.36)
Pr(Y=k) 0.045 0.007 0.047 0.007 0.039 0.006
Observations 32,153 32,153 25,289 25,289 6,864 6,864
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Notes: Cell entries are average marginal effects from a multinomial probit, with t-statistics in parentheses. Base Outcome 0: no promotion; Outcome
1: promotion within firm (“Within”); Outcome 2: promotion across firms (“Across”). Row “Pr(Y=k)” refers to the probability of the column’s outcome.
All right-hand-side variables are measured in year t-1, and the dependent variable is measured in year t. Base education category is the middle
education level, BA. All specifications include age, (age) squared, tenure, (tenure) squared, experience, (experience) squared, one-digit industry and
occupation codes, firm size, occupation group (white-collar, blue-collar or civil service), worker’s hierarchical level controls, and an intercept term.
Source: German SOEP, 1984-2009.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
in DeVaro and Waldman (2012), which considers only white, male stayers and
within-firm promotions in a single firm, and it matches the result from the
Finnish analysis.
Second, the incremental effects of the education variables are smaller in
column 5 than in column 3, suggesting that the previous result is stronger for
first promotions than for subsequent promotions. These results are consistent
with first promotions having a stronger signaling role than subsequent promo-
tions, as theory predicts and as found in the Finnish analysis. This result also
matches what was found in DeVaro and Waldman (2012). We suspect that our
evidence in favor of this second result is understated given that our method of
distinguishing between first and subsequent promotions likely produces some
misclassifications that would blur the distinction between columns 3 and 5.
Third, as seen in column 2 and as found in the Finnish analysis, the result
that promotion probability is increasing in the level of educational attainment
(controlling for pre-promotion performance) holds for across-firm promotions
just as it did for within-firm promotions.
Fourth, as seen by comparing the incremental effects of education in col-
umn 4 to those in column 6, it is unclear whether the previous result concerning
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across-firm promotions is stronger for first promotions than for subsequent pro-
motions. On the one hand, moving from column 4 to column 6, the incremental
effect of HS shrinks in magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant. But
on the other hand, the incremental effect of GRAD increases in magnitude.
Fifth, as seen in columns 1, 3, and 5 concerning within-firm promotions,
the marginal effect of pre-promotion performance has the anticipated positive
sign, though it is statistically insignificant in column 5. However, as seen in
columns 2, 4, and 6, the sign flips to negative in the case of across-firm promo-
tions. The same pattern of results occurred in the Finnish analysis. As noted
there, although one possible explanation for the negative sign for across-firm
promotions is adverse selection in the labor market as discussed in Greenwald
(1986), we see that explanation as unlikely given that, as will be shown in Ta-
ble 7, job transitions that occur across firms (whether promotions or not) are
associated with wage increases. As noted earlier, we think that a more likely
explanation for the negative sign derives from the definition of our performance
measure, which is constructed from individual bonus data.
Sixth, the probability of promotion (within and across firms) is lower for
women than men. The gender difference in within-firm promotion probabil-
ities (controlling for pre-promotion performance) is three percentage points,
which is similar in magnitude to the results from the Finnish analysis and
from Blau and DeVaro (2007), both of which control for worker performance.
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As in the Finnish analysis, the gender gap is larger for within-firm first pro-
motions than for within-firm subsequent promotions. This result is consistent
with first promotions releasing considerable information about the ability of
“Invisible” women (using terminology from Milgrom and Oster 1987), thereby
diminishing the gender gap in information about abilities.
Panels B and C of Table 6 repeat the preceding analyses for the subsamples
of men and women, respectively. The first five results just stated apply both to
men and women, though there are two noteworthy differences between these
two subsamples. First, the effect of education on promotion differs somewhat
between men and women, with education having a larger impact on promotion
receipt for women than for men. For the overall sample within firms (column
1), for women a GRAD degree increases the probability of promotion by 2.4%
over the baseline education level (BA), whereas for men it increases the proba-
bility by only 1.0%. A HS degree reduces the probability of promotion for both
men and women almost equivalently (1.9% and 2.0% for men and women, re-
spectively); however, since the within-firm promotion rate for women is 0.7%
lower overall than for men, these differences in coefficients understate the ef-
fects. This result is consistent with the Milgrom and Oster (1987) argument
concerning Visible and Invisibles, in which the education signal is more valu-
able for women than men. Second, for men, performance is positively related
to within-firm promotion receipt in the first-promotion sample, but not in the
subsequent-promotion sample, whereas for women performance is even more
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relevant for subsequent promotions than for first promotions.
4.5.2 Wage Growth and Promotion: Germany
Results for OLS regressions of the wage growth attached to promotions ap-
pear in Table 7, which has the same structure as Table 4.4 from the Finnish
analysis. First consider Panel A. In contrast to promotion signaling theory, the
results in column 1 suggest that the level of educational attainment does not
influence the magnitude of the annual wage increase attached to promotions.
However, graduate degree holders who switch firms (but without receiving a
promotion) experience bigger wage increases than do workers with less educa-
tion who make the same job transition. Unsurprisingly, last year’s performance
is positively related to annual wage increases. Annual wage changes are lower
for women than men. For our purposes, the most important point to take away
from the education-related results in column 1 is that (given that the educa-
tion variables do not influence the wage changes attached to promotion) there
is no empirical support for promotion signaling. This state of affairs does not
change when we separate first promotions (column 2) from subsequent promo-
tions (column 3). The promotion-as-signal hypothesis implies that the wage
increase from promotion should be decreasing in the level of educational at-
tainment to a greater extent in column 2 than in column 3, whereas in fact
there is no evidence of such a pattern in any of columns 1, 2, or 3. Finally,
column 1 also reveals some other points. As has been well documented in the
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literature, within-firm promotions are associated with wage increases. If the
promotion involves a change in firms, this wage increase is even larger. Job
transitions that occur across firms but do not involve promotion are also as-
sociated with big wage increases, relative to remaining in the original firm
without a promotion.
If the dependent variable is the change in log-wages (columns 4, 5, and 6)
the preceding observations from Panel A continue to hold for within-firm pro-
motions, i.e. there is no evidence of a signaling role of promotions. However, for
across-firm promotions there is evidence of signaling except in the case of high
school graduates. For that educational group, the interaction with across-firm
promotions should be positive according to the theory, whereas it is negative
in columns 4, 5, and 6 (though statistically significant only in column 4). The
results in DeVaro and Waldman (2012) also fail to support the wage-related
predictions of the promotion-as-signal hypothesis for workers with high school
degrees. As seen in column 4 and consistent with theory, workers with grad-
uate degrees experience smaller raises upon promotion than do workers with
the same job performance but only a college degree. Furthermore, again con-
sistent with theory, this effect is present for first promotions and disappears for
subsequent promotions. In summary, Panel A of Table 4 exhibits evidence of
promotion signaling for changes in log-wages (with the exception of high school
graduates) but not for changes in wage levels.
Comparing the results for men (Panel B) and women (Panel C) reveals some
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Table 4.7: OLS Estimates, Changes in Wage Levels and Log-Wage, Germany
Panel A: All Workers
Wage Levels Log-Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
Workers
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
All
Workers
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
HS -111.823∗∗ -122.117∗∗ -56.636 -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.002
(-2.04) (-1.98) (-0.48) (-2.48) (-2.36) (-0.40)
GRAD 54.411 74.292 -108.263 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.52) (0.61) (-0.52) (0.86) (0.58) (0.14)
Promotion-Within 356.575∗ 414.499∗ 145.385 0.019∗∗ 0.024∗∗ -0.003
(1.72) (1.76) (0.35) (1.99) (2.17) (-0.19)
X HS -9.493 -24.430 80.290 -0.000 -0.004 0.017
(-0.04) (-0.10) (0.18) (-0.04) (-0.34) (1.02)
X GRAD 173.770 7.257 1,018.507 0.009 0.003 0.039
(0.43) (0.02) (1.23) (0.53) (0.14) (1.47)
Promotion-Across 1,631.125∗∗∗ 1,709.914∗∗∗ 1,320.766 0.105∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗
(3.50) (4.02) (0.79) (4.79) (4.45) (2.00)
X HS -698.260 -734.895 -540.639 -0.047∗ -0.037 -0.089
(-1.28) (-1.38) (-0.30) (-1.77) (-1.30) (-1.30)
X GRAD -327.320 -1,294.186 2,385.697 -0.088∗∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.010
(-0.34) (-1.18) (1.13) (-2.22) (-2.49) (-0.14)
No Promotion-Across 667.940∗∗ 877.126∗∗∗ 96.593 0.028∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ -0.003
(2.53) (3.00) (0.17) (2.39) (2.81) (-0.12)
X HS -18.922 -60.740 20.125 0.014 0.014 0.008
(-0.07) (-0.19) (0.03) (1.06) (0.90) (0.34)
X GRAD 1,190.279∗∗ 1,179.855∗∗ 1,044.982 0.049∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.034
(2.44) (2.34) (0.83) (2.31) (2.14) (0.75)
Performance t-1 3,494.490∗∗∗ 2,649.726∗∗ 5,983.949∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.058 0.192∗∗∗
(3.12) (2.01) (2.83) (2.85) (1.57) (2.98)
Female -93.420∗∗ -96.641∗∗ -82.228 0.002 0.002 0.001
(-2.34) (-2.18) (-0.87) (0.83) (0.88) (0.25)
Observations 99,748 75,796 23,952 99,748 75,796 23,952
R2 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.014
Panel B: Men
Wage Levels Log-Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
Men
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
All
Men
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
HS -130.829 -130.743 -103.391 -0.006∗ -0.006∗ -0.003
(-1.64) (-1.46) (-0.61) (-1.91) (-1.66) (-0.56)
GRAD 61.874 128.431 -271.252 0.005 0.007 -0.005
(0.46) (0.82) (-1.04) (1.15) (1.26) (-0.63)
Promotion-Within 161.032 248.553 -68.499 0.004 0.010 -0.015
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(0.56) (0.76) (-0.12) (0.38) (0.82) (-0.79)
X HS 211.609 167.001 297.909 0.013 0.009 0.028
(0.69) (0.48) (0.48) (1.16) (0.68) (1.24)
X GRAD 690.430 537.784 1,386.588 0.039∗∗ 0.036 0.054
(1.27) (0.88) (1.19) (2.03) (1.62) (1.51)
Promotion-Across 1,634.093∗∗ 1,816.310∗∗∗ 1,041.300 0.100∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.131
(2.32) (2.89) (0.47) (3.61) (3.49) (1.64)
X HS -510.106 -690.711 77.464 -0.039 -0.028 -0.075
(-0.65) (-0.94) (0.03) (-1.19) (-0.84) (-0.88)
X GRAD 365.783 -657.838 4,186.491 -0.078 -0.091 -0.020
(0.24) (-0.41) (1.32) (-1.37) (-1.38) (-0.22)
No Promotion-Across 747.292∗∗ 874.235∗∗ 419.341 0.029∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.011
(2.00) (1.98) (0.59) (1.97) (1.93) (0.50)
X HS -94.079 -6.096 -426.407 0.011 0.017 -0.014
(-0.23) (-0.01) (-0.54) (0.68) (0.83) (-0.51)
X GRAD 1,478.215∗∗ 1,648.970∗∗ 716.771 0.051∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.000
(2.17) (2.35) (0.40) (1.90) (2.07) (0.00)
Performance t-1 3,334.793∗∗∗ 2,065.990 6,947.137∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.044 0.213∗∗∗
(2.64) (1.39) (2.92) (2.42) (1.04) (3.00)
Observations 67,595 50,507 17,088 67,595 50,507 17,088
R2 0.015 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.016
Panel C: Women
Wage Levels Log-Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
Women
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
All
Women
First
Promotion
Subsequent
Promotion
HS -99.850 -141.044∗ 16.265 -0.007∗ -0.009∗∗ 0.002
(-1.58) (-1.95) (0.12) (-1.84) (-2.09) (0.24)
GRAD 61.800 -29.359 222.757 -0.002 -0.009 0.009
(0.44) (-0.20) (0.65) (-0.36) (-1.24) (0.53)
Promotion-Within 757.386∗∗∗ 743.799∗∗∗ 801.378 0.049∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.032∗
(3.00) (2.62) (1.58) (2.62) (2.36) (1.72)
X HS -465.965∗ -414.165 -559.380 -0.028 -0.029 -0.009
(-1.67) (-1.33) (-0.94) (-1.35) (-1.23) (-0.36)
X GRAD -848.145∗ -1,018.776∗ 139.508 -0.052∗ -0.060∗ 0.001
(-1.67) (-1.72) (0.17) (-1.92) (-1.89) (0.03)
Promotion-Across 1,606.741∗∗∗ 1,534.203∗∗∗ 1,987.719 0.110∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.101
(3.23) (2.95) (1.49) (3.08) (2.84) (1.28)
X HS -1,093.126 -872.084 -2,839.386∗ -0.060 -0.047 -0.160∗
(-1.48) (-1.10) (-1.93) (-1.28) (-0.91) (-1.89)
X GRAD -1,360.703 -2,527.693∗∗∗ 376.596 -0.095∗ -0.159∗∗∗ 0.025
(-1.63) (-2.71) (0.25) (-1.90) (-2.85) (0.28)
No Promotion-Across 538.081 826.258∗∗ -657.084 0.027 0.042∗∗ -0.033
(1.63) (2.57) (-0.71) (1.41) (2.08) (-0.71)
X HS 78.801 -159.518 1,051.676 0.019 0.010 0.056
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(0.22) (-0.44) (1.06) (0.88) (0.45) (1.11)
X GRAD 545.951 266.325 1,829.439 0.046 0.035 0.106
(1.01) (0.45) (1.41) (1.40) (0.95) (1.44)
Performance t-1 4,216.925∗ 4,804.066∗ 2,013.188 0.117 0.117 0.145
(1.72) (1.67) (0.46) (1.58) (1.41) (0.90)
Observations 32,153 25,289 6,864 32,153 25,289 6,864
R2 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.022 0.025 0.029
Notes: Dependent variables are change in: 1) net yearly wage levels (columns 1-3); and 2) net yearly log-wages (columns 4-6), 2009 Euros. All right-
hand-side variables are measured in year t-1, and the dependent variable is measured in year t. Base education category is the middle education
level, BA. All specifications include age, (age) squared, tenure, (tenure) squared, experience, (experience) squared, two-digit industry and occupation
codes, firm size, occupation group (white-collar, blue-collar or civil service), worker’s hierarchical level controls, and an intercept term. t-statistics are
shown in parentheses. Source: German SOEP, 1984-2009.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
further results. For men, the wage increase (in levels) attached to within-firm
first promotions is positive but statistically insignificant, whereas the corre-
sponding result for women is considerably larger in magnitude and statistically
significant at the one percent level. For within-firm subsequent promotions, on
the other hand, neither gender experiences a statistically significant wage in-
crease. The preceding results also hold in logs, with the only difference being
that women continue to experience a positive raise even in the case of within-
firm subsequent promotions, though it is still smaller than the raise women
receive from within-firm first promotions. This pattern of results is consistent
with the Milgrom-Oster framework that predicts larger wage increases from
promotion for women than men, with this gender difference dissipating after
first promotion.30
Further evidence suggesting support for the Milgrom-Oster framework can
be found by comparing the education coefficients in Panel B to those in Panel
30In the case of across-firm promotions both men and women experience positive and sta-
tistically significant wage changes from first promotion but no statistically significant wage
change from subsequent promotion.
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C. In the case of men, the education-related results do not support the promo-
tion signaling model for either dependent variable. In contrast, in the case of
women, whether the dependent variable is changes in wage levels or changes
in log-wages, and whether promotions are within firms or across firms, the
education-related results are clearly consistent with promotion signaling ex-
cept for high school graduates. In particular, the interactions of either pro-
motion dummy with the dummy for receipt of a graduate degree exhibit the
same pattern of results, namely a negative and statistically significant coeffi-
cient in the case of first promotions and a positive and insignificant coefficient
in the case of subsequent promotions. The fact that the evidence of asymmetric
learning is stronger for women than men is consistent with the argument in
Milgrom and Oster (1987) that the abilities of women are less visible to the
outside labor market than are the abilities of men. This can be true for a vari-
ety of reasons, one of which may be that women benefit less from networking in
an “old boys club”. Our evidence suggests that this informational disadvantage
faced by women is mitigated following the public release of information about
abilities that accompanies a first promotion. The basis for this conclusion is
that the gender gap (in both promotion probabilities and the wage change con-
ditional on promotion) is present for first promotions but not for subsequent
promotions. The evidence suggests that there is significant information con-
tent in a first promotion. Prior to that, women may be at a disadvantage rel-
ative to men in that their skills are less easily observed by other employers
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in the labor market. But the positive public signal released when a woman
is first promoted tends to level the informational playing field, and thereafter
asymmetric learning may be less relevant.
4.6 Summary and Conclusion
We include controls for worker performance in our analyses of promotion prob-
abilities and of the wage growth conditional on promotion, which are crucial in
empirical models designed to test the signaling role of promotions. Since such
worker performance measures are typically absent in the large-scale panel
data sets that span many firms, previous evidence on the signaling role of pro-
motion has had to rely either on single-firm data, as in DeVaro and Waldman
(2012) and DeVaro, Ghosh, and Zoghi (2012), or on multi-firm panel data that
do not control for worker performance, as in Bognanno and Melero (2012). We
overcome this difficulty by constructing a measure of worker performance from
individual bonus data, and find that (for both Finland and Germany) its auto-
correlation structure is quite similar to that of the actual performance ratings
from the single-firm personnel data set used first in Baker, Gibbs, and Holm-
stro¨m (1994a,b) and later in DeVaro and Waldman (2012).31
31The correlation matrix from DeVaro and Waldman (2012) was matched somewhat more
closely by the Finnish matrix than by the German matrix, though here it should be recalled
that the German data include white-collar, blue-collar, and civil service workers, whereas the
Finnish data include only white-collar workers as in DeVaro and Waldman (2012). Restrict-
ing the German analysis to white-collar workers results in a correlation matrix more closely
matching that from DeVaro and Waldman (2012).
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To summarize the Finnish analysis, the results from both the promotion
probability analysis and the wage growth analysis (for both men and women)
are consistent with a signaling role of promotion and corroborate the findings in
DeVaro and Waldman (2012). That is, for the most relevant case of within-firm
promotions, and controlling for pre-promotion worker performance, promotion
probability is increasing in the level of educational attainment, and the wage
increase conditional on promotion is decreasing in the level of educational at-
tainment for the lowest-level educational group. These results are stronger for
first than for subsequent promotions. The fact that the predictions concern-
ing wage growth are unsupported for the highest-level education group echoes
the results from DeVaro and Waldman (2012). Furthermore, controlling for
pre-promotion worker performance, women experience lower promotion prob-
abilities than men and higher wage growth attached to within-firm promotion
than men, but only in the case of first promotions. These results are consistent
with the promotion signaling framework in Milgrom and Oster (1987), though
only the gender differences in promotion probability are statistically significant
and not the gender differences in the wage increases attached to within-firm
promotion. Finally, evidence of promotion signaling is weaker in the rarer case
of across-firm promotions.
To summarize the German analysis, the probability of promotion is increas-
ing in the level of educational attainment, holding performance in the pre-
promotion job constant. This result holds for both within-firm and across-firm
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promotions, for both men and women, and it is stronger for first promotions
than for subsequent promotions. These results are consistent with the sig-
naling role of promotion and the evidence in DeVaro and Waldman (2012).
For women (with the exception of high school graduates) the theoretical pre-
dictions related to wage changes are also supported. Controlling for perfor-
mance in the pre-promotion job, the wage change accompanying promotions
is decreasing in the level of educational attainment, both for within-firm and
across-firm promotions, and whether the wage change is measured in levels
or logs. Furthermore, consistent with the theory, these results are present for
first promotions but not subsequent promotions. The fact that the predictions
concerning wage growth are unsupported for high school graduates echoes the
results from DeVaro and Waldman (2012). For men, however, the theoretical
predictions concerning wage changes are unsupported. The fact that evidence
of asymmetric learning is stronger for women than men is consistent with the
arguments in Milgrom and Oster (1987) in which the abilities of women are less
visible to employers than are the abilities of men, though our results suggest
that this informational disadvantage of women diminishes or vanishes follow-
ing the first promotion. Further support for the Milgrom-Oster framework is
found in the result that, for within-firm first promotions, the wage increase
for men is positive but statistically insignificant whereas the corresponding in-
crease for women is considerably larger and statistically significant at the one
percent level. Furthermore, for both genders there is no statistically significant
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wage change associated with within-firm subsequent promotions.
Overall, we see the results from both countries as broadly consistent with a
signaling role of promotions, and given the considerable breadth of the Finnish
and German samples we see the results as important in establishing the appli-
cability of the promotion-as-signal hypothesis across a wide range of employer
types, particularly given that our evidence comes from two distinct economies.
We conclude the analysis with some remarks on the current state of the em-
ployer learning literature and how it might fruitfully evolve in the future.32 Al-
though our focus in this chapter is on asymmetric learning about worker ability
in the labor market, a second important perspective in the literature concerns
symmetric learning. Under symmetric learning, all employers in the market
learn about a worker’s abilities at the same rate, so that promotions convey
no new information to competing firms.33 Our impression is that most em-
ployment relationships are characterized by at least some asymmetric learn-
ing, which would be an argument for preferring that modeling approach. On
the other hand, the asymmetric learning model tends to be less analytically
tractable than the symmetric learning model, and therefore more difficult to
extend and enrich in various dimensions the researcher may wish to explore.
Thus, although the asymmetric learning model may offer a more realistic de-
scription of the nature of the employer learning that occurs in the labor market,
32We are grateful to Mike Waldman for numerous discussions that shaped our thinking on
this subject.
33Examples of theoretical promotions models based on this assumption are Gibbons and
Waldman (1999, 2006), Ghosh (2007), and DeVaro and Morita (2013).
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as long as the symmetric learning model offers a reasonable approximation it
might be preferable on grounds of tractability. Which of the two perspectives
is more appropriate ultimately depends on the production context. These con-
siderations highlight the need for empirical work aimed at discerning the im-
portance of asymmetric learning in promotions, and our work is a step in that
direction.
The current empirical evidence suggests that asymmetric learning plays
a role, but this same evidence does not rule out the possibility of symmetric
learning, nor does it suggest anything about the relative importance of the two
types of learning. Empirical studies have generally tended to focus either on
tests of symmetric learning (e.g. Farber and Gibbons 1996, Altonji and Pier-
ret 2001, and Lange 2007) or of asymmetric learning (e.g. Scho¨nberg 2007,
Kahn 2009, Pinkston 2009, DeVaro and Waldman 2012, and DeVaro, Ghosh,
and Zoghi 2012). Collectively, the empirical work in this literature suggests
that asymmetric learning plays a role and that symmetric learning also plays
a role. What it does not yet do is provide a clear sense of the relative impor-
tance of both types of learning, either overall or in a given production context.
A promising next step for the literature, therefore, might be developing the-
oretical frameworks and corresponding empirical frameworks that nest both
types of learning so that their relative importance is reflected in estimable
parameters. Ideally these frameworks would be developed for application on
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large-scale, worker-firm matched data sets such as the Finnish data we ana-
lyze in this chapter. However, such an approach would require attention to
what variables are typically included (and excluded) from such data sets. For
example, such data sets typically lack anything resembling an AFQT score,
which is a crucial input to the current NLSY-based framework for studying
symmetric learning, as developed by Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and
Pierret (2001), and Lange (2007). We think that development of a structural
empirical framework that nests both types of learning and that does not ne-
cessitate data on AFQT scores (so that analysis could move beyond the NLSY
to data sets like the Finnish data) would be a significant step forward in this
literature. The relative importance of the two types of learning could then be
assessed both within and across different job types.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
My dissertation consists of studies on worker promotions, hierarchical levels,
and wage growth.
In my first chapter, I assess the importance of job characteristics on the
likelihood that a worker receives a promotion. I assign a four-dimensional skill
requirement vector to each occupation as a measure of that occupation’s char-
acteristics. These measures are derived from the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles. I take labor market histories from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979, and I fit probit estimations to investigate the determinants of pro-
motion. I find that the skill requirements of an occupation have a significant
effect on the probability that the worker receives a promotion. Specifically, I
find that higher levels of cognitive skill requirement, and lower levels of mo-
tor and strength skill requirements, are associated with higher probabilities of
promotion. I also show wage change upon promotion is not greatly impacted by
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skill requirements, which would otherwise mitigate the impact that a higher
promotion probability would have on a worker’s career outcome. In addition to
impacting promotion receipt directly, I find that including skill requirements
changes the effects of other important worker characteristics: the gender gap
in promotion is significantly understated when skill requirements are omitted,
and including skill requirements increases the gap by 56%, while the impor-
tance of Armed Forces Qualification Test scores is greatly reduced when skill
requirements are included.
In my second chapter, I estimate an occupational choice model where each
occupation is composed of multiple hierarchical levels. Each occupation-level
contains a different vector of task usages that describe what activities are
performed on that job. Workers search for jobs both across-occupations as
well as within-occupations, and accumulate both task-specific and occupation-
specific human capital through learning by doing. I take labor market histories
from the German Socio-Economic Panel, and I derive task usage information
by occupation-level from the German Qualification and Career survey. Using
these data, I show three key empirical observations: first, wage losses during
unemployment are higher for workers that return to a lower hierarchical level
than before unemployment; second, workers in the lowest level have a greater
probability of changing occupations than workers in the higher levels; and
third, task usage varies significantly within occupations by hierarchical level,
with cognitive task usage typically rising, and manual task usage typically
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falling, as a worker moves to higher levels. I estimate my model using indirect
inference. Using the model to simulate worker histories, I show that my model
is also able to match well the wage profile and the occupation employment frac-
tions over the worker’s life cycle. Also, I find that my model is able to replicate
the first two key empirical observations. The specificity of human capital varies
by occupation, with blue-collar workers accumulating more occupation-specific
skills while white-collar workers accumulate more task-specific skills. Also,
the specificity of human capital differs significantly between the model that
includes hierarchical levels versus the model that omits levels.
The third and final chapter is coauthored with Jed DeVaro and Antti Kauha-
nen. In this chapter, we investigate the theory that promotion serves as a
signal of worker ability using two large-scale, nationally-representative, Euro-
pean panel data sets, the German Socio-Economic Panel and the Confedera-
tion of Finnish Industries. One of the difficulties in using these type of data
is that data on worker performance is typically unavailable. We address this
problem by fitting regressions of performance-related-pay and bonus data on
worker, firm, and job characteristics. Whatever we are not able to explain by
observable characteristics, i.e. the residual of these regressions, we assume
is the unobserved worker performance and we use these values as our per-
formance measures. We test the first empirical prediction, that education is
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positively related to promotion receipt, by using probit estimations which in-
clude our performance measure. The second empirical prediction, that condi-
tional on promotion, more educated workers receive lower wage gains, is tested
using a wage change regression, again controlling for performance using our
inferred measure. We find that promotion probabilities are increasing in edu-
cational attainment whereas wage increases from promotion are decreasing in
educational attainment for some educational groups. Both of these results are
stronger for first promotions than for subsequent promotions. We also find that
women have lower promotion probabilities than men, though this difference
dissipates after the first promotion. Since we are able to follow workers after
they leave their current firm, and our hierarchical level assignment procedure
not firm-specific, we can separately investigate within-firm versus across-firm
promotion. We find that evidence of promotion signaling is stronger for within-
firm than for across-firm promotions.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1 Additional Tables
Table A-1: Skill Levels: White-Collar
All Technicians Managers and Prof. Sales Admin. and Support
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive 10.23 11.58 10.91 9.16 8.48
1.66 1.21 0.59 0.98 1.04
Interpersonal 2.82 3.26 3.34 2.87 1.88
1.26 1.53 0.71 0.25 0.88
Motor 6.24 6.95 5.19 5.09 6.72
1.69 2.01 0.84 0.44 1.47
Strength 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.16
0.13 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.16
Observations 21,551 6,955 6,207 1,538 6,851
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Table A-2: Skill Levels: Blue-Collar
All Service Precision Craft Operators and Laborers
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive 6.81 6.53 8.38 5.57
1.76 1.55 1.33 0.90
Interpersonal 1.32 1.61 1.63 0.92
0.86 0.72 1.09 0.40
Motor 7.43 6.50 8.47 6.95
1.52 1.36 1.54 0.94
Strength 0.48 0.45 0.47 0.51
0.14 0.13 0.15 0.13
Observations 17,995 3,670 6,704 7,621
Table A-3: Skill Level Correlations, Men Only
Cognitive Interpersonal Motor Strength
Cognitive 1.00
Interpersonal 0.70 1.00
Motor -0.03 -0.45 1.00
Strength -0.72 -0.67 0.38 1.00
Table A-4: Skill Level Correlations, Women Only
Cognitive Interpersonal Motor Strength
Cognitive 1.00
Interpersonal 0.69 1.00
Motor -0.08 -0.42 1.00
Strength -0.53 -0.24 -0.02 1.00
Table A-5: Skill Level Correlations: 1970 and 2000 Codes
1970
Cognitive Interpersonal Motor Strength
Cognitive 1.00
Interpersonal 0.70 1.00
Motor -0.04 -0.46 1.00
Strength -0.64 -0.51 0.24 1.00
2000
Cognitive Interpersonal Motor Strength
Cognitive 1.00
Interpersonal 0.68 1.00
Motor -0.11 -0.43 1.00
Strength -0.61 -0.52 0.38 1.00
Note: 1970 codes include years prior to 2002; 2000 codes include 2002 to 2008
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Table A-6: Skill Changes: 1970 and 2000 Codes
1970 2000
All Promoted Only All Promoted Only
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive Change 0.27 0.67 0.39 0.96
2.40 2.45 2.62 2.55
Interpersonal Change 0.14 0.34 0.26 0.58
1.22 1.32 1.81 1.94
Motor Change −0.10 −0.26 −0.16 −0.42
1.94 1.96 2.07 2.08
Strength Change −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.05
0.18 0.18 0.21 0.20
Observations 7,040 2,009 1,029 467
Note 1: Only occupation changes included
Note 2: 1970 codes include years prior to 2002; 2000 codes include 2002 to 2008
Table A-7: Skill Levels: AFQT Quintiles
AFQT1 AFQT2 AFQT3 AFQT4 AFQT5
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive 6.98 7.90 8.58 9.19 10.37
2.05 2.21 2.19 2.14 2.06
Interpersonal 1.50 1.86 2.09 2.34 2.77
1.04 1.23 1.26 1.34 1.34
Motor 6.91 6.86 6.81 6.79 6.54
1.51 1.63 1.74 1.78 1.85
Strength 0.44 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.22
0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18
Observations 6,281 8,709 8,036 8,402 8,118
Table A-8: Skill Levels: High School vs College
High School College
Mean/s.d. Mean/s.d.
Cognitive 7.62 9.59
2.15 2.24
Interpersonal 1.64 2.57
1.08 1.36
Motor 7.05 6.54
1.62 1.76
Strength 0.39 0.25
0.20 0.19
Observations 18,402 21,144
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Table A-9: Promotion Determinants: Marginal Effects of Random Effects Pro-
bit, Job Variables, Annual Period (1988-1990)
All Men Women
No Skills Skills No Skills Skills No Skills Skills
Job
log Wage −0.015 −0.034∗∗ −0.023 −0.041∗∗ −0.004 −0.029
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
Overtime hours 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.003 0.004 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Union −0.030∗∗ −0.016 −0.026 −0.012 −0.034∗ −0.020
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Medium (100-500) 0.028∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.015 0.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Large(>500) 0.057∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 13,992 13,992 8,183 8,183 5,809 5,809
Standard errors in parentheses
Note 1: Dependent variable: promotion receipt between interviews; Time period: 1988-1990; Interviews annual
Note 2: Average marginal effects reported; derivatives w.r.t. entire varlist and continuous approximations of discrete variables
Note 3: Human capital and demographic variables and year dummies included in estimation but not displayed
Note 4: Columns labelled skills include skill requirement levels in estimation
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A-10: Promotion Determinants: Marginal Effects of Random Effects Pro-
bit, Job Variables, Biannual Period (1996-2008)
All Men Women
No Skills Skills No Skills Skills No Skills Skills
Job
log Wage 0.007 −0.008 0.009 −0.004 0.003 −0.016
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Overtime hours 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Union −0.020∗∗ −0.006 −0.007 0.006 −0.042∗∗ −0.030∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Medium (100-500) 0.019∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.012 0.014
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Large(>500) 0.053∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 25,554 25,554 14,537 14,537 11,017 11,017
Standard errors in parentheses
Note 1: Dependent variable: promotion receipt between interviews; Time period: 1996-2008; Interviews biannual
Note 2: 1970 Codes: 1996-2000; 2000 Codes: 2002-2008
Note 3: Average marginal effects reported; derivatives w.r.t. entire varlist and continuous approximations of discrete variables
Note 4: Human capital and demographic variables and year dummies included in estimation but not displayed
Note 5: Columns labelled skills include skill requirement levels in estimation
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A-11: Wage Change from Promotion (1988-1990)
All Men Women
Cognitive −0.001 −0.002 −0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Interpersonal −0.006 0.003 −0.013∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Motor −0.005∗ −0.002 −0.009∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Strength −0.008 0.018 −0.022
(0.023) (0.037) (0.035)
Observations 5,371 3,146 2,225
Standard errors in parentheses
Note 1: Dependent variable in log wage change.
Note 2: All specifications control for age, tenure,
experience, race, year, and industry.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A-12: Wage Change from Promotion (1996-2008)
All Men Women
Cognitive −0.007 −0.005 −0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Interpersonal −0.007 −0.005 −0.009
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
Motor −0.008 −0.010 −0.006
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Strength −0.034 0.023 −0.094
(0.042) (0.062) (0.069)
Observations 1,293 711 582
Standard errors in parentheses
Note 1: Dependent variable in log wage change.
Note 2: All specifications control for age, tenure,
experience, race, year, and industry.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix B
Chapter 3 Appendix
B.1 Hierarchical Level Assignment
In this appendix I describe the procedure used to assign job levels in both
the GSOEP and GQCS. The basis for the assignment is the skill level of the
worker’s main job. Note that the worker is not asked about his or her own skill
level but rather the skill level requirement or task complexity of the job. For-
tunately, the wording of the occupational status question has remained essen-
tially unchanged throughout the entire GSOEP panel history, so that consis-
tent hierarchical assignment across time is possible. It is also consistent across
both the 1986 and 1992 waves of the GQCS. The occupational status question
for the 1985 GSOEP survey for blue-collar, white-collar, and civil servants is as
follows:1
What position do you have at the moment? If you have more than one job at
the moment, please answer the following in reference to your main job.
Blue-collar worker:
unskilled worker (1)
trained worker (2)
semi-skilled and skilled worker (3)
foreman (4)
1Since self-employed workers and trainees are dropped from our sample, their sections of
the question are omitted.
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White-collar worker:
industry and works foreman in nontenured employment
employee with simple duties (e.g. salesperson, clerk, stenotypist) (1)
employee with qualified duties (e.g. official in charge, technical
drawer) (2)
employee with highly qualified duties or managerial function (e.g. scien-
tific worker, attorney, head of department) (3)
employee with extensive managerial duties (e.g. manager, managing di-
rector, head of a large firm or concern) (4)
Civil servant (including judges and professional soldiers):
lower level (1)
middle level (2)
upper level (3)
executive level (4)
Note that the worker can only answer yes to one of the preceding options, and
his or her response to the question determines blue-collar, white-collar or civil
service status. The number in parentheses after some of the responses indi-
cates the level to which a worker responding with that answer is assigned.
Following Lluis (2005), I do not assign the “industry and works group” in the
white-collar category to a level, as it is unclear where these employees should
be placed. For Chapter 2 I assign all level 4 workers into level 3.
B.2 Value Functions
Specifying the worker’s value function is straightforward but tedious. This is
due to the large number of different potential options each period arising from
the search process. First, I start by specifying the value function for a worker
in unemployment in period t:
Ut(Sit) =uj=0,t(Sit) + βE[(1− φ1) ∗ Ut+1(Si,t+1)+
φ1(φ2(
L∑
l=1
κ1lmax{Ut(Si,t+1), V1l,t+1(Si,t+1)})+
(1− φ2)(
L∑
l=1
κ2lmax{Ut(Si,t+1), V2l,t+1(Si,t+1)}))]
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Note that, even when the worker receives an job offer, they still have the option
of remaining in unemployment. Next, the value function of a worker employed
in occupation j, level l in period t:
Vjlt(Sit) =ujlt(Sit) + βE[ψ
j((1− φ1) ∗ Ut+1(Si,t+1)+
φ1(φ2(
L∑
l=1
κ1lmax{Ut+1(Si,t+1), V1l,t+1(Si,t+1)})+
(1− φ2)(
L∑
l=1
κ2lmax{Ut+1(Si,t+1), V2l,t+1(Si,t+1)}))+
(1− ψj)(νj1(
L∑
l=1
κjlmax{Ut+1(Si,t+1), Vjl,t+1(Si,t+1)}))+
(1− νj1)(νj2(
L∑
l=1
κ
j−1
l max{Ut+1(Si,t+1), Vj−1l,t+1(Si,t+1)})+
(1− νj2)max{Ut+1(Si,t+1), V1l,t+1(Si,t+1)})))]
Where j−1 refers to the other occupation. Numerous different events can occur
to an employed worker. These include suffering a job loss, suffering a job loss
but immediately receiving a new job offer, receiving a within-occupation job
offer, and receiving an across-occupation job offer. Finally, Sit evolves according
to Equations (3.2) and (3.3).
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B.3 Model Fit: No Levels
Figure B.1: Overall Wages, No Levels
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Figure B.2: Wages: Blue-Collar,
No Levels
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Figure B.3: Wages: Blue-Collar, No
Levels
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Figure B.4: Occupation Composition,
No Levels
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Figure B.5: Unemployment, No Lev-
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B.4 Auxiliary Model Moments
Table A-1: Auxiliary Model: Fixed Effect Wage Regression
Data Model
τit 0.0792359 0.146504
(0.0120271) (0.0114068)
t 0.0134151 -0.00142
(0.0010218) (0.0015451)
t2 -0.0004912 -0.00051
(0.0000106) (0.000011)
exp1,it ∗ 1(j = 1) 0.0256619 0.067642
(0.0017627) (0.0017558)
exp2,it ∗ 1(j = 2) -0.0024922 0.024357
(0.0025122) (0.0025009)
exp21,it ∗ 1(j = 1) -0.0021433 -0.00239
(0.0001556) (0.0001675)
exp22,it ∗ 1(j = 2) -0.0008734 -0.00108
(0.000219) (0.0002288)
exp31,it ∗ 1(j = 1) 0.0000543 2.99E-05
(0.0000044) (0.00000498)
exp32,it ∗ 1(j = 2) 0.0000292 0.000029
(0.00000606) (0.00000675)
expit 0.0164093 -0.02579
(0.0018337) (0.0021369)
exp2it -0.0001338 0.001137
(0.0000619) (0.0000603)
cogsumit ∗ τit 0.0617233 0.128395
(0.0055294) (0.0053761)
cogsum2it ∗ τit -0.0012552 -0.0042
(0.0004111) (0.0004009)
Constant 7.274401 7.525145
(0.0155622) (0.0237668)
N = 45316 N¯ = 45860.25
R2(within) = 0.175 R2(within) = .216
R2(between) = 0.016 R2(between) = .002
R2(overall) = 0.048 R2(overall) = .004
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Table A-2: Auxiliary Model: Event Probabilities
Event Data Model
Employment to Unemployment:
Blue-Collar − > Unemp 0.0401 0.052
White-Collar − > Unemp 0.0181 0.027
Unemployment to Employment:
Unemp − > BC 1 0.482 0.318
Unemp − > BC 2 0.313 0.385
Unemp − > BC 3 0.259 0.435
Unemp − > WC 1 0.076 0.113
Unemp − > WC 2 0.074 0.115
Unemp − > WC 3 0.029 0.025
Promotion/Demotion:
Promotion (BC) 0.052 0.037
Promotion (WC) 0.068 0.050
Demotion (BC) 0.066 0.050
Demotion (WC) 0.045 0.019
Table A-3: Auxiliary Model: Employment to Unemployment Regression
Data Model
wagei,t−1 -0.06309 -0.02707
(0.0029528) (-0.0028215)
Constant 0.506511 0.246049
(0.0221727) (0.0211382)
N = 39392 N¯ = 41873.5
R2 = 0.012 R2 = 0.002
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Table A-4: Auxiliary Model: Linear Probability Regressions
Blue-Collar
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Data Model Data Model Data Model
t -0.00041 -0.00397 -0.00661 7.03E-06 0.007586 0.001162
(0.0001826) (0.0001836) (0.0008779) (0.0008692) (0.0004497) (0.0004502)
t2 3.87E-05 6.84E-06 -0.00015 -9.17E-06
(0.0000183) (0.0000183) (0.00000936) (0.00000948)
N = 50578 N¯ = 50589.5 N = 50578 N¯ = 50589.5 N = 50578 N¯ = 50589.5
R2 = 0.0001 R2 = 0.009 R2 = 0.012 R2 = 0.0002 R2 = 0.006 R2 = 0.001
White-Collar
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Data Model Data Model Data Model
t -0.00103 -0.00222 0.012404 0.006228 0.003102 0.001497
(0.0004022) (0.0004252) (0.0007232) (0.0007503) (0.0001159) (0.0001133)
t2 1.72E-05 2.53E-05 -0.00023 -0.00013
(0.00000837) (0.00000895) (0.0000151) (0.0000158)
N = 50578 N¯ = 50589.5 N = 50578 N¯ = 50589.5 N = 50578 N¯ = 50589.5
R2 = 0.0002 R2 = 0.003 R2 = 0.006 R2 = 0.002 R2 = 0.014 R2 = 0.004
Table A-5: Auxiliary Model: Wage Change Regression
Data Model
1
log(t)
∗ τi,t−1 ∗ τit 0.053254 0.074325
(0.0134531) (0.0141713)
1
log(t)
0.20257 0.178783
(0.012046) (0.0125158)
expj,it -0.00081 0.00053
(0.0001865) (0.0002243)
Constant -0.05155 -0.05514
(0.0048188) (0.0050784)
N = 38086 N¯ = 40052
R2 = 0.010 R2 = 0.006
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Table A-6: Auxiliary Model: Initial Wages
Blue-Collar
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Mean 7.111 7.168 7.145 7.167 7.433 7.290
S.D. 0.310 0.281 0.298 0.271 0.279 0.322
White-Collar
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Mean 7.005 7.108 7.145 7.229 7.457 7.388
S.D. 0.307 0.300 0.254 0.344 0.254 0.380
Table A-7: Auxiliary Model: Wages by Age
Data Model
Age 29-31 Age 39-41 Age 54-56 Age 29-31 Age 39-41 Age 54-56
Blue-Collar Level 1 7.37 7.42 7.38 7.43 7.47 7.43
Blue-Collar Level 2 7.43 7.51 7.47 7.42 7.44 7.43
Blue-Collar Level 3 7.57 7.65 7.61 7.88 7.55 7.55
White-Collar Level 1 7.31 7.4 7.43 7.28 7.3 7.39
White-Collar Level 2 7.47 7.53 7.63 7.52 7.62 7.7
White-Collar Level 3 7.58 7.91 7.99 7.62 7.81 7.89
Table A-8: Auxiliary Model: Wage Change by Events
Event Data Model
No Change 0.0131 0.0114
Promotion 0.0358 0.102
Demotion -0.0052 -0.006
Occupation Change 0.0162 0.0370
Unemployment Spell -0.0342 -0.121
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Table A-9: Auxiliary Model: Overall Occupation-Level Make-up
Data Model
Age 18-30 Age 31-50 Age 51-60 Age 18-30 Age 31-50 Age 51-60
Blue-Collar Level 1 0.261 0.243 0.243 0.301 0.260 0.191
Blue-Collar Level 2 0.374 0.290 0.234 0.284 0.279 0.283
Blue-Collar Level 3 0.033 0.069 0.050 0.047 0.057 0.069
White-Collar Level 1 0.053 0.042 0.046 0.070 0.049 0.038
White-Collar Level 2 0.123 0.186 0.164 0.165 0.194 0.179
White-Collar Level 3 0.020 0.093 0.114 0.050 0.083 0.093
Unemployment 0.137 0.076 0.147 0.083 0.078 0.146
Table A-10: Auxiliary Model: Occupation Change by Occupation and Age
Data Model
Blue-Collar
Age 18-30 0.029 0.026
Age 31-45 0.028 0.023
Age 46-60 0.023 0.017
White-Collar
Age 18-30 0.062 0.047
Age 31-45 0.034 0.040
Age 46-60 0.035 0.031
Table A-11: Auxiliary Model: Other Moments
Data Model
S.D. Ind. Wages 0.147 0.157
Mean Wage Before Unemp 7.327 7.406
Mean Wage After Unemp 7.236 7.265
Unemployment Make-up by Age:
Age 18 0.561 0.562
Age 19 0.382 0.308
Age 20 0.248 0.188
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